

1580s TRANSFER ATTEMPTS OF THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH'S SEAT TO THE RUTHENIAN LANDS OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH (RZECZPOSPOLITA)

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Abstract: *The article focuses on the historical issue surrounding the 1580s plans to transfer the Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremiah II Tranos' seat to the Rus regions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Due to the changes in the structure of the Constantinople Patriarchate and the fact that the Rus lands were becoming increasingly dependent on the Moscow, Lithuanian and Polish principalities, such a plan allowed for a new context of relations between the Kyiv Metropolitanate and the Constantinople Patriarchate. The unification of the Eastern and Western Churches in the 15th century enabled popes to actively participate in the Kyiv Church's life. At the end of the 16th century, the functioning of church institutions varied throughout the Christian world. The Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches were planning a missionary invasion of the East, while the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Kyiv Metropolitanate were becoming increasingly consumed by the institutional crises. The shared aspirations of the Greek Orthodox and Kyiv Churches in the revival of Byzantine Church ecclesiastical, cultural, and political traditions strengthened the institutional ties between the Kyiv Metropolitanate and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. They were defined at the end of the 16th century by the calendar reform and the prospect of establishing a patriarchate in the East Slavic lands, namely in the settlement of the Orthodox Prince Kostiantyn Vasyl Ostrozkyi. The claims of the Ruthenian-Ukrainians to a patriarchate in the Rus lands boosted the formation of the Moscow Patriarchate (1589).*

Keywords: *Constantinople Patriarchate, Kyiv Metropolitanate, Moscow, the seat, East Slavic lands.*

Rezumat: *Tentativele de strămutare a scaunului patriarhului ecumenic în ținuturile rutene ale Uniunii polono-lituaniene (Rzeczpospolita), în anii 1580.* Articolul se concentrează asupra problemei istorice legate de planurile anilor 1580 de a transfera scaunul Patriarhului Ecumenic Ieremia al II-lea Tranos în regiunile ucrainene din Uniunea Polono-Lituaniană. Din cauza modificărilor în structura Patriarhiei Constantinopolului și a faptului că ținuturile rutene deveneau tot mai dependente de principatele Moscovei, Lituaniei și Poloniei, un astfel de plan a conturat un nou context al relațiilor între Mitropolia Kievului și Patriarhia Constantinopolului. Unirea Bisericilor Răsăriteană și Occidentală în secolul al XV-lea a permis papilor să participe activ la viața Bisericii de la Kiev. La sfârșitul secolului al XVI-lea, modul de funcționare a instituțiilor bisericești a variat în întreaga lume creștină. În timp ce bisericile romano-catolică și protestantă plănuiau o invazie misionară în Orient, Patriarhia Constantinopolului și Mitropolia Kievului erau din ce în ce mai consumate de crizele instituționale. Aspirațiile comune ale Bisericii Ortodoxe Grecești și cele a Kievului de renaștere a tradițiilor bisericești, culturale și politice ale Bisericii Bizantine au întărit legăturile instituționale între Mitropolia de la Kiev și Patriarhia Constantinopolului. La sfârșitul secolului al XVI-lea, acestea au fost influențate de reforma calendaristică și de perspectiva înființării unei patriarhii în ținuturile slavilor răsăriteni, și anume în reședința prințului ortodox Konstantin-Vasyl Ostrozkyi. Pretențiile rutenilor-ucrainenilor asupra unei patriarhii în ținuturile rutene au impulsat formarea Patriarhiei Moscovei (1589).

INTRODUCTION

Religious issues have affected not just the life of the Church throughout history. Political problems have often determined the destiny of various religious communities, and the church has been the decisive factor in specific social processes or political changes. The Orthodox Christian Church of Byzantium faced several threats from both the East and the West. For these reasons, its hierarchies sought measures to protect or save the church. The attempts of the Patriarch of Constantinople to relocate the centre of the church to the region dominated by the Slavic Orthodox represent a fascinating historical moment. Besides the Papacy and Patriarch Jeremiah II Tranos' of Constantinople, a quartet of notable political and religious figures repeatedly supported these attempts, including the Polish king Stephen Báthory (1576-1586), the Grand Crown chancellor and Great Crown hetman Jan Sariusz Zamoyski (1578-1605), the Archbishop Dionysius Rally-Palaeologus of Cyzikus (? – 1620), and, last but not least, the highly influential Kostiantyn Vasyl Ostrozkyi (1526-1608), the founder of the so-called Ostroh Academy (ca. 1576). The Ukrainian Orthodox Church canonised this nobleman on July 12, 2008, for his religious accomplishments.

HISTORIOGRAPHY OVERVIEW

The Ukrainian historiography of this topic is associated with the names of Mykhailo Hrushevskiy¹, Mykhailo Vozniak², Orest Levitskyi³, Volodymyr Antonovych⁴, Ivan Krypiakevych⁵, Ivan Nechuy-Levytskyi⁶, Bohdan Buchynskiy⁷, Volodymyr Favorskyi⁸, Ivan Vlasovskiy⁹, Mykhailo Harasevych¹⁰, Ivan Ohienko¹¹,

¹ Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury v 5-ty tomakh* [History of Ukrainian Literature, in 5 Volumes], Kyiv, Lviv, Nakladom tovarystva imeni Tarasa Shevchenka, t. 5, 1923, t. 6, 1995; Ibid, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy: v 10-ty tomakh* [History of Ukraine-Russia: in 10 Volumes], Kyiv, Lviv, Nakladom avtora, t. 5, 1905, t. 6, 1907.

² Mykhailo Vozniak, *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury* [History of Ukrainian Literature], Lviv, Nakladom tovarystva „Prosvita”, t. 1, 1920, t. 2; 1921, t. 3, 1924; Ibid, *Shkola Uspenskoho bratstva u Lvovi* [Assumption Brotherhood School in Lviv], Lviv, 1936.

³ Orest Levitskiy, *Yuzhno-russkie arhierey XVI i XVII v.* [South Russian Bishops of the 16th and 17th Centuries], “Kievskaya starina”, 1882, №1, s. 49–100; Ibid, *Vnutrennee sostoyanie Zapadno-Russkoy tserkvi v Polsko-Litovskom gosudarstve v kontse XVI v. i Uniya* [The Internal Situation of the Western Russian Church in the Polish-Lithuanian State at the End of the 16th Century], Kiev, Tip. G. T. Korchak-Novitskogo, 1884.

⁴ Volodymyr Antonovych, *Narys stanovyshcha pravoslavnoi tserkvy na Ukraini vid polovyny XVII do kintsia XVIII st.* [An Outline of the Position of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine from the Middle of the 17th to the End of the 18th Centuries], in *Russkaya istoricheskaya biblioteka*, 1908, t. 8, c. 81–154.

⁵ Ivan Krypiakevych, *Z diialnosti Possevina* [From the Activities of Possevin], in *Zapysky naukovoho tovarystva imeni Shevchenka*, 1912, kn.VI, s. 5–28.

⁶ Ivan Nechui-Levytskyi, *Uniia i Petro Mohyla, Kyivskiy mytropolit* [Union and Petro Mohyla, Metropolitan of Kyiv], Cherkasy, Siiach, 1918.

⁷ Bohdan Buchynskiy, *Studii z istorii tserkovnoi unii. Misailiv lyst* [Studies in the History of Church Union. Missail's Letter], in *Zapysky naukovoho tovarystva imeni Shevchenka*, 1909, kn., s. 5–24; Ibid, *Studii z istorii tserkovnoi unii. II Mytropolyt Hryhorii* [Studies in the History of Church Union. II Metropolitan Gregory], in *Zapysky naukovoho tovarystva imeni Shevchenka*, 1909, kn. 2, s. 5–22.

⁸ Volodymyr Favorskyi, *Tserkva ta natsionalnyi rukh na Ukraini* [Church and National Movement in Ukraine], Kyiv-Kharkiv, Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1929.

⁹ Ivan Vlasovskiy, *Narys istorii Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy: v 4-kh tomakh* [Essay on the History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church: in 4 volumes], Kyiv, Ukrainska Pravoslavna Tserkva Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu, 1998.

¹⁰ Mykhailo Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, Lviv, 1862.

¹¹ Ivan Ohienko, *Kniaz Kostiantyn Ostrozkyi i yoho kulturna pratsia. Istorychna monohrafiia* [Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozkyi and his Cultural Activity. Historical Monograph], Vinnipeh, 1958; Idem, *Ukrainska tserkva: Narysy z istorii Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi*

Arkadii Zhukovskiy¹², Ihor Skochylias¹³, Borys Gudziak¹⁴, Leonid Tymoshenko¹⁵,

Tserkvy [Ukrainian Church: Essays on the History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church], Kyiv, Ukraina, t. 1–2, 1993.

¹² Arkadii Zhukovskiy, *Petro Mohyla i pytannia yednosti tserkov* [Petro Mohyla and the Issue of Unity of Churches], Kyiv, Mystetstvo, 1997; Idem, *Ideia tserkovnoi yednosti u tvorchosti Petra Mohyly (1597–1647)* [The Idea of Church Unity in the Works of Peter Mohyla (1597–1647)], in “Tserkva i zhyttia”, 1990, vyp. 2, s. 23–28; Idem, *Sproby yednosti Tserkov u XVII st. (Pravoslavna perspektyva)* [Attempts to Unite the Churches in the 17th Century. (Orthodox perspective)], in Volodymyr Yaniv (Ed.), *Yuvileyny zbirnyk prats' naukovoho konhresu u 1000-littya khreshchennya Rusy-Ukrayiny*, München, 1988–1989, s. 208–235.

¹³ Ihor Skochylias (Ed.), *Sobory Lvivskoi yeparkhii XVI–XVIII stolit* [Councils of the Lviv Diocese of the 17th – 18th Centuries], Lviv, Vydavnytstvo UKU, 2006; Andrzej Gil, Ihor Skochylias, *Volodymyrsko-beresteiska yeparkhiia XI – XVIII stolit: istorychni narysy* [The Volodymyr-Brest Diocese of the 11th – 18th Centuries: Historical Essays], Lviv, 2013.

¹⁴ Borys Gudziak, *Kryza i reforma: Kyivska mytropoliia, Tsarhorodskiy patriarkhat i geneza Beresteiskoi unii* [Crisis and Reform: the Kyiv Metropolitanate, the Constantinople Patriarchate and the Genesis of the Brest Union], Lviv, Instytut Istorii Tserkvy, Lvivska Bohoslovska Akademiia, 2000.

¹⁵ Leonid Tymoshenko, “*Zhal nam dushy i sumnenia vashei mylosty*” (Kyivskiy mytropolyt Onysyfor Divochka pered vyklykom chasu) [“We are Sorry for the Soul and the Reason of Your Grace.” Kyiv Metropolitan Onysifor the Girl Before the Challenge of Time], in “Drohobyskyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk”, X, 2006, s. 149–165; Idem, *Yezuity i Beresteiska uniia* [Jesuits and the Brest Union], in “Kyivska starovyna”, 2001, №4, s. 43–55; Idem, *Artykuly Beresteiskoi unii 1596 r.* [Articles of the Brest Union of 1596], in “Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal”, 1996, №2, s. 15–34; Idem, *Skilky tserkovnykh bratstv zasnuvaly patriarkhy v XVI – pershii polovyni XVII st.? (Malodoslidzheni aspekty henezy ta masshtabiv stavropihiiskoi formy orhanizatsii myrianskoho rukhu v Kyivskii mytropolii)* [How Many Church Fraternities were Founded by Patriarchs in the 16th – First Half of the 17th Century? (Little-Studied Aspects of the Genesis and Scale of the Stavropegial Form of Organization of the Secular Movement in the Kyiv Metropolitanate)], in “Zapysky NTSh”, T. 264, 2013, s. 234–256; Idem, *Geneza ta ideia Ostrozkoi akademii u svitli istoriohrafii ta novykh hipotez* [Genesis and the Idea of the Ostroh Academy in the Light of Historiography and New Hypotheses], in “Ostrozka davnyina”, T. 3, Ostroh, 2014, s. 148–191; Idem, *Intryhy i konflikty v istorii ukladennia Beresteiskoi unii u svitli dokumentalnykh dzherel ta polemichnoi lateratury* [Intrigues and Conflicts in the History of the Brest Union in the Light of Documentary Sources and Polemical Literature], in “Sotsium. Almanakh sotsialnoi istorii”, XI–XII, Kyiv, 2015, s. 185–209.

Ihor Mytsko¹⁶, Vasil Ulyanovskiy¹⁷, Nataliia Yakovenko¹⁸, Petro Kraliuk¹⁹, Petro Saukh²⁰, Vitalii Shevchenko²¹, Serhii Plokhii²², Oleksandr Sahan²³, Ivan Okhtyrskiy²⁴, and Polish historiography with the names of Kazimierz Chodyncki, Jan Krajcar, Marek Melnik, Tomasz Kempa, and others.²⁵ They have contributed to

¹⁶ Ihor Mytsko, *Ostrozka sloviano-hreko-latynska akademiia (1576 – 1636)* [The Ostroh Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy (1576 – 1636)], Kyiv, Naukova dumka, 1990.

¹⁷ Vasil Ulianovskiy, *Istoriia tserkvy ta relihiinoi dumky v Ukraini: u 3-kh kn.* [History of the Church and Religious Thought in Ukraine: in 3 books], Kyiv, Lybid, 1994.

¹⁸ Nataliia Yakovenko, *Ukrainska shliakhta z kintsia XVI – do seredyny XVII st. (Volyn, Tsentralna Ukraina)* [Ukrainian Gentry from the End of the 16th – until the Middle of the 17th Centuries (Volyn, Central Ukraine)], Kyiv, Naukova dumka, 1993; Eadem, *Paralelnyi svit. Doslidzhennia z istorii uiaavlennia ta idei v Ukraini XVI–XVII st. Naukove vydannia* [Parallel World. Research on the History of Ideas in Ukraine in the 16th – 17th Centuries. Scientific Publication], Kyiv, Krytyka, 2002.

¹⁹ Petro Kraliuk, *Ostrozka Bibiliia yak forpost pravoslavno-slovianskoho svitu* [Ostroh Bible as an Outpost of the Orthodox-Slavic World], in “Vidomosti Mytropolii UAPT u diaspori i Yeparkhii u Velykii Brytanii”, LV, 2004, ch.1, s. 34–37; Idem, *Osoblyvosti vyjavu natsionalnoi svidomosti ukraintsiv v ukrainskii suspilno-politychnii dumtsi XVI – pershii polovyni XVII st* [Features of the Manifestation of the National Consciousness of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian Socio-Political Thought of the 16th – First Half of the 17th Centuries], Lutsk, Nadstyria, 1996.

²⁰ Petro Saukh, *Kniaz Vasyl-Kostiantyn Ostrozkyi* [Prince Vasyl Kostiantyn Ostrozkyi], Rivne, Volynski oberehy, 2002.

²¹ Vitalii Shevchenko, *Pravoslavno-katolytska polemika ta problemy uniinosti v zhytti Rusy-Ukrainy doberesteiskoho periodu* [Orthodox-Catholic Polemics and Problems of Unity in the Life of Russia-Ukraine in the pre-Brest Period], Kyiv, Pressa Ukrainy, 2002.

²² Serhii Plokhii, *Papstvo i Ukraina. Politika Rimskoy kurii na ukrainskiih zemlyah v XVI – XVII vv.* [The Papacy and Ukraine. The Politics of the Roman Curia on the Ukrainian Lands in the 16th – 17th Centuries], Kyiv, Vyshcha shkola, 1989.

²³ Oleksandr Sahan, *Vselske pravoslavia: sut, istoriia, suchasnyi stan* [Universal Orthodoxy: Essence, History, Current State], Kyiv, Svit Znan, 2004.

²⁴ Ivan Okhtyrskiy, *Pid znamenniam beresteiskoi podii (dukh Beresteiskoi Unii 1595–96): istorychne nasvitlennia ta bohoslovske mirkuvannia z nahody yuvileiu 400-littia Beresteiskoi Unii* [Under the Sign of the Brest Event (Spirit of the Brest Union 1595–96): Historical Coverage and Theological Considerations on the Occasion of the 400th Anniversary of the Brest Union], Vydavnytstvo oo. Salezian, 1993.

²⁵ Kazimierz Chodyncki, *Kościół prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska. Zarys historyczny 1370–1632* [The Orthodox Church and the Republic of Poland. Historical Outline 1370–1632], Warszawa, Drukarnia Kasy im. Mianowskiego, 1934; Jan Krajcar, *Konstantin Basil Ostrožskij and Rome in 1582 – 1584*, *Orientalia Christiana Periodika*, Vol. 35, 1969, s. 193–214; Marek Melnyk, *Zagadnienia soteriologiczne widziane w świetle projektu Unii Konstantego Ostrožskiego* [Soteriological Issues Seen in the Light of Kostiantyn

the historical research development by focusing on the history of religion and the Church in Ukraine during the 16th and 17th centuries. Historians studied the Metropolitanate of Kyiv's various challenges and institutional connections with Western Christian denominations and the Mother Church in Constantinople.

The corpus of documents issued by Athanasius G. Welykyj in Rome and Ukraine is relevant to the study of the topic.²⁶ Athanasius G. Welykyj's multi-volume edition *From the Annals of Christian Ukraine*²⁷ was republished in Ukraine. Athanasius G. Welykyj is a recognised authority in the field of knowledge of the history of the Church.

Isidorus I. Patrylo²⁸, Pacivo Lozovei²⁹ and Sophia Senyk³⁰ provided information about the Kyiv Metropolitanate from the 14th to the end of the 16th centuries. Ihor Ševčenko³¹ and Georg P. Majeska³² offered a comprehensive outline of Russia

Ostrozkyi's Union Project], in Stanisław Stępień (Ed.), *Polska – Ukraina 1000 lat sąsiedstwa*, Przemyśl, T. 4, 1998, s. 97–142; Tomasz Kempa, *Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski (ok. 1524/1525–1608): Wojewoda Kijowski i Marszałek Ziemi Wołyńskiej* [Kostiantyn Vasyl Ostrozkyi (c. 1524 / 1525–1608): Voivode of Kiev and Marshal of the Volyn District], Toruń, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 1997; Idem, *Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski wobec katolicyzmu i wyznań protestantskich* [Kostiantyn Vasyl Ostrozkyi Towards Catholicism and Protestant Denominations], in "Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce", 1996, No. 40, s. 17–36; Andrzej Gil (Ed.), *Studia z dziejów i tradycji metropolii kijowskiej XII-XIX wieku* [Studies in the History and Traditions of the Kiev Metropolitanate of the 12th - 19th Centuries], Lublin, Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2009.

²⁶ Athanasius G. Welykyj (Ed.), *Acta S. C. de Propaganda Fide Ecclesiam Catholicam Ucrainae et Bielarusjae spectantia*, Vol. 1-5, Romae, 1953-1955; Idem, *Documenta Unionis Berestensis eiusque auctorum (1590 – 1600)*, Romae, PP. Basiliani, 1970; Idem, *Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantia (1075–1953)*. Vol. 1-2, Vol. I, 1075–1700, Romae, PP. Basiliani, 1953.

²⁷ Atanasiy Velykyj, *Z litopysu khrystyians'koyi Ukrayiny. Tserkovno-istorychni radiolektsiyi z Vatykanu* [From the Annals of Christian Ukraine. Church-Historical Radio Lectures from the Vatican], Vol. 1–9, Rome, PP. Basiliani, 1968-1977.

²⁸ Isidorus I. Patrylo, *Archiepiscopi-metropolitani Kievo-Halicienses (Attentis Praescriptis m. p. "Cleri sanctitati")*, Romae, PP. Basiliani, 1962.

²⁹ Pacivo Lozovei, *De Metropolitaram Kioviensium potestate (988 – 1596)*, Romae, PP. Basiliani, 1962.

³⁰ Sophia Senyk, *A History of the Church in Ukraine*, Vol. 1, *To the End of the Thirteenth Century (Orientalia Christiana Analecta)*, Rome, Pontifical Oriental Institute, 1993.

³¹ Ihor Ševčenko, *Ukraine Between East and West. Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century*, Edmonton, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996.

³² Georg P. Majeska, *Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth*

and Byzantium's relations, while Dorothea Wendebourg³³ published one of the few biographies of Patriarch Jeremiah II. Otto Kresten³⁴ provided information about the relations between the Kyiv Metropolitanate and Patriarch Jeremiah II. At the same time, the calendar issue and misunderstanding between the Western and Eastern Churches were discussed at the 1982 Conference.³⁵

RESEARCH CONTEXT

The Orthodox religious culture centred on the history of Byzantium predominated in the Ruthenian territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 16th century. Despite centuries of complex and multifaceted relations with Constantinople, Ruthenian clergy recognised the universal hierarchy as "patriarch and father". The decline of the Byzantine Empire and changes in the structure of the Constantinople Patriarchate, on the one hand, and the fact that the Ruthenian lands became more dependent on the Principalities of Moscow, Lithuania, and Poland, on the other hand, created a new context of relations between the Metropolitanate of Kyiv and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The union between the Eastern and Western Churches (1439) and its long echo in the Metropolitanate of Kyiv created the conditions for Roman Popes to participate directly in the life of the Kyiv Church.

At the end of the 16th century, the Christian world witnessed various church institution situations. The Western world, aided by reform movements, strengthened the leading denominations: the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches were preparing for a missionary invasion of the East. At the same time, institutional crises increasingly consumed the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Metropolitanate of Kyiv. The Greek Orthodox and Kyiv Churches were ready to revive and preserve the Byzantine Church's religious, cultural, and political heritage.

Patriarch Jeremias II Tranos initiated the reform of the Greek Orthodox Church after he acceded to the patriarchal throne in May 1572. His pastoral work

Centuries, Washington D. C., Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1984.

³³ Dorothea Wendebourg, *Reformation und Orthodoxie. Der ökumenische Briefwechsel zwischen der Leitung der Württembergischen Kirche und Patriarch Jeremias II von Konstantinopel, in den Jahren 1573 – 1581*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986.

³⁴ Otto Kresten (Ed.), *Das Patriarchat von Konstantinopel im ausgehenden 16. Jahrhundert. Der Bericht des Leontios Eustratios im Cod. Tyb. Mb 10.*, Wien – Köln – Graz, Böhlau, 1970.

³⁵ George V. Coyne, Michael A. Hoskin, Olaf Pedersen (Eds.), *Gregorian Reform of the Calendar. Proceedings of the Vatican Conference to Commemorate its 400th Anniversary 1582 – 1982*, Città del Vaticano, Pontifica Academia Scientiarum, 1983.

was noticed in the Eastern Christian world, where a new ethos of the Eastern Church was expected, as well as in Western-Protestant and Catholic circles. Involved in European interdenominational controversy, Jeremias consistently yet tolerantly supported Orthodox normative principles. However, the Orthodox Catholic position on adopting a new church calendar took an unexpected turn and this unprecedented communication time amongst Christian hierarchs ended.

At this time, in the early 1580s, the institutional relations between the Metropolitanate of Kyiv and the Patriarchate of Constantinople were strengthened. They were determined by the calendar reform and the prospect of establishing a patriarchate in the East Slavic lands.

TRANSFER OF THE PATRIARCH'S SEAT AS A WAY OUT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OF THE PATRIARCHATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE

The Orthodox Church's institutional crisis, triggered by the fall of Constantinople under the pressure of the Ottoman Empire, influenced the way of life of the Orthodox world at the end of the 16th century.³⁶ The patriarchal throne holders succeeded each other due to struggles and intrigues. This was the case with Patriarch Metrophanes III, who held the patriarchal throne twice, from 1565 to 1572 and 1579 to 1580, and only his death in 1580 cleared him from further conspiracies against his successor Jeremias II Trans, the most famous Orthodox Church leader in the 16th century. Jeremias served as Patriarch of Constantinople three times, from 1572 to 1579, 1580 to 1584, and 1587 to 1595. The High Porte had no concerns about cultivating and fostering conspiracies surrounding Jeremias since he was thought to be pursuing anti-Ottoman policies in connection with Pope Gregory XIII. The Patriarchate of Constantinople had a particularly severe institutional and financial crisis in the 1580s, during which time it increasingly believed in the Tsardom of Muscovy.

Greek emissaries were present in the 16th century in the territories of Wallachia, Moldavia, Ruthenia, and the Tsardom of Muscovy. Many people ended up leaving the Muslim rule they were under, but the majority went to Moscow to collect donations for Orthodox church institutions.

Greek clergy, therefore, arrived in the Ruthenian lands of the Polish-

³⁶ P. M. Kralyuk, R. Torkonyak, I. D. Pasichnyk, *Ostroz'ka Bibliya v konteksti ukraïns'koyi ta yevropeys'kykh kul'tur* [Ostroh Bible in the Context of Ukrainian and European Cultures], Ostroh, Ostroz'ka Akademiya, 2006, s. 25.

Lithuanian Commonwealth on their way to Moscow. However, they often stayed longer and integrated into the local Orthodox community, learning about its church and religious life. This was the case with a learned theologian in 1518, the time of reviving Roman-Moscow church relations, a monk from the Vatopedi Monastery named Maxim, who was known as the Greek in Muscovy. He was invited to the Tsardom of Muscovy for several years of godly work, but it seemed that he stayed there for his entire 38-year life, 26 of which he spent in prison.³⁷ Travels to the Tsardom of Muscovy, the risks involved, and the humiliation suffered by Greek beggars testify to the Orthodox Church's hopelessness and sorrow. The Orthodox Greeks explained the reasons for their plight directly to the Ottoman rule, but "their petitions show that the various factions into which the Greek Orthodox were divided often disagreed with each other or allowed the Turks to manipulate them, only complicating institutional and financial problems."³⁸ The Greeks' situation was complicated because their travels inevitably had a political and diplomatic purpose. The Greeks transmitted information to the rulers on both sides: Moscow and Turkey. Muscovites were always distrustful of foreigners and treated newcomers coldly and sparsely. The Greeks' requests got increasingly dramatic. And they were continually informing potential donors about the poverty of their Church.³⁹ The Patriarchate of Constantinople declined under the Ottomans long before the disclosure of the unhealthy state of the Ruthenian Orthodox Church. The intrigues of 1584 plunged the Patriarchate into a long-term financial and institutional crisis.

From his first accession to the patriarchal throne in 1572, Patriarch Jeremias Tranos, rightly called the Great, set out to correct the decline of Ecumenical Orthodoxy. He led the struggle against simony and extortion at all levels of the church, even the lowest, prohibited collecting confession and communion fees and punished those who were excommunicated. Jeremias administered church affairs with special care. The trip to the accessible territory of Greece and the Peloponnese was aimed at getting acquainted with the state of affairs in church life. The unsatisfactory condition of the Church forced the Patriarch to send envoys to the Tsardom of Muscovy to help the "Mother Church."

Many problems of the Patriarchate were explained by the Greek church people's low cultural and intellectual level. The Patriarch Jeremias could not help

³⁷ Vitalii Shevchenko, *Pravoslavno-katolytska polemika* [Orthodox-Catholic Polemics], s. 194–195.

³⁸ Borys Gudziak, *Kryza i reforma* [Crisis and Reform], s. 124.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, s. 126.

but realise that "there was an urgent need to raise the education and take the Orthodox clergy to a higher level."⁴⁰ Although historians accept that Jeremias' plans included educational reforms, they do not consider them well thought out, systematic, and wise. In the 16th century, the system of education and training of priests in Greece did not undergo visible changes. Additionally, this circumstance will later push the Ruthenian hierarchy away from the reform initiatives of Jeremias in the Metropolitanate of Kyiv.

The association of Jeremias with Western Christian denominations was particularly notable for his first two terms on the patriarchal throne. The response to the interdenominational controversy came from the Orthodox Patriarchate, on the one hand, and from the German Lutherans, on the other hand. The latter used the levers to establish contacts with the Greek Orthodox Church through envoys in Constantinople, correspondence, translation of the Augsburg Confession into Greek, calls for controversy, etc. Of course, they never agreed upon the doctrines. Roman Catholic polemicists appreciated Jeremias for the way he defended traditional church structures while exercising restraint and showing respect for his opponents. Therefore, when Pope Gregory XIII signed the bull on February 24 1582, which changed the chronology, Jeremias was expected to approve this decision in Catholic circles. On May 28 and June 10, at an audience with Jeremias, the Patriarch did not reject the proposal to the envoy of the Roman Curia, Livio Cellini, but pointed out the inconsistency of the Gregorian calendar with the canons of the Council of Nicaea (325). Negotiations with Cellini convinced Jeremias that Pope would decide on an agreement between the parties. That is why, when he learned about the Pope's decision in late June-early July 1582 to introduce a new calendar in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its Ruthenian-Belarusian lands,⁴¹ while he continued negotiations with Cellini, Jeremias changed his attitude toward the introduction of a new calendar. He sent letters to the head of the Kyiv Church, Metropolitan Onesiphorus (Divochka)⁴², to

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, s. 48.

⁴¹ Serhii Plokhii, *Papstvo i Ukraina* [Papacy and Ukraine], s. 39.

⁴² The figure of Metropolitan Onesiphorus (Divochka) (1579 – 1589) was not given much attention, perhaps because there were various rumours about him as about a dishonest priest. Myths about the metropolitan were dispelled by Mykhailo Hrushevsky: "he was an energetic fighter for internal order in the church" (Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, *Do biohrafiï mytropolyta Onysyfora Divochky* [To the Biography of Metropolitan Onesiphorus the Maiden], in *Zoshyty naukovoho tovarystva Shevchenka*, Lviv, 1906, t. LXXIV, kn.VI, Mittheilungen, s. 5–9; Leonid Tymoshenko, "Zhal nam dushy i sumnenia vashei mylosty" (Kyivskiy mytropolyt Onysyfor Divochka pered vyklykom chasu) ["We

the burghers of Vilnius and Prince Kostiantyn Vasyl Ostrozkyi, stating that he opposed the calendar reform and called on all Orthodox to follow the old Julian calendar to calculate Easter. Having learned from the Prince of Ostroh about the great discontent among the Ruthenian people, the Patriarch sent Protosyncellus Nikephoros, Archimandrite Dionysius, and a Ruthenian student Theodore, who was supposed to be the translator, to the Ruthenian lands to carefully study the situation and strengthen the faith of the Ruthenian people. The Patriarch promised to send a second mission to the Ruthenian lands for educational purposes. Although the letters and the Patriarch's envoys did not solve the problems caused by the "Latin stellar observers,"⁴³ they initiated the attentive attitude of the Patriarchate of Constantinople towards Ruthenian religious life. Thus, the 1580s in the Ruthenian lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began with "great confusion" amongst Ruthenian "people of quality and clergy" due to the introduction of the calendar reform by Pope Gregory XIII in 1582.⁴⁴ However, another outcome of this event was the closer relationship between the Metropolitanate of Kyiv and the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which helped improve the Ruthenian people's religious and ecclesiastical life.

Patriarch Jeremias II acted as an experienced diplomat and authoritative hierarch during the second term on the patriarchal throne in 1580-1584; therefore, his removal in 1584 and exile to the island of Rhodes worried both Roman authorities and Ruthenian noblemen, especially the Prince of Ostroh.⁴⁵

Prince Kostiantyn Vasyl Ostrozkyi was a crucial figure in the events of the

Feel Sorry for the Souls and Doubts of Your Mercy" (Kyiv Metropolitan Onesiphorus The Girl Before the Challenge of Time], in "Drohobytskyi kraieznavchyyi zbirnyk", X, 2006, s. 149-165; Vasylii Ulianovskyyi, *Istoriia Tserkvy ...*, Vol. 1, s. 73-75).

⁴³ Ivan Malishevskii, *Aleksandriiskii patriarh Meletii Pigas i ego uchastie v delah Russkoi tserkvi* [Patriarch of Alexandria Meletius Pigas and His Participation in the Affairs of the Russian Church], Kiev, V tipografii Kievo-Pecherskoi Lavri, 1872, t. 2, s. 98.

⁴⁴ The charter of the King of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Stefan Batory obliged all subjects to adopt a new calendar. This innovation could affect many spheres of human existence: liturgical, economic and family life (Orthodox often married Catholics or vice versa), so it immediately ran into widespread opposition (Makarii /Bulgakov/, ep. Vinnitskii, *Istoriya russkoi tserkvi* [History of the Russian Church], SPb, Tipografiya R. Golike, 1879, t. IX, s. 427-434). Therefore, the king issued decrees prohibiting the forcible implementation of the reform (*Akty Zapadnoi Rossii* [Acts of Western Russia], t. 3, ss. 280, 315-316), but "the calendar conflict" lasted a long time, which is reflected in the numerous polemical literatures.

⁴⁵ Ivan Ohienko, *Kniaz Kostiantyn Ostrozkyi i yoho kulturna pratsia...*, s. 52.

1580s and 1590s, which preceded the Union of Brest.⁴⁶ He became the representative for the Ruthenian Orthodox community and the bearer of a “strict Orthodox spirit”⁴⁷ because no one else in the Orthodox hierarchy held similar power and authority. For Ostrozkyi, the Church was his ward.⁴⁸ Polish historian Marek Melnyk wrote that Ostrozkyi was the bearer of patristic ideas about the Church as Mother, deeply rooted in the minds of Ruthenians, and his interference in religious affairs was motivated by filial responsibility for its fate. “The emphasis on the “maternal” function of the Church and the shared responsibility for the “Mother Church” was the soteriological background of the joint participation of the laity and the Orthodox hierarchy in the life of the Ruthenian Church,” Marek Melnyk wrote.⁴⁹ The Prince of Ostroh had a special affection and respect for Constantinople. Therefore, the removal of Jeremias from the patriarchal throne by the “worst” intriguer, Pachomius, in 1584 and his exile to the island of Rhodes became an unmeasured disaster for the Christians.

Thus, both parties and Pope Gregory XIII, for his part, conceived a plan to unite the Eastern Slavs, stemming from the permanent difficulties of the Patriarchate and the commitment of Jeremias to the Roman throne, at least until 1582 (Eastern Slavs in the 1570s and 1580s also increasingly considered the status of the Patriarchate of Constantinople). The Prince of Ostroh, for his part, considered the possibility of taking Jeremias to either Muscovy or Ruthenia to his lands.⁵⁰

People authorised by the Roman Emperor and Pope arrived in the Tsardom of Muscovy in 1576. The letter to Ivan the Terrible emphasised the great piety of the Muscovites and expressed confidence in the possibility of persuading the Muscovites to “reject the differences between Greek and Roman law,”⁵¹ paving the way for a union with the Catholic Church.

That same year, another legation led by Rudolph Klenke arrived in the land of Moscow. Klenke had a letter of recommendation from Pope Gregory XIII. His Holiness intended to convince the Russian tsar to unite with the Apostolic See “so that such a significant and wonderful part of the Christian body, so to say, united with the other members into a unified being, would act together in agreement

⁴⁶ Mykola Shkribliak, Oleksii Balukh, *European Reformation and Distinguishing Features of the Institutional Design of the Early Protestant Currents in the Ukrainian Lands*, in “Codrul Cosminului”, XXIII, 2017, No. 1, p. 134-135.

⁴⁷ Leonid Tymoshenko, *Geneza ta ideia Ostrozkoï akademii ...*, s. 150.

⁴⁸ Jan Krajcar, *Konstantin Basil Ostrožskij and Rome in 1582 – 1584*, s. 208–209.

⁴⁹ Marek Melnyk, *Zagadnienia soteriologiczne...*, s. 97.

⁵⁰ Borys Hudziak, *Kryza i reforma...*, s. 180.

⁵¹ Vitalii Shevchenko, *Kilka dokumentalnykh svïdchen...*, s. 68.

with them.”⁵² Pope wrote that one could not rely on the Patriarch of Constantinople because he was entirely dependent on the Sultan, and “therefore it would be much more proper if His Majesty allies with the Roman Church...”⁵³

Hopes for the possible compliance of Muscovites were growing during the mission of Istoma Shevrigin in Rome on August 25 1580. At that time, the Polish king Stephen Bathory was besieging the city of Pskov. The Russian tsar and the Boyar Duma decided to request Pope to facilitate a reconciliation between the Tsardom of Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.⁵⁴ Shevrigin, “a young lad”, who was from a lowly family, because everyone was wary of sending a decent boyar’s son,⁵⁵ was the one to hand over the charters with this request. Pope Gregory XIII saw the request as a chance to convince Muscovy’s Tsardom to join Rome.

Among the people who were not overjoyed by the tsar’s intentions to ally with Rome was the Polish king Stephen Báthory. He called Ivan the Terrible “an executioner who is not inclined to accept the Catholic faith”⁵⁶ – and he was right, for the Tsardom of Muscovy remained hostile to Western sciences even in the 1510s, while the reformation movement was gaining momentum in Europe.⁵⁷ Antonio Possevino, papal diplomat, helped end the Polish-Russian war, but the religious part of the apostolic legate’s programme failed. To Possevino’s arguments, Ivan the Terrible responded that “our faith will not converge with yours, the Christian faith has been by itself for a long time, and the Roman church has been by itself... There is no religion we want besides our faith, our true Christian faith, and we do not need any teaching beyond our true Christian faith.”⁵⁸ The tsar also rejected Possevino’s last argument - the decision of the Council of

⁵² *Perepiska pap s rossiiskimi gosudaryami v XVI veke, naidennaya mezhdru rukopisyami, v Rimskoi barberinevskoi biblioteke. Izdana s perevodom aktov s latinskogo na russkii yazik* [Correspondence of Popes with Russian Sovereigns in the 16th Century, Found Between Manuscripts, in the Roman Barberine Library. Published with the Translation of Acts from Latin into Russian], Sankt Peterburg, Akademiya nauk, 1834, s. 39.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, s. 58.

⁵⁴ Vladimir Snegarevskii, *Papskii nuntsii Antonio Possevino i russkii poslanets Istoma Shevrigin* [Papal Nuncio Antonio Possevino and Russian Envoy Istoma Shevrigin], in “Voprosi istorii”, 1967, № 2, s. 213–215.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, s. 213.

⁵⁶ *Akty istoricheskie, otnosyashch'iesya k Rossii, izvlechennye iz inostrannykh arkhivov i bibliotek A. I. Turgenevym* [Historical Acts Relating to Russia, Extracted from Foreign Archives and Libraries by A. I. Turgenev], t. II, Sankt Peterburg, 1842, s. 13.

⁵⁷ Vitalii Shevchenko, *Pravoslavno-katolytska polemika*, s. 189–194.

⁵⁸ *Akty istoricheskie, otnosyashch'iesya k Rossii...*, s. 13.

Florence. However, he described the council and the union as unlawful acts, neglected by both the Greeks and their ancestors. They believe in Christ and the Gospel but not in those Greeks who accepted the alliance.⁵⁹ It was the second time the pinnacle of these aspirations recurred in the 16th century: in 1519, Pope Leo X, with the good intention of bringing the Tsardom of Muscovy to reconciliation with the Roman See, promised a royal crown for the prince of Moscow and the dignity of the Patriarch for the metropolitan, having closed his eyes to the escalation of the Muscovite-Lithuanian conflict and expansionist infringements of the Tsardom.⁶⁰ Now, just as then, the hopes of the Apostolic Capital for the union with Muscovites finally disappeared. Borys Gudziak wrote, "In 1580, on the return journey, which passed through the Ruthenian lands, Possevino's proposals received the recognition from the Orthodox Christians of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth."⁶¹ In the Ruthenian lands, the Italians met with several Ukrainian dukes and some members of the Ukrainian nobility. They said that if Ukrainians had opened their eyes, they would not have hesitated to leave the Orthodox Church and join the Roman Church (the Prince of Ostroh had been in contact with Possevino as early as 1576–1580).⁶² Therefore, the commitment of the Ruthenian secular nobility prompted Possevino to the idea that the union would reach the East starting from Lviv, Lutsk, Vilno, and Polotsk.⁶³ Possevino began active negotiations with the Prince of Ostroh for Church unification. In 1580, measures for union started to be taken at the highest level, and Rome focused attention on the Ruthenian lands. Each time, Possevino's reports strengthened this interest, especially since the papal ambassador permanently lost trust in the Russian tsar. Therefore, when the idea of repositioning the Patriarchate of Constantinople from a hostile environment occurred, Possevino did not even consider Moscow to be the place of its new possible location.⁶⁴ The Patriarchate and the Apostolic Capital's concern focused on the Metropolitanate of Kyiv. It led to the realisation of the Patriarchate's relocation to the Ruthenian lands in this instance.

⁵⁹ Ivan Malishevskii, *Zapadnaya Rus v borbe za veru i narodnost* [Western Russia in the Struggle for Faith and Nationality], Sankt Peterburg, 1897, s. 133.

⁶⁰ Vitalii Shevchenko, *op. cit.*, s. 183.

⁶¹ Borys Gudziak, *op. cit.*, s. 181.

⁶² Leonid Tymoshenko, *op. cit.*, s. 150.

⁶³ Serhii Plokhii, *Papstvo i Ukraina* [Papacy and Ukraine], s. 21–22; Ivan Okhtyrskyi, *Pid znamenniam beresteiskoi podii (dukh Beresteiskoi Unii 1595–96)* [Under the Sign of the Brest Event (Spirit of the Brest Union 1595–96)], s. 28.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

The Prince of Ostroh was interested in the Roman version of relocating the East Slavic Patriarchate. On the one hand, offering to provide it with a location in Ostroh, he showed due respect to Jeremias, and on the other hand, the prince considered the possible prospects for the union. As for this last statement, in the private life of Ostrozkyi, the “guardian and protector”⁶⁵ of the Church, there were numerous facts that directly indicated that in the 1580s, Ostrozkyi did not question the usefulness of the Roman See in the Ruthenia church affairs⁶⁶.

The prince's interest in land explains his religious tolerance, according to Ukrainian historian Nataliia Yakovenko. The marriage strategy was a well-thought-out “family policy” to strengthen the lineage's position in society and power structures by maintaining family connections among “great people”.⁶⁷ As the result of marriage to Suzanne Seredi, a Hungarian noblewoman, the Ostrozkyis acquired land within the territory of the Holy Roman Empire. They got to play a role in the relationship between the emperor and the Polish king.⁶⁸ The goal of the marriage of his son Oleksandr, “the Orthodox Church's hope for the father”, with Anna Kostchanka, who supported Jesuits, was to get land in the Yaroslavl region, which would connect the prince's property in Volyn and Malopolska. Ostrozkyi's support of creating the Orthodox Patriarchate in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in this regard is illustrative. If that happened, the prince hoped to have a significant influence on this Church, especially since Ostroh was an option for the city of the Patriarchate, and Archbishop Dionysius Rally-Palaeologus of Cyzikus, who lived with the prince for more than ten years, was a candidate for the head of the new eparchy.⁶⁹ Rally worked in Ostroh on translating the Bible and was also a passionate supporter of the Florentine union. Therefore, after bringing the Church into an alliance with Rome and the personal interest of a highly respected Greek, Rally was a link in the plans for establishing the Patriarchate in Ostroh. That is why the idea of Patriarchate in the Ruthenian lands should be sought in Ostroh, a significant cultural and ideological centre at the turn of the

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, s. 45.

⁶⁶ Tomasz Kempa, *Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski (ok. 1524/1525–1608) ...*, s. 129; Idem, *Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski wobec katolicyzmu i wyznań protestantskich...*, s. 17–36.

⁶⁷ Nataliia Yakovenko, *Paralelnyi svit* [Parallel World], s. 40; Eadem, *Ukrainska shliakhta* [Ukrainian Nobility], s. 88–96.

⁶⁸ Ihor Mytsko, *Ostrozka sloviano-hreko-rymska akademiia* [Ostroh Slavic-Greco-Roman Academy], s. 65–71.

⁶⁹ Athanasius G. Welykyj (Ed.), *Litterae Nuniiorum Apostolicorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantes 1550– 1850*, vol. I, Romae, PP. Basiliani, 1953, p. 197; Ihor Mytsko, *op. cit.*, s. 23.

16th-17th centuries,⁷⁰ rather than in Rome.

Dionysius Rally convinced the papal nuncio Bolognetti in the summer of 1583 that establishing the Patriarchate in the Ruthenian lands would be the shortest path to reconcile the Metropolitanate of Kyiv with Rome. Bolognetti pointed out the agility of Rally when he again reminded him of the idea via some personal acquaintance, and the nuncio guessed that he had his reasons for advancing it. Nonetheless, he considered Rally's plan to remove the Ruthenian bishops from subordination to the ruling Patriarch of Constantinople worthy of thought. Consequently, referring it to Rome, the nuncio added that, as it seemed to him, Rally himself would not mind taking over the new Patriarchate, but at the same time noted that God's providence often turned human anticipations to an unexpectedly blessed path. Throughout February, rumours regarding the Patriarchate's dissolution emerged in Constantinople.⁷¹

After the exile of Jeremias to Rhodes, Rome transformed Rally's idea of creating the Patriarchate in the realm of Ostrozkyi into a proposal to transfer Jeremias to the Ruthenian lands or the Tsardom of Muscovy.⁷² Among the cities for the new possible location of the Patriarch, along with Ostroh, were Lviv, Slutsk, and Kyiv, from where patriarchal influence could efficiently spread to Moscow. Rome did not publicly announce its plans and did not share them with Ostrozkyi. As Bolognetti explained, Ostrozkyi had to assure the Patriarch that the Ottomans had deprived him of his patriarchal dignity after finding out about him being sympathetic to the union. Thus, it forced Ostrozkyi to support the relocation of the Patriarchate without revealing the general intentions of the Pope.⁷³

There is no evidence whether Jeremias gave a clear answer about the union with Rome. When he returned to the Apostolic See in 1587, the arguments in favour of the Patriarchate had lost their meaning, and Rome no longer took them seriously. Furthermore, Ostrozkyi did not insist on this idea anymore, realising that Jeremias did not accept the Union of Florence, and the prince, traditionally oriented towards Eastern Orthodoxy, relied on the opinion of the Patriarch in this matter. A third party, the Ottomans, not explicitly but indirectly influenced the Pope's decision to bury the project of the East Slavic Patriarchate. Pope, not without reason, was afraid that having found out their intentions, the Ottomans

⁷⁰ Ihor Mytsko, *op. cit.*, s. 3; Petro Kraliuk, *Ostrozka bibliia*, s. 31.

⁷¹ Borys Gudziak, *op. cit.*, s. 181.

⁷² Serhii Plokhii, *Papstvo i Ukraina* [Papacy and Ukraine], s. 45; Kazimierz Chodynicki, *Kościół prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska...*, s. 250.

⁷³ Tomasz Kempa, *Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski (ok. 1524/1525 – 1608)...*, s. 129.

would not release Jeremias since, at that time, they were considering restoring him to the throne.

Part of the Catholic and Orthodox (Hypatius Pociej) circles returned to the idea of establishing the Patriarchate in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the visit of Patriarch Jeremias in 1588–1589. However, it happened without Ostrozkyi's involvement and brought no result. In 1588, when Patriarch Jeremias arrived in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Chancellor Jan Zamoyski, in a conversation with legate Aldobrandini, mentioned the intentions to relocate the Patriarchate, naming Kyiv as the final potential location of the Patriarch. Zamoyski argued that this would facilitate the union. When Jeremias, appointed to be the Patriarch for the third time, passed through the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on his way to Moscow, he met with the chancellor in Lviv. On October 5, Zamoyski recounted the content of the conversation with the Patriarch in a letter to Aldobrandini. In particular, they discussed the relocation of the Patriarchate's capital to Kyiv, the ancient centre of the Metropolitanate of all Rus'. The chancellor also believed that this action could lead to the future unification of the Churches. According to Zamoyski, Patriarch Jeremias did not "avoid" this project.⁷⁴ However, it also remained unimplemented.

CONCLUSIONS

Nonetheless, Jeremias's visit to Moscow ended with the implementation of another project - the establishment of the Moscow Patriarchate. Jeremias arrived in the capital with the patriarchal retinue and stayed until the Muscovites resolved all issues regarding establishing their Patriarchate. According to *Ambassador's Book*, Muscovites requested Jeremias to create the Patriarchate in their lands. The bishop of Constantinople did not immediately support them⁷⁵ because he did not want to agree to the first proposal of Moscow, which was to grant the status of Patriarch to a Muscovite elected by the synod. Jeremias also saw serious canonical obstacles: tradition held that a church authority, the supreme organ of local and ecumenical Councils, shaped church policy in the Christian East. Jeremias could

⁷⁴ *Archiwum Jana Zamojskiego, kanclierza i hetmana wielkiego koronnego* [Archives of Jan Zamoyski, Chancellor and Grand Hetman of the Crown], t. 4 (1585 – 1588), Kraków, Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1948, s. 249–250.

⁷⁵ *Posolskaya kniga po svyazyam Rossii i Gretsii (pravoslavnyimi ierarhami i monastiryami) 1588 – 1594 gg.* [Ambassadorial Book on Relations Between Russia and Greece (Orthodox Hierarchs and Monasteries) 1588 – 1594], Moskva, Misl, 1988, s. 35.

not establish the fifth Patriarchate without the Orthodox Church Council's permission, consisting of three other Eastern patriarchs.⁷⁶

The battle of opinions continued for half a year and ended with Jeremias agreeing to appoint Metropolitan Jonah, Boris Godunov's protege, as the Patriarch of Vladimir, Moscow, and All Rus'.⁷⁷ On February 5 (January 26), 1589, Patriarch of Constantinople Jeremias II Tranos raised Jonah to the dignity of Patriarch of Moscow.⁷⁸ But it was not the end: Boris Godunov tried to convince Patriarch Jeremias II to relocate the Patriarchal Seat to Moscow.⁷⁹ Although they received a generous sum for which they had initially come, the Greeks did not comply with this demand, "even if the price of their superiority was increasing reliance on and service to the Turkish power, or the convergence of the Greek Orthodox Church with Catholicism."⁸⁰

The establishment of the Patriarchate of Moscow should be analysed in the light of Moscow's ambitions to unite the Eastern Slavs under the protectorate of the "heirs of the Rurik dynasty". Having annexed almost all of the lands of the central region, Grand Prince Ivan III began to claim the territory of the former Kyivan Rus'.⁸¹ In 1503-1504, the Prince of Moscow drafted the all-Rus' claims, informing the Grand Duke of Lithuania Alexander, who at that time had become the ruler of Poland, and his brother Vladislav of Hungary, that the Moscow tsars now owned not just the cities and the regions, but the entire Ruthenian land was "otchina" (fatherland) of Moscow rulers. In addition, referring to the continuous dynastic connection between Moscow and ancient Kyiv dukes, the prince did not hide his intentions "to get all of the otchina."⁸² According to the Russian historian Konstantin Kharlampovich, the establishment of the Patriarchate in Moscow must be viewed as a means of the Tsardom of Muscovy's struggle with Poland for the Lithuanian-Ruthenian lands.⁸³ Moscow used the Orthodox tradition of Kyivan Rus'

⁷⁶ Oleksandr Sahan, *Vselenske pravoslavia* [Ecumenical Orthodoxy], s. 199 – 214.

⁷⁷ *Posolskaya kniga po svyazyam Rossii i Gretsii...*, s. 39.

⁷⁸ Aleksandr Shpakov, *Gosudarstvo i Tserkov v ih vzaimnyh otnosheniyah v Moskovskomu gosudarstve* [State and Church in Their Mutual Relations in the Moscow State], Odessa, Tip. Tehnik, 1912, s. 170.

⁷⁹ Oleksandr Sahan, *Vselenske pravoslavia* [Ecumenical Orthodoxy], s. 228.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Ivan Ovsii, *Zovnishnia polityka Ukrainy (vid davnikh chasiv do 1944 roku)* [Foreign Policy of Ukraine (from Ancient Times to 1944)] Kyiv, Lybid, 2002, s. 63

⁸² *Sbornik imperatorskogo Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obsh'estva* [Collection of the Imperial Russian Historical Society], Sankt Peterburg, 1869, t. 35, s. 81–82.

⁸³ Konstantin Harlampovich, *Zapadnorusskie pravoslavnye shkoly XVI i nachala XVII veka*,

to ideologically legitimise its imperialist interests.

The establishment of the Patriarchate of Moscow finally buried any claims of Rusyns-Ukrainians to create a Patriarchate on Ruthenian lands. The Patriarch of Constantinople confirmed the fragility of the Church he represented. The Ruthenian society regarded Moscow's reality with fear, having witnessed its cruelty and darkness since duke Kurbsky. Based on this, the Ukrainian church elite was reluctant to converge with the Patriarchate of Moscow. Because of Jeremias' reformatory actions, the Kyiv church hierarchy was granted a secondary status, which paved the way for a union with Rome.

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MEDIATION AS A DIPLOMATIC TOOL IN OTTOMAN CAPITULATIONS

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Abstract: *Despite the substantial body of literature on capitulations in the Ottoman Empire, hardly any of it explores the role of mediation in the process of concessions becoming a heavy burden for the Ottoman Empire. However, there is an undeniable connection between the advent of mediation in Ottoman diplomacy and the spread of capitulations. As the Ottoman Empire weakened militarily, especially from the end of the 17th century, it was forced to seek peace through the mediation of European states (especially France and England). Subsequently, the Ottomans started to grant new concessions as a token of gratitude to these states for assisting them in signing a treaty with their opponents (especially Austria and Russia). As a result of this situation, mediation, which was a technique used sparingly under international law, was repurposed into a diplomatic tool used to increase European states' capitulations. In this sense, this study aims to establish a link between the emergence of the notion of mediation in Ottoman diplomacy and the increase of capitulations granted to European states. This study sheds more light on how the Ottoman Empire became trapped in a vicious spiral of growing capitulations in exchange for mediations.*

Keywords: *Ottoman Empire, European states, House of Islam, House of War, Diplomacy, Mediation, Capitulations.*

Rezumat: *Medierea ca instrument diplomatic în capitulațiile otomane. În ciuda cantității impresionante de literatură despre „capitulațiile” Imperiului Otoman, foarte puține lucrări explorează rolul medierii în procesul acordării acestora, care devin treptat o povară grea pentru Imperiul Otoman. Există însă o legătură incontestabilă între acceptarea practicii medierii de către diplomația otomană și răspândirea capitulațiilor. Pe măsură ce Imperiul Otoman a slăbit din punct de vedere militar, mai ales începând cu sfârșitul secolului al XVII-lea, acesta a fost nevoit să caute pacea prin medierea acestora de către statele europene. Ulterior, otomanii au început să acorde noi concesii în semn de recunoștință față de*

aceste state (în special Franța și Anglia) care îi ajutaseră să semneze un tratat de pace cu oponenții lor (în special Austria și Rusia). Ca urmare a acestei situații, medierea, care era o tehnică utilizată cu moderație în dreptul internațional, a fost transformată într-un instrument diplomatic folosit de europeni pentru creșterea numărului de capitulații acordate unor state europene. Scopul acestui studiu este de a stabili o legătură între apariția noțiunii de mediere în diplomația otomană și creșterea numărului de capitulații acordate statelor europene. Studiul aruncă mai multă lumină asupra modului în care Imperiul Otoman a fost prins într-o spirală vicioasă, de acordare a tot mai multor capitulații în schimbul medierilor.

INTRODUCTION

This study examines the relationship between the introduction of the concept of mediation to Ottoman diplomacy and the continuous expansion of capitulations granted to European states. While much research has been done about the capitulations in the Ottoman Empire, little has been done about the relationship between capitulations and *mediation*. However, to properly comprehend how capitulations became an inextricable spiral and a heavy burden for the Ottoman Empire, the role of *mediation* in this context should be well established.

When it was at the peak of its political and military power, the Ottoman Empire maintained a one-sided diplomatic relationship with European states, the terms of which it determined. Since the conquest of Istanbul, it had permitted these states to have permanent representation in its capital while only sending ad hoc envoys when it thought it was necessary. As a result, through these foreign resident representatives in its capital, it cultivated political communication with these states, was informed about what was going on in Europe, and made European powers aware of its might and grandeur. It carried out this one-way diplomatic linkage so skilfully that it also affected the balance of power in Europe for centuries. It did not use diplomacy for any purpose other than the security of trade and political *mediation*. The Ottoman pragmatism's discovery of the capitulations as a diplomatic tool played the most crucial role. Through the capitulations it provided to European powers, the Ottoman Empire not only secured the flow and security of foreign trade on its lands but also established Istanbul as a diplomatic centre.

Furthermore, it turned the balance of power in Europe in its favour by bringing some European states to its side through capitulations. Naturally, it did not perceive the capitulations as a threat to itself at a time when it was militarily and politically powerful. However, when the Ottoman Empire weakened militarily and politically and had to make concessions because of one-way diplomacy, capitulations became a system that worked against itself. Thus, over time capitulations

turned into a system in which European states used all kinds of diplomatic means to expand privileges in their favour by exploiting the Ottoman Empire's weaknesses. *Mediation* was the most profitable of these diplomatic means. As the Ottoman Empire weakened militarily, it had to seek the mediation of European states to sign treaties with its enemies whom it could not defeat on the battlefield. The Ottoman Empire gave new privileges as a token of gratitude to these states that mediated the signing of treaties with its enemies. In this context, European states discovered *mediation* as a diplomatic tool to expand capitulations.

Therefore, there is an undeniable linkage between the introduction of mediation in Ottoman diplomacy and the increasing number of capitulations given to European states. This paper attempts to clarify how European states turned mediation into a diplomatic tool to expand capitulations through several Ottoman archival sources and European ambassadors' reports in Istanbul.

Some of the questions to be asked in this paper are: What were the dominant motives for the Ottoman rulers to issue capitulations in practice at first? Why does the literature, which focuses primarily on the Ottoman Empire, generally consider the capitulations a terrible mistake from the Ottoman perspective? How did *mediation* become a tool for increasing European capitulations, and how did the Ottoman Empire allow its interests to be so subverted? First, a literature survey on the historical context of the Ottoman Empire's Capitulatory Regime was conducted. The emergence and development of capitulations must be examined to comprehend the primary motivations of the Ottoman rulers in giving capitulations in the early periods. Second, an explanation of how European powers discovered *mediation* as a means of expanding capitulations in the context of the Karlowitz treaty is presented. Finally, the role of mediation in the Ottoman Empire's concessions becoming an insurmountable problem is addressed.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAPITULATORY REGIME DURING THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Until the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire regulated its commercial and diplomatic relations with European states in general terms through documents called *ahdnâme-i hümayûn*. In general, *ahdnâme-i hümayûn* was an imperial charter by which the Porte regulated its peaceful ties and alliances with foreign states, international trade and the safe conduct of foreigners in the Ottoman domains.¹ In

¹ Mübühâ S. Kütükoğlu, *Ahidnâme* [Ahdname], in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* [TDVİA], Vol. 1. p. 536-540.

essence, the term *ahdnâme* consists of the combination of two words, the Arabic “*ahd*”, meaning oath, compact, covenant and the Persian “*nâme*”, meaning letter.²

In the Ottoman chancery, an *ahdnâme* was a unilateral treaty in which the Sultan granted promise and permission to the ruler of a foreign state. It had to be renewed at the accession to the throne of each Sultan. That meant the privileges previously bestowed had to be restated in each subsequent renewal. Therefore, although the *ahdnâme* sometimes included the terms agreed through mutual consent and occasionally the rights granted, the Ottoman authority did not recognize it as a document signed between equals because the Islamic concept of *aman* served as the foundation for the legal system of the Ottoman Empire’s traditional *ahdnâmes*.³ According to the theoretical notion of the Islamic state, the world was divided into two, the *dar-ül-Islam* (the House of Islam) and *dar-ül-harb* (the House of War), and there could never be sustainable peace between these two worlds, at least not legally. Theoretically, those entering from dar-ul-harb countries outside the Islamic world (Abode of Islam) did not have the security of life and property since they were accepted as *harbis* (war status). Yet, this explanation does not help comprehend the historical development of the Ottoman Empire’s relations with foreign states. In practice, a guarantee must be provided for all forms of travel, lodging, and shopping for the *harbis* to allow political and economic ties between governments to flourish. These assurances were providing all non-Muslim foreigners (*harbis*) in the *dar-ül-Islam* safe conduct in compliance with the legal principle of *aman*. Therefore, *ahdnâme* can be viewed as a particular case of *aman*, the protection granted by the Ottoman Sultans to all non-Muslim foreigners (*harbis*). It can be said that the *ahdnâmes* were the instruments of the Ottoman state law that created legal bases for all non-Muslim foreigners (*harbis*) to stay and trade in the Ottoman domains. The precondition of *aman* for *harbis* was their pledge of friendship and sincere goodwill. The Sultans who bestowed privileges

² Viorel Panaite, *Western Diplomacy, Capitulations and Ottoman Law in the Mediterranean (16th-17th Centuries)*, in Seyfi Kenan (Ed.), *The Ottomans and Europe: Travel, Encounter and Interaction from the Early Classical Period until the End of the 18th Century*. İstanbul, 2010, p. 357.

³ “Contrary to a common supposition, the practice of granting foreigners extraterritorial privileges did not originate with Islam. From 1082 onward, Byzantium provided Venetian merchants preferential treatment in trade, freeing them from tariffs incumbent on natives. The Byzantines allowed Venetians also to maintain courts of their own. Over time similar concessions were made to other nations.” See subchapter *Early Capitulations*, in Timur Kuran, *The Long Divergence. How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East*, Princeton – Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 210.

to the foreigners could revoke them when they sensed that the foreign power had broken the commitment of friendship and goodwill.⁴

Over time, the Europeans called these *ahdnâmes* Capitulations. The root of the word Capitulations derives from the Latin *caput* or *capitulum* (pl. *capitula*), which refers to the articles or chapters. In European terminology, peace treaties were called Capitulations, presumably because they were divided into chapters or paragraphs. Likewise, since the contents of the *ahdnâmes* were organized as chapters or articles, and the Ottoman texts were translated, they were also called *Capitulo* by the Europeans. The Ottomans approved the plural version of this word, Capitulations, over time as a name for special agreements and concessions regulating the permanent presence and trading of non-Muslim foreigners in Ottoman domains.⁵

Foremost, the Ottoman Empire emerged in an area with a concession tradition. Therefore, the Ottoman capitulations were inspired by similar practices in the Seljuk, Mamluk and Byzantine Empires, which gave privileges to foreigners in their realms. According to what is known, the Byzantine Empire provided preferential treatment to Genoese merchants trading in Galata. Likewise, the Seljuks and Mamluks granted capitulations to the European merchants. Thanks to these capitulations, European merchants could easily establish trade connections with the Chinese and Indian markets. Until the 16th century, the primary motivation for early Ottoman capitulations was the same.⁶

However, from the early sixteenth century, as the Ottoman Empire began to emerge as a political, military, and economic superpower, the significance that it attributed to capitulations started to alter, as the Ottomans began to seek diplomatic advantages in addition to commercial benefits through concessions. Since the sixteenth century, the Ottoman rulers saw the Habsburgs as the biggest obstacle to this claim, and they sought stronger possible anti-Habsburg allies in Europe. Throughout this quest, Ottoman pragmatism discovered capitulations as the most effective and convenient diplomatic tool. Indeed, during the 16th and 17th centuries, capitulations provided strategically planned to manoeuvre freedom for Ottoman Sultans to undermine their Western rivals politically and militarily by building and strengthening alliances. In this context, the French King, the devoted

⁴ İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı'da Milletler ve Diplomasi. Seçme Eserleri III* [Nations and Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire. Selection Works III], İstanbul, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, p. 200.

⁵ Viorel Panaite, *op. cit.* p. 23.

⁶ Emrah Şahin, *Ottoman Institutions, Capitulations*, in Andrea L. Stanton (Eds.), *Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Asia, & Africa. An Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, SAGE Publications, 2012, p. 177-179.

antagonist of Habsburg expansionist policies in Europe since the 1530s, became the only European ruler who made both an offensive and a defensive alliance with the Ottoman Sultans. Thus, he was the first ruler to receive the *ahdnâme* from the Ottoman Empire.⁷ Henceforth the continuation of privileges became contingent on alliance relations against common rivals. As he prepared to conquer Cyprus, which was in the hands of Venice, France's commercial rival, the Ottoman Sultan expanded the rights granted to France before. Likewise, the capitulations given to the Protestant states such as England and the Netherlands after the Battle of Lepanto of 1571 resulted from the search for an alliance against the threats of the Holy League (Habsburg Spain, Venice and Papal alliance).⁸ As shown, in certain cases, the Ottoman Sultans issued capitulations to build coalitions.

Thus, the capitulations served the Ottoman Empire not only to establish and develop commercial relations with European states but also to establish and develop diplomatic relations. There were also several clauses in the capitulations governing the operations of these states' ambassadors and consuls in the Ottoman domains. Moreover, the *ahdnâmes* became chief documents of Ottoman diplomacy, symbolizing not only the framework for relations between the Ottoman Empire and the rest of Europe but also the relative position of the diplomatic and commercial representatives of other European states within the Empire.⁹

The substance of the guarantees offered by chief Capitulations to the Western merchants and the diplomats was as follows; they were to have the liberty to travel in all parts of the Ottoman domains. They would be able to carry on trade according to their laws. They were to be free from all duties apart from customs duties. They were to have freedom of worship. They were to enjoy immunity of domicile so their residence would not be searched by an Ottoman official without the presence of a consular or diplomatic official of their state. Their ambassadors and consuls would have extraterritorial jurisdiction over them. Even if they committed an offence, they were to be detained by an Ottoman official only in the presence of a consular or diplomatic official of their country.¹⁰ The capitulations guaranteed that the Ottoman authorities would not confiscate the estates of deceased foreigners because they had the full right to make wills. When they died,

⁷ Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It*, New York, I. B. Tauris, 2004, p. 3.

⁸ Timur Kuran, *op. cit.*, p. 212-215.

⁹ Halil İnalcık, *Doğu Batı Makaleler I* [East West Articles I], Ankara, East West Publications, 2010, p. 267.

¹⁰ James B. Angell, *The Turkish Capitulations*, in "The American Historical Review", Vol. 6, 1901, No. 2, p. 254.

their properties were given to whoever they bequeathed. In case of their death without a will in the Ottoman domains, their consul would take possession of their property and remit it to their heirs.¹¹

Up to the end of the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire gave trade capitulations only to France, Venice and Poland. When France started to act under the influence of its rival Spain in 1573, the trust of the Ottomans in the French was shaken, and in 1575, Murad III was reluctant to recapitulate French concessions. On the other hand, upon the arrival of the letter of Queen Elizabeth I of England in 1579 asking for commercial benefits to be granted to British citizens, some Ottoman leaders emphasized the importance of gaining British friendship against Spain. Despite strong opposition from France, the Ottoman Sultan did not hesitate to issue an *ahdnâme* to England in 1580, based on French capitulations. Consequently, France had to settle for the new situation, but a bitter diplomatic struggle between France and England began in the Porte. This struggle was further exacerbated as privileges were granted to the other European states. So constantly, they sought the *most-favoured-nation status* to ensure extraterritorial rights, to force “foreigner” merchants to trade under their flags, to acquire the lowest possible tariffs and the best commercial terms for their communities and the most autonomy from the Ottoman Empire.¹²

On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire did not perceive the capitulations that it granted proportionally as a threat to itself for a long time. For the Ottoman government, capitulations were considered commercially in terms of its treasury, military needs, and subjects’ access to goods and services, as well as diplomatically in terms of rewarding present and future support against the Habsburgs.

However, in 1683, concessions began to be given in exchange for diplomatic support, and the institution of capitulation acquired a new form. Previously there was a tacit understanding that the Sultans, who bestowed privileges to the foreigners, could revoke these privileges whenever they wished.¹³ However, over time the Ottoman Sultans lost so much bargaining advantage that capitulations had to be renegotiated with each Sultan change. So, capitulations were no longer seen as privileges bestowed to European states by the Ottoman Sultan but as rights acquired by them.¹⁴

¹¹ Maurits H. van den Boogert, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls, and Berathis in the 18th Century*, Leiden, Brill Publication, 2005, p. 160.

¹² Halil İnalcık, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ Feroz Ahmad, *Ottoman Perceptions of the Capitulations 1800-1914*, in “Journal of Islamic Studies”, Vol. 11, 2000, p. 2.

MEDIATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF EXPANDING CAPITULATIONS: THE ROLE OF THE KARLOWITZ TREATY

The Ottoman Empire played a pivotal role in European diplomatic relations from the middle of the 15th century to the end of the 17th century. During this period, most European states also made alliances with the Ottomans to strengthen their positions against their rivals in power struggles. Thus, the Ottomans became involved in European diplomacy (politics) with the partnerships they made and changed the balances between European states in their favour. Since the Ottoman Empire was politically and militarily strong in the aforementioned period, it did not have any difficulties in getting its European counterparts to accept its diplomatic demands. On the contrary, most European countries endeavoured to acquire the right to have a resident representative in the Ottoman capital. However, by the end of the 17th century, when the political and military presence of the Ottoman Empire in Europe began to be threatened and endangered, it had to make concessions from the one-way diplomacy notion that it had been practising for centuries because it was no longer a state directing European diplomacy through alliances. On the contrary, the Ottoman Empire had become a state that needed diplomatic support from European states to get its counterparts to accept its claims.

Since 1683, the Ottoman Empire has relied on the mediation of England, France and the Netherlands to settle disputes with Austria, Russia, Venice and Poland. In line with their interests, these states also responded positively to the Ottoman request for mediation. Thus, they not only ensured that the Capitulations were regularly improved, but they also directed the Ottoman foreign policy by increasing their efficacy in Ottoman diplomacy. In this regard, the 1699 Karlowitz treaty was a turning point because it was the first one in which the Ottoman Empire agreed to accept the mediation of European states. The Ottoman Empire, which suffered severe land losses against the Holy League, gladly welcomed the mediation offers of England and the Netherlands. So much so that the Sultan sent letters of thanks to the Kings of England and the Netherlands for this *mediation*.¹⁵ In the 19th article of the treaty, particular emphasis was placed on the *mediation* of these envoys.¹⁶ This situation meant a significant loss of prestige for Ottoman diplomacy. Until the Karlowitz Treaty, while the *ahdnâmes* (peace treaties) were

¹⁵ See for the copy of letters: Silahdâr Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Silahdâr Tarihi* [Silahdâr Chronicle], Vol. 1-2, Istanbul, Devlet Matbaası, 1928, pp. 652-668.

¹⁶ See for the text of the treaty in Ottoman Archives: BOA. A. DVN. DVE. D. 59/3: pp. 31-34.

unilaterally determined and bestowed as a blessing by the Ottoman Sultans, they now turned into the documents on which the two sides negotiated and agreed together with the mediation of other states.

These mediation offers of England and the Netherlands emerged from these states' efforts to turn the political and military struggles occurring in Europe at that time in their favour, rather than a noble desire to stop the Ottoman Empire from losing any more ground. Britain and the Netherlands wanted their former allies, the Austrian Emperor, to remain strong against their shared rival France by creating peace with the Ottomans on the eastern front because of the conflict of succession in Spain between the King of France and the Austrian Emperor, which grew more intense. On the other hand, it can be said that the real reason underlying these mediation attempts was commercial. This conflict severely harmed the trade of these Levantine states. Therefore, these states wanted to restore their prosperity in the Eastern Mediterranean by securing peace. Another piece of evidence, in this case, was their attempt to seek more profitable economic privileges from the Ottoman Empire after Karlowitz. In other words, while the ambassadors were involved in international diplomacy in Karlowitz with the mediation initiative, they were trying to be engaged in regional diplomacy. They sought to elevate their people's economic and legal status within the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷ These two states persistently made mediation proposals to the Austrian Emperor and the Ottoman Sultan for these reasons.

On the other hand, France encouraged the Ottomans to maintain the state of the war to keep Austria fighting on two fronts. Despite the imminent peace between the Sultan and Kaiser in 1697-98, the resident French ambassador in Istanbul kept placing pressure on the Ottomans to continue their war with the Habsburgs. He did not even hesitate to give verbal assurances that France would continue its campaigns against the Habsburg Monarchy upon the death of the Spanish King.¹⁸ The Ottomans, worn out by the war, which had become increasingly exhausting for them, simply ignored the French approaches and accepted the English and Dutch mediation offer to make peace instead.¹⁹

¹⁷ Maurits H. van den Boogert, *The Spoils of Peace: What the Dutch Got Out of Carlowitz*, in Colin Heywood, Ivan Parvev (Eds.), *The Treaties of Carlowitz (1699). Antecedents, Course and Consequences*, Leiden, Brill Publication, 2020, p. 70.

¹⁸ Rifa'at A Abou-El-Haj, *Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz*, in "Journal of the American Oriental Society", Vol. 87, 1967, No. 4, p. 499.

¹⁹ See for the detailed information about the successful mediation of the British

The Treaty of Karlowitz was not only the first negotiated treaty in which the Ottoman Empire accepted the mediation of foreign states but also became a trigger of significant changes in Ottoman diplomacy. Because of this mediation practice, European states began to intervene in the Porte's established diplomatic manners, emphasizing their superiority. However, up to this era, the Ottomans strictly did not allow the European representatives to emphasize the supremacy of their state or ruler in Istanbul.²⁰ Through this mediation, the importance of the resident representatives of these states in the Porte began to increase in Ottoman diplomacy. These ambassadors started to meet more often and intensely than before with the Ottoman statesmen. They were increasingly influencing the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire through their interests.²¹

On the other hand, the terms of the Karlowitz treaty indicate that European states had gained sufficient authority to force further capitulations on the Ottoman Empire. Thus, a new era commenced in the Ottoman Capitulation system. The *Ahdnâmes*, which were previously granted unilaterally by the Ottoman sultan, would henceforth be reciprocal treaties. This change of mentality was reflected in the diplomatic language used in the texts of the *ahdnâmes*. For example, instead of "bestowed" or "granted", the expressions "affirmed" began to be used.²² At this point, European states would start to see the Capitulations as acquired rights and Ottoman obligations.²³ Therefore, the more the Ottoman Empire was weakened politically and militarily. In need of political support against its enemies, the more these obligations would expand proportionally, and European states would seek

ambassador in Istanbul, Lord Paget, in the Karlowitz negotiations: Colin Heywood, *This Great Work. Lord Paget and the Processes of English Mediating Diplomacy in the Latter Stages of the Sacra Lega War, 1697–1698*, in Colin Heywood, Ivan Parvev [Eds.], *The Treaties of Carlowitz (1699). Antecedents, Course and Consequences*, Leiden, Brill Publication, 2020, p. 40.

²⁰ Even the presence of a separate section titled Kanun-ı Elçiyân (envoys law) in the Ottoman codes was an evidence of this notion. See H. Ahmet Arslantürk (Ed.), *Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa Kanunnâmesi* [Abdurrahman Abdi Pasha Code], İstanbul, Okur Kitaplığı, 2012, p. 36.

²¹ Güneş Işıksel, *II. Selim'den III. Selim'e Osmanlı Diplomasisi: Birkaç Saptama* [Ottoman Diplomacy from Selim II to Selim III: A Few Detection], in Seyfi Kenan (Ed.), *Nizâm-ı Kadîm'den Nizâm-ı Cedîd'e III. Selim ve Dönemi*, İstanbul, ISAM, 2010, p. 315.

²² Halil İnalcık, *op.cit.*, p. 277.

²³ The first example in this context was the fact that, after much effort, Venedik envoy Soranzo was able to include the previous capitulations in Karlowitz's final peace treaty. See Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* [History of Ottoman Empire], Vol. 5, İstanbul, Yeditepe Yayınları, 2011, p. 159.

ways to enhance these vested rights at every opportunity.²⁴

On the other hand, through the Karlowitz treaty, the Ottoman Empire's notion of ally has undergone significant changes. After the Karlowitz, Britain and the Netherlands began to replace France in the Ottoman Empire. In other words, France's primacy was challenged by England, whose power and prestige grew at an alarming rate. The British were by no means the allies of the Ottomans until this date. France was the Ottoman Empire's oldest and closest friend. However, when France came under the influence of Spain, this dominant position of France in the Empire began to fade.²⁵ However, this successful *mediation* in the Karlowitz treaty was a turning point in the relationship between England and the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the Ottoman Sultan's desire to take advantage of Queen Elizabeth's hostility towards Spain as a counterpoise to Philip II in the Mediterranean should be regarded as the main reason for the Ottoman-British rapprochement. The Ottoman Sultan was well aware that he could not expect assistance from the French King in the event of a conflict with Spain. At the same time, it was well known by the Ottoman Sultan that the French industry, ruined by prolonged internal disturbances, could not compete with English products.

Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire required weapons in its wars with Iran. In other words, the Ottomans responded positively to the English approaches because they wanted access to the English silver, tin, gunpowder, and ships.²⁶ In addition to all this, the successful mediation of the English in the Karlowitz treaty secured them the position of the closest ally of the Sultan. From this date on, the French ambassadors in the Porte would engage in a bitter struggle to regain the preferential position that the British had stolen from them.

For instance, the French ambassador was fiercely envious of the British and Dutch ambassadors, who were the first resident representatives to receive sable fur from the Ottoman Sultan upon their return from the Karlowitz negotiations. The recently appointed French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, M. De Ferriol, also requested that the same reward be bestowed to him during his admission to the audience. However, the ministers of the Porte informed that sable fur was bestowed

²⁴ Oral Sander, *Anka'nın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü. Osmanlı Diplomasi Tarihi Üzerine Bir Deneme* [The Rise and Fall of Phoenix. An Essay on the History of Ottoman Diplomacy], Ankara, İmge Kitabevi, 2000, p. 128.

²⁵ Michael Talbot, *British-Ottoman Relations, 1713-1779: Commerce, Diplomacy, and Violence*, in "State Papers Online, Eighteenth Century 1714-1782. Part IV: Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, and Turkey", Cengage Learning (EMEA) Ltd, 2018, p. 5.

²⁶ Arthur Leon Horniker, *Anglo-French Rivalry in the Levant from 1583 to 1612*, in "The Journal of Modern History", XVIII, 1946, No. 4, p. 304.

by the Sultan as a token of appreciation for the *mediation* services of M. Paget and M. Colyer in the Karlowitz negotiations.²⁷ However, the French ambassadors could not accept this situation and, for many years, struggled to wear sable fur.²⁸

On the other hand, throughout the 18th century, the British attempted to consolidate the preferential position they had gained in the Ottoman Empire as a “*mediator of the Karlowitz Treaty*”. England understood that providing the Ottoman Empire with this sort of diplomatic support would help it achieve its political and economic goals, both in Europe and the Mediterranean.

THE AFTERMATH: MEDIATIONS IN THE 18TH CENTURY

After the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) ended the War of the Spanish Succession, England, which managed to take control of the Strait of Gibraltar, also strengthened its position in the Mediterranean. In addition, England desired to draw the Ottoman Empire to its side both in its struggle for Mediterranean domination and in its competition with Russia. The Ottomans’ severe defeat against the Habsburgs in the Battle of Petrovaradin would give the British another opportunity to achieve this goal. In the negotiations of the Passarowitz Treaty (1718), England would once again defend the interests of the Ottoman Empire against the Habsburgs and the Venetians as a mediator with the Netherlands. In the aforementioned negotiations, Jakob Colyer, the Netherlands Ambassador in Istanbul at the time, represented the Netherlands. In contrast, Robert Sutton, the English Ambassador to Porte, represented England in such a way that, despite France’s desire to keep the Ottoman Empire at war with Austria, England ensured that the treaty was signed.²⁹

²⁷ The two mediators of the Karlowitz Peace Treaty, Jakob Colyer and Lord Paget were not only appreciated by ‘the Ottoman sultan, but also by the Kayser. When Lord Paget was recalled from Istanbul, on his way back home from Vienna in 1702, the Kayser not only paid all the travel expenses to Vienna, a right only granted to the Russian and Turkish envoys, but also he expressed his gratitude again during his acceptance to the presence. Like Kayser, Venice also expressed its gratitude to these mediators. See Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

²⁸ M. Charles Schefer (Ed.), *İstanbul’da Fransız Elçiliği. Marki de Bonnac’ın Tarihi Hatırat ve Belgeleri* [French Embassy in Istanbul. Historical Memoirs and Documents of the Marquis de Bonnac], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007, p. 138.

²⁹ Güner Doğan, *İstenmeyen Barış Pasarofça’da Osmanlı-Venedik Diplomatları ve Diplomatik Tavırlar* [Undesirable Peace Passarowitz. Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats and Diplomatic

However, the Ottoman-British relations in the post-Passarowitz period would not continue as the two sides had hoped. Britain wanted to attract the Ottoman Empire to its side in the domination struggle with Russia in the Baltic Sea. For this, Britain would go to considerable lengths to disrupt the Ottoman-Russian relations in the post-Passarowitz period.³⁰ This attitude of England would cause the Ottomans to be suspicious of the British policies. Because of this policy, France would replace England as the mediator in the Ottoman-Russian conflict over Iran in 1724. Through the mediation of Jean Louis d'Usson, Marquis de Bonnac, his ambassador then in Porte, the King of France prevented a potential Ottoman-Russian war by securing an agreement between the two sides as the conflict was about to escalate into a war. Because the French government, in contrast to England, believed that Ottoman-Russian strife would only strengthen Austria, a state that was hostile to both the Ottomans and the French.

On the other hand, France's effort in this *mediation* role was partly due to its policy against Austria and partly due to its concerns about Russia. France campaigned for the Ottoman Empire's strengthening against Russian expansion beginning in the early 18th century. The primary reason for this was that the Ottoman domains were a profitable market for French goods. In other words, France desired to continue its political and commercial interests in the Ottoman territories through the wide-scaled capitulations it obtained.³¹

In addition, France attributed another meaning to this *mediation*. For a long time, France wished to reclaim the favourable position it had lost due to the *mediation* role of England in the Karlowitz and Passarowitz treaties. This situation was clearly detected in the memoirs of the French ambassador Jean Louis d'Usson, Marquis de Bonnac, who was a mediator in the negotiations between the Russians and the Ottomans. During the talks, the ambassador emphasized in his report to the French King that he had the dominance and authority that the British and Dutch ambassadors never attained in their mediation of the Karlowitz and Passarowitz accords. The ambassador said that he was the first of the French diplomats to wear sable fur on this particular occasion. Due to the mediation services provided by the Karlowitz Treaty, the French ambassadors had to fight for over

Attitudes], in Gültekin Yıldız (Ed.), *Harp ve Sulh. 300. Yılında Pasarofça Antlaşması Sempozyum Bildirileri* [Passarowitz Treaty Symposium Proceedings on the 300th Anniversary of War and Peace], İstanbul, Merkez Basım ve Yayınevi, 2019, p. 114.

³⁰ Fatih Yeşil, *Pasarofça Antlaşması ve Osmanlı Diplomasisindeki Değişim* [The Treaty of Passarowitz and the Change in Ottoman Diplomacy], in Gültekin Yıldız (Ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 107.

³¹ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* [Ottoman History], Vol. IV/I, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988, p. 249.

25 years to obtain the sable fur that had been provided to the British and Dutch ambassadors. The French ambassador was confident that the Ottoman Sultan would expand the French concessions as a token of appreciation for the pertinent *mediation* service. He reported to his King that if the Sultan did not agree to the treaty's specific article of capitulations, which granted the French monarch authority over other Christian rulers, he would not sign it. Indeed, through this *mediation*, the French ambassador not only regained France the title of "*the most favoured nation*", but he also acquired the right to re-establish French consulates on islands, such as Sifnos, Naxos, Miconi, Mile and Santorini with a decree he received from the Sultan. Thus, the French ambassador could appoint consuls to each place mentioned above. This Ottoman Sultan's decree emphasized, "Marquis Bonnac also showed a new proof of his friendship with an honourable *tavassut* [mediation] in the negotiations at conferences on the occasion of the eternal peace between our Sublime Porte and the Tsar of Muscovy. In this respect, it was deemed appropriate to re-establish and confirm the consulates in the islands mentioned above, if deemed necessary".³² By giving this decree, the Ottoman Sultan emphasized that he saw this *mediation* as proof of the friendship of the French king and that these privileges were given in return for this friendship.

Approximately 11 years after this rewarding *mediation* service, France would again assure a much more profitable *mediation* opportunity by tackling the Ottoman-Russian and Austrian conflict. In 1736, Russia took action to realize the expansion policy by taking advantage of the Ottoman Empire's war with Iran. However, as Russia thought it could not achieve this goal alone, it signed a secret alliance treaty with Austria. According to this alliance treaty, Russia would attack the Ottoman Empire at an unexpected moment. At the same time, Austria, on the pretext of mediating between these two states, would distract the Ottomans and prevent them from making war preparations. After completing war preparations, Austria would declare war on the Ottoman Empire, and so they would force the Ottomans to fight on two fronts.³³ The subsequent events took place exactly to plan. First, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire, and then Austria kept the Ottomans distracted with the pretext of *mediation*. Although the Ottoman Empire

³² M. Charles Schefer, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

³³ The alliance treaty in question was signed between the emperor of Austria Karl VI and the Russian tsarist Anna Ioannovna in 1723. According to this agreement, if Austria participated in a possible Ottoman-Russian war as an ally of Russia it would get a share of the lands that would be taken from the Ottoman Empire at the end of the war. See for detailed information Karl Roeder, *The Reluctant Ally. Austria's Policy in the Austro-Turkish War, 1737- 1739*, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1972, p. 84.

had to fight on two fronts, it achieved remarkable success on the Austrian front. Meanwhile, France, worried that Russia's expansion would damage its commercial interests in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, offered *mediation* between the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Russia.³⁴ Initially, this *mediation* offer of France was not accepted by Austria and Russia. However, in the face of the Ottoman armies' victories on the Austrian front, Austria had to get this offer from France.

On the other hand, with the withdrawal of its ally Austria from the war, Russia, which was superior to the Ottomans but left alone, had to accept this offer. Besides, this was not the only factor that propelled Russia to peace. Meanwhile, the Swedish-French alliance and the Ottomans' negotiation for an alliance treaty with Sweden were possibly the foremost factors. Thus, Russia, whose plans to force the Ottomans to fight on two fronts failed, and its northern border was threatened too, had to accept to sign a treaty with the Ottomans. On the other hand, it was pretty ironic that France sought to negotiate an agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Austria because, before both the Karlowitz Treaty and the Passarowitz Treaty, France was continually pressing the Ottoman Empire to prolong the conflict with Austria. France made its mediation offer partly because it became superior to Austria, and partly because it did not want Russia to beat the Ottomans. Meanwhile, England and the Netherlands, who saw France's *mediation* attempts, also offered *mediation*. The Ottoman Empire thanked these two nations for their offer of mediation, but instead of accepting it, it chose to accept the offer made by France. The mediator Louis Sauveur, Marquis de Villeneuve, who was also the French Ambassador to the Porte at the time, made this offer, which was considered more appropriate for the Ottoman interests.³⁵ Since France was victorious in the Polish war of succession between France, Austria, and its ally Russia, and the two sides had not yet agreed to a treaty, the Ottoman administration did a very accurate job by preferring the French mediation offer. France, which assumed the position of mediator between Ottoman-Austria-Russia, was able to turn the negotiation table in favour of the Ottoman Empire.³⁶

On the other hand, Austria accepted the *mediation* of France only on the

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

³⁵ See for the copy of the letter written by the Ottoman government to the French government stating that "if they would agree to the mediation, the Ottoman government would gladly accept it", in Mehmed Subhî, *Subhî Tarihi* [Subhi Chronicle] TBMM Kütüphanesi. Yazma Eserler [Parliament Library. Manuscripts] H. K. 3-a, p. 119.

³⁶ İsmail Hakki Uzunçarşılı, *op. cit.*, p. 283-292.

condition that England and the Netherlands also would participate in the negotiations as co-arbitrators.³⁷ Meanwhile, another *mediation* offer that surprised the Ottoman Empire occurred. Nadir Shah, the shah of Iran, also made a *mediation* offer to the Ottoman Empire on this issue. It was quite surprising because Iran always deemed the Ottoman Empire's constant warfare on the northern and Western fronts more favourable for its interests. For this purpose, Iran had always sought an alliance with the Western enemies of the Ottoman Empire. Now, Nadir Shah was attempting such a *mediation* because he desired to improve diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. Of course, the Ottoman government kindly turned it down.³⁸

Furthermore, this treaty differed from earlier accords formed through the mediation of other powers. The Belgrade Treaty (1739) was signed not only with the *mediation* of France but also under the guarantee of this state. That meant if Austria violated the treaty, it would be considered to have declared war on France. Thus, France separated Austria from its ally Russia. Actually, at the time of ratification, Austria declined to sign the treaty because Russia had passed the Prut River, entered Moldova, and occupied Jassy. Austria did not want to ratify the treaty. However, it did not dare to do so because the treaty was under the guarantee of France. This event once again proved the validity of the Ottomans' choice of French mediation.

On the other hand, Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall defined the Belgrade Peace Treaty as the most glorious peace signed by the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century.³⁹ François-Emmanuel Guignard, Comte de Saint-Priest, the French ambassador to the Porte between 1768 and 1785, described the same treaty as "*the masterpiece of French diplomacy*" in his work on the history of Ottoman-French diplomacy. As justification, he maintained that the Ottoman Empire had managed to hide its real weakness from Europe for 30 years by this treaty.⁴⁰ The Ottoman Empire, quite exhausted from a thirteen-year war with Iran on its eastern front, found itself in a challenging situation with the attacks of Russia and Austria. The Ottoman Sultan was grateful to France for rescuing him in such a troubled

³⁷ Karl Roider, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

³⁸ See for the text of the correspondence of Mahmud I and Nadir Shah on this issue: BOA. DVNS. NMH. D. 7, p. 24-26.

³⁹ Ali İbrahim Savaş, *Osmanlı Diplomáticasına Ait Nâme-i Hümâyûn, Ahidnâme-i Hümâyûn ve Mektup Tahlilleri* [Nâme-i Hümâyûn, Ahidnâme-i Hümâyûn and Letter Analysis of the Ottoman Diplomatic], in "OTAM Dergisi" [Journal Of Ottoman Historical Studies Center], Vol. 7, 1996, p. 220.

⁴⁰ Christine Isom-Verhaaren, *Kâfirle İttifak. 16. Yüzyılda Osmanlı – Fransız Antlaşması* [Alliance with the Infidel. Ottoman-French Treaty in the 16th Century], Istanbul, Kitap Yayınevi, 2015. p. 31.

circumstance and turning the case in favour of the Ottomans with its *mediation*. Therefore, he expanded the capitulations of France as a token of his gratitude.

These new privileges were issued in seven articles in addition to the old *ahdnâme*. With the fifth article, the Frankish bishops and priests in the Ottoman domains were deemed to be under the auspices of the French King regardless of their nationality, and the rights previously provided to the French were likewise extended to them. The French King was also granted the jurisdiction of the Christian holy places in and around Jerusalem. With these newly added articles, which included more commercial, religious and diplomatic privileges, France consolidated its status as the “*most favoured nation*” in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, by assuring the eastern trade with this treaty, from the second half of the 16th century, France turned its commercial struggle with Venice and England in its favour. One of the most notable differences between this covenant and the traditional Ottoman *ahdnâmes* was its duration. The traditional Ottoman *ahdnâmes* were in effect during the reign of each Sultan. Therefore, former *ahdnâmes* had to be renegotiated with each Sultan change. The term in question was eliminated in this *ahdnâme* issued to France.⁴¹ Thus, the Sultan gave up considerable bargaining power.

As can be seen, these capitulations given to France for the successful mediation of the Peace of Belgrade represented the most extensive set of privileges granted to Western power. The most remarkable element of this *ahdnâme* was the recognition of France as a *most favoured nation*. Far more significant than all of that was the fact that this *ahdnâme* would grow into one corpus of texts whose contents could be exploited by all foreign powers, great or small. In other words, by making these capitulations a precedent, the way was opened for all privileges to be granted to all powers represented at the Porte and the former privileges were now acquired rights.⁴² After that, the Ottoman Empire would find itself on a slippery edge, forced to grant more generous and generally unrequited privileges to almost all European Powers. Therefore, with this *ahdnâme*, the capitulations entered a new phase, and the Ottomans lost control over it.⁴³

On the other hand, Russia realized that the Ottoman Empire managed to sign profitable treaties with its enemies through the *mediation* of the European states.

⁴¹ Reşat Ekrem Koçu, *Osmanlı Muahedeleri ve Kapitülâsyonlar 1300-1920 ve Lozan Muahedesi* [Ottoman Treaties and Capitulations 1300-1920 and the Treaty of Lausanne], İstanbul, 1934, p. 443.

⁴² Alexander H. de Groot, *The Historical Development of the Capitulatory Regime in the Ottoman Middle East from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries*, in “Oriente Moderno”, Nuova serie, Vol. 22 (83), 2003, No. 3, p. 604.

⁴³ Timur Kuran, *op. cit.*, p. 282-283.

Therefore, Russia turned down the *mediation* offer of Austria and Prussia, stating that it did not need *mediation* during the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji (1774) negotiations with the Ottomans. Therefore, Russia believed it could more readily obtain its demands from the Ottoman Empire on its own.⁴⁴ Indeed, Russia had a point. For through this treaty, Russia had essentially accomplished its policy of sailing to the Mediterranean via the Black Sea and the Straits, paving the way for the annexation of Crimea. From this date on, Russia not only acquired the right to trade freedom for its merchants in the Ottoman domains but also got the right to provide foreigners with the privilege of sailing the Ottoman territorial waters under the Russian flag.

Furthermore, to revive trade in Crimea and its environs, Russia began to encourage Westerners and Ottomans' Greek, Armenian and Jew subjects to invest in the region. With its subsequent attempts, Russia showed that it would not be satisfied with the privileges it had obtained with Kuchuk-Kainarji and would seek to expand these privileges at every opportunity. For this purpose, on the one hand, Russia began to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire under the pretext that its Orthodox subjects were protected by Ottoman rule while also interfering in the internal affairs of Crimea. In addition to all this, trying to control the Black Sea trade, Russia ensured the French the opportunity to trade in the Black Sea under the Russian flag. The Ottoman Empire, worried by these attempts of Russia, wanted to interfere in this situation but could not take the risk of a new war with Russia.

On the other hand, Russia was looking for pretexts to annex Crimea and was not hiding its readiness for a new war, if necessary. The Ottoman Empire, in the face of this hostile attitude of Russia, once again had to resort to the *mediation* of the British and French ambassadors (respectively, Sir Robert Ainsley and the Comte de Saint-Priest) in the Porte and agreed to leave Crimea to the Russians without war, through the *mediation* of the mentioned ambassadors (1784).⁴⁵ Thus, for the Ottoman Empire, *mediation* was no longer just a remedy used in the peace negotiations that ended the war, but also a tool used to resolve disputes it

⁴⁴ Ali İbrahim Savaş, *Osmanlı Diplomasisi* [Ottoman Diplomacy], İstanbul, 3F Publications, 2007, p. 34.

⁴⁵ Ali İhsan Bağış, *İngiltere'nin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toprak Bütünlüğü Politikası ve Türk Diplomasisinin Çaresizliği* [Britain's Territorial Integrity Policy of the Ottoman Empire and the Desperation of Turkish Diplomacy], in *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç*. Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 15-17 Ekim 1997: *sempozyuma sunulan tebliğler* [Contemporary Turkish diplomacy: 200 years of process. Ankara, Turkish Historical Society, 15-17 October 1997: Papers submitted to the symposium], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, p. 46.

could not afford to engage in. Since England had been attempting to secure the benefit of the exemption from customs duty known as “*Mastariye*”⁴⁶ from the Ottoman Empire for the British merchants for a long time, this mediation meant obtaining further advantages from the Ottoman Empire for England. This exemption was granted to the French merchants with the capitulations of 1740. The British ambassador demanded this privilege in return for the *mediation* service. At this point, the Ottomans, who did not want to lose the support of England against Russia, were desperate and had to give this privilege, too.⁴⁷

When the Ottoman Empire, exhausted from the endless demands of Russia, which annexed Crimea in this way, declared war on Russia in 1787, Russia’s ally Austria also declared war on the Ottomans in the following year. However, the Ottomans suffered territorial losses on both fronts and had to resort to the *mediation* of Prussia, England and the Netherlands once again. Due to the concern created by the French Revolution in Europe, the states mentioned above agreed to mediate between the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Austria. As mediators, Sir Robert Murray Keith would represent Britain, Count Rénier von Häften would represent the Netherlands, and the Marquis von Lucchesini would represent Prussia. By mediating the Ottoman Empire’s signing of the Treaty of Sistova (1791) with Austria and then the Treaty of Jassy (1792) with Russia, they ensured the end of the Ottoman-Austrian and Russian war. Particularly Ainslie, then the ambassador of England in the Porte, would try to act a significant role as an impartial mediator at the Treaty of Sistova in 1791 to repair British-Ottoman relations.

In the preamble of the Sistova treaty, it was stated that this treaty was signed by the *mediation* of the Kings of England, Prussia and the Netherlands. A *tavassut* [mediation] deed showing that the mediator envoys approved the treaty with their signatures and seals was added to the concluding part of the same treaty.⁴⁸ Special gifts were offered, particularly to the Prussian ambassador, who made substantial efforts to sign the treaty.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ It was a kind of tax, also called “sarfiyat”, collected from goods that came from abroad and were consumed within the country: Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *Türk İktisat Tarihi* [History of Turkish Economy], İstanbul, Dergah Yayınları, 1994, p. 258.

⁴⁷ Ali İhsan Bağış, *op.cit.*, p. 46.

⁴⁸ See for the text of treaty: BOA. A. DVN. DVE. D. 59/3: 31-34.

⁴⁹ Zülfiye Koçak, *Son Osmanlı-Avusturya Mücadelesinde Değişen Dengeler ve Zıstovi Antlaşması* [Changing Balances in the Last Ottoman-Austrian Struggle and the Treaty of Sistova], in “Gazi Akademik Bakış Dergisi” [Journal of Gazi Academic Perspective], Vol. 11, 2018, No. 22, p. 281.

MEDIATIONS FROM THE 19TH CENTURY

The use of *mediation* by European states as a tool of expanding the capitulations they acquired from the Ottoman Empire reached a peak in England, in the first half of the 19th century, especially during Lord Ponsoby and Lord Stanford Canning's missions in Istanbul, because the Ottoman Empire required mediation not only in solving foreign issues but also in solving domestic issues during this period. Firstly, the Ottoman Empire signed the *Hünkâr Iskelesi* Treaty with Russia in 1833 to solve its domestic matter with its governor of Egypt. However, the *Hünkâr Iskelesi* Treaty, in which the Russians managed to close the Black Sea and the Straits to foreign ships, caused other problems. The European states, especially England, did not recognize this treaty because it gave Russia extensive rights over the Straits.⁵⁰

In the following period, the British openly supported the Ottoman Empire by solving the Egyptian problem and ensuring that the Straits attained an international status with the 1841 Straits Agreement.⁵¹ Thus, on the one hand, England prevented Russia from having a say over the straits, and, on the other hand, it secured its eastern trade. In return for this political support, England signed the *Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838* (also known as a trade treaty of Balta Limanı) with the Ottoman Empire and managed to obtain significant commercial and economic privileges from the Ottoman Empire.⁵²

The primary purpose of this treaty was to extirpate the ever-increasing power of the Empire's troublemaking Egypt governor, Mehmed Ali Pasha. Just a few years earlier, he had dared challenge the Sultan. With this treaty, Britain not only got the right to expand capitulations indefinitely, which France obtained in 1740, but it also assured English merchants the right to buy and sell the goods they wanted without any exception in all Ottoman domains. In addition, with this treaty, Britain ensured the annulment of the old restrictions that prevented the freedom of movement of British merchants in the Ottoman territories.⁵³ In other

⁵⁰ Bayram Soy, *Lord Palmerston'un Osmanlı Toprak Bütünlüğünü Koruma Siyaseti* [Lord Palmerston's Policy of the Ottoman Territorial Integrity], in "Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi" [Journal of Hacettepe University Turkic Studies] (HÜTAD), Vol. 7, 2007, p. 148.

⁵¹ Bayram Soy, *op.cit.*, p. 155.

⁵² Ali İhsan Bağış, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁵³ B. Ali Eşiyok, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Dünya Ekonomisine Eklemlenmesinde Bir Dönüm Noktası:1838 Serbest Ticaret Anlaşması* [A Turning Point at Adding Ottoman

words, this treaty took away the control of the Ottomans over the circulation of goods within their borders. It ensured English merchants' access to the Ottoman products and markets as they wished. All this meant a fatal blow to the economic freedom of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, with the *Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838*, the Ottoman Empire had surrendered entirely its traditional economy, which it had tried to protect with the *yed-i vahit* (monopoly) customs system, to the capitalist economy. So much so that when the news of the agreement reached London, even the British foreign minister, Lord Palmerston, could not hide his astonishment at the unlimited privileges the Ottomans granted England and stated that no state could overturn its interests so much.⁵⁴ However, James Porter, the British ambassador to the Porte between 1746-1761, had said that it was difficult to demand more from the capitulations Britain received from the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, the Ottoman Empire had to abolish even various domestic monopolies. With the removal of the domestic monopolies, the Ottomans imposed a customs tax of only three per cent on imports and nine per cent on exports based on the value of the goods. In other words, with the *Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838*, the Ottoman Empire also consented to enforce substantially higher duties on exports than on imports. Indeed, not even the British could have predicted that.⁵⁵

For the Ottoman Empire, the Capitulations spiralled out of control. When a new privilege was granted to a state, not only the Great Powers like England, France, Russia, Austria, Hungary, Germany, and Italy, but also minor states were quick to seek the same privileges. The main reason for this was that European states considered Capitulations as their vested rights and the Ottomans' obligations in the period starting with Karlowitz rather than concessions bestowed by the Ottomans. This did not change after this treaty. After the Ottomans signed with Britain the *Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838*, they had to sign similar treaties between the years 1838 and 1856 with France, Russia, Sardinia, Sweden and Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Prussia. Smaller powers such as Denmark, Tuscany, the Hanseatic Cities, Portugal, the Two Sicilies, Greece and Brazil, Mexico, the Mecklenburg Duchies and Bavaria also signed the same treaty

Empire into The World Economy: 1838 Agreement of Free Commerce]. in "Mülkiye Dergisi" [Journal of Mülkiye] Vol. 34, 2010, No. 266, p. 81.

⁵⁴ Ali İhsan Bağış, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁵⁵ Halil İnalçık, *İmtiyâzât* [Privileges], in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* [TDVİA], Vol. 5, p. 251.

in 1864, 1868 and 1870.⁵⁶

As can be seen, there was a vast abyss between the intentions of the Ottoman sultans who first gave the capitulations and the point reached in the nineteenth century. The concessions had become horrific and burdensome for the Ottoman Empire. Naturally, the Porte made repeated efforts to annul the capitulations. However, the great powers generally were unwilling to yield to their wish and give up their privileges.⁵⁷ Firstly, the Ottomans tried to do this at the Paris Congress of 1856. Grand Vizier Ali Pasha, who attended the Paris peace conference as the representative of the Porte after the Crimean War, considered this conference an opportunity to annul the capitulations. He stated that because the Ottoman Empire was now recognized as a European state, it should be treated by European law as a state with no capitulations. Therefore, capitulations should be annulled. The Great Powers, undoubtedly bewildered by Ali Pasha's rationale, admitted that he was right. However, they cheated, claiming that this was not a suitable time or place for a discussion. They suggested that this matter be postponed until a later conference.⁵⁸ Of course, such a conference was never convened. Aside from the request to abolish capitulations, the great powers considered capitulations as the main symbol of Ottoman impotence concerning Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century.

CONCLUSIONS

The Ottoman Empire, who for centuries had performed one-way and non-reciprocal implementations in its diplomatic affairs, sought for the first time the *mediation* of other states to make peace at the 1699 Karlowitz peace negotiation. This peace attempt marked a turning point for Ottoman diplomacy. It also marked the beginning of a new phase for the capitulatory system. Many historians believe that the capitulations are a great example of the Ottomans' practical approach to governance because they not only served the commercial interests of the Empire but also evolved to serve as the principal legal basis of the Ottoman Empire's diplomatic relations with the European states. Moreover, the Ottomans turned the capitulations into a diplomatic tool highly adaptable to the requirements of the ever-changing balance of power they encountered in their relations with the European states. In this context, up to the closing years of the seventeenth century,

⁵⁶ Reşat Ekrem Koçu, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

⁵⁷ James B. Angell, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

⁵⁸ Feroz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

the Ottoman Sultans used capitulations as a diplomatic instrument to make alliances and reward their enemy's enemy. However, in 1699, when *mediation* entered Ottoman diplomacy, the capitulation system evolved into a different phase.

This article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of how the European powers identified *mediation* as a helpful diplomatic instrument in expanding capitulations. In addition, in line with the negotiating theory, as the Ottomans militarily weakened and needed increasing political support (mediation), the European powers obtained greater privileges. Consequently, the Ottomans placed themselves on a flawed premise by generously expanding privileges to express their gratitude for the mediation provided by European states. It has also been demonstrated how the capitulations turned the Sublime Porte into a centre of diplomatic conflict and how, throughout time, European powers came to regard the capitulations as Ottoman duties and vested rights, as well as a symbol of Ottoman powerlessness vis-à-vis Europe.

On the other hand, not only Western nations but also the Ottomans indeed employed mediation as a technique of diplomacy. The Ottomans were able to conceal their true vulnerability from European states for many years via mediation. Because the central goal of this study was to draw attention to the link between mediation and the increase in capitulations, the Ottomans' use of mediation has only been covered briefly. However, it demands special attention and should be the topic of independent research.

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GERMAN COLONISTS FROM BESSARABIA IN RUSSIAN HISTORICAL LITERATURE OF THE 19TH – EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

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Abstract. *The article analyses the Russian historiographical heritage of German settlers in Bessarabia in the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century, the least researched period in Russian history. The historical Bessarabia territory is currently part of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Despite using the same documents, the studies on the Germans of Bessarabia reach different conclusions because they depended on the political conjuncture in which the papers were written. Russian authors of the 19th - the first decades of the 20th centuries viewed German settlers' ethnic, confessional and agricultural development in Bessarabia from different angles, often guided by their subjective impressions. The researchers covering this period relied exclusively on the recollections of contemporaries of German ancestors who had been living in Bessarabia since the beginning of the 19th century. Often, the authors used unverified propaganda information. In this paper, printed sources from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were used to create a coherent image of the German population in Bessarabia and reflect the attitudes of Russian scientists and authorities regarding this ethnical group of immigrants who endured great hardship.*

Keywords: *Germans, historiography, Bessarabia, population, authorities, migration.*

Rezumat. *Coloniștii germani din Basarabia în lucrările de istorie rusești din secolul al XIX-lea și începutul secolului XX. Articolul analizează patrimoniul istoriografic de limbă rusă privitor la coloniștii germani din Basarabia în secolul al XIX-lea și primele decenii ale secolului al XX-lea, în perioada cel mai slab cercetată din istoria Rusiei. În prezent, teritoriul Basarabiei istorice face parte din Republica Moldova și Ucraina. În ciuda faptului că folosesc aceleași izvoare, studiile privind germanii din Basarabia ajung la concluzii diferite, deoarece au depins de conjunctura politică în care s-au redactat lucrările. Autorii*

ruși din secolul al XIX-lea și din primele decenii ale secolului XX au privit evoluția etnică, confesională și agrară a coloniștilor germani din Basarabia din unghiuri diferite, ghidându-se adesea de impresiile lor subiective. Cercetătorii acestei perioade s-au bazat exclusiv pe memoriile contemporanilor strămoșilor germani care s-au așezat în Basarabia încă de la începutul secolului al XIX-lea. Adeseori, autorii au folosit informații de propagandă neverificate. În studiul de față, sursele tipărite din secolul al XIX-lea și începutul secolului XX au fost folosite pentru a schița o imagine coerentă a populației germane din Basarabia, precum și pentru a reflecta atitudinile oamenilor de știință și ale autorităților ruse față de acest grup etnic de imigranți care a avut de îndurat mari greutăți.

INTRODUCTION

Bessarabia was, in the 19th century, a gateway to the Balkans. It was evident when this territory became a space of confrontation between empires. The region's peculiarity is that all life activities closely interact between the autochthonous population and immigrants. One of the understudied ethnic groups was the German colonists. They arrived in Bessarabia in the 19th century and nearly vanished entirely because of a decision made by the Stalinist administration in 1940. German colonists represented a different governmental initiative for recovering vacant areas, and a small portion of the Swiss and French joined them. They were also called "Warsaw settlers", although there were very few Poles among them. They left Poland and went to Bessarabia. By the mid-nineteenth century, they were around 26 thousand people.¹ They all lived mainly in the region's south in the Akkerman uyezd². By the beginning of the 20th century, the German population had already been living in 75 villages in Bessarabia³. Many

¹ *Spiski naselennyh mest Rossijskoj imperii, sostavlennye i izdavaemye central'nyh statisticheskim komitetom ministerstva vnutrennih del. III Bessarabskoj oblast'* [Lists of the Russian Empire localities, compiled and published by the Central Statistical Committee of the Ministry of the Interior. III Bessarabia region], Sankt-Peterburg, 1861, p. XXIV.

² Pompei N. Batyushkov, *Bessarabiya. Istoricheskoe opisanie* [Bessarabia. Historical description], Sankt-Peterburg, 1892, s. 144; I. F. Lagorio, *Statisticheskie svedeniya o bessarabskikh nemetskih koloniyah v 1861-1862 gg.* [Statistical information about the Bessarabian German colonies in 1861-1862], in "Zapiski Bessarabskogo oblastnogo statisticheskogo komiteta", t. I, Kishinev, 1864, p. 73.

³ Valentin S. Zelenchuk, *Naselenie Bessarabii i Podnestrov'ya v XIX v. (Etnicheskie i social'no-demograficheskie processy)* [The Population of the Bessarabia and Transnistria in the 19th century (Ethnic and Social-Demographical processes)], Kishinev, 1979, p. 212.

German colonies created subsidiary settlements to preserve land capital.

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

The article focuses on German migration to Bessarabia and their impact and development of the Bessarabian land. During the interwar period, the Romanian sociologist Anton Golopenția, a Romanian sociologist, was interested in the German population of Bessarabia. He dedicated his research in the Bug⁴ Region to statistics, particularly those affecting the German people. Before the Second World War, the theme of German settlers comes up with renewed vigour in Germany⁵ and the USSR. Moreover, in the Soviet Union, a steadily negative attitude towards the German population began to take shape in the late 20s (A. Reimarus = David Penner⁶, Viktor Schirmunski⁷, Aleksandr Klibanov⁸).

Hermann Aubin, one of the authors of the theory of “cultural province,” attempted to explain how the German people’s cultural area took shape, regardless of state and temporary borders⁹. According to the theory, the colonists played an essential role in expanding the ecumene of the Germanic ethnos. Many experts supported this theory, including Heinrich Brunner, Joachim Schulz¹⁰, and others.

The period of 1940-1944 was a period of active spread of Romanian values. This process also affected German settlers who survived after repatriation in 1940. Particular attention was paid to the situation in the Transnistria of the Dniester region. It is worth mentioning the works of Ion Nistor¹¹, I. A. Nestorescu¹², and others.

⁴ Anton Golopenția, *Românii de la est de Bug* [Romanians from the East of the Bug River], Vol. 1, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2006, p. 33.

⁵ Georg Leibbrandt, *Die deutschen Kolonien in Cherson und Bessarabien: Berichte der Gemeindeämter über Entstehung und Entwicklung der lutherischen Kolonien in der 1. Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Stuttgart, Ausland und Heimat-Verl.-Aktienges., 1926.

⁶ A. Reimarus, *Mennonity (kratkiy ocherk)* [Mennonites (Brief Essay)], Moskva, Bezbozhnik, 1930.

⁷ Viktor Schirmunski, *Die deutschen Kolonisten in der Ukraine. Geschichte, Mundarten, Volkslied, Volkskunde*, Charkow, Zentral-Völker-Verlag, 1928.

⁸ A. Klibanov, *Menonity* [Mennonites], Moskva-Leningrad, 1931.

⁹ Hermann Aubin, *Die Jahrtausendfeier der Rheinlande und die Ostmark*, in *Festschrift zur Jahrtausendfeier der Rheinländer in Danzig*, Danzig, 1925, S. 9–15.

¹⁰ Joachim Schulz, *Die deutschen Volksgruppen in Südosteuropa*, Leipzig – Berlin, Teubner, 1940.

¹¹ Ion Nistor, *Aspecte geopolitice și culturale din Transnistria* [Geopolitical and cultural aspects of Transnistria], București, 1942.

¹² I. A. Nestorescu, *Transnistria noastră* [Our Transnistria], Buzău, 1942.

The following period focuses on Soviet Moldova. The scholars practically did not study the German population. Separate studies in the field of ethnic demographics only partially touched upon certain aspects of the history and culture of the German settlers' everyday life (Valentin S. Zelenchuk¹³ and the book of Vladimir M. Kabuzan¹⁴). The data on the German population of the region's cities is partly reflected in the works of Nikolai V. Babilunga¹⁵ and Stepanida F. Kustriyabova¹⁶. The monographs of well-known historians of the time, Yakim S. Grosul¹⁷, Il'ya G. Budak¹⁸ and Ivan I. Meshcheryuk¹⁹ present aspects of the socio-economic life of the German population in the region. The studies of Elena I. Druzhinina, who investigated the general situation in southern Ukraine in the 19th century, including the condition of the German colonies²⁰, are worth mentioning.

¹³ Valentin S. Zelenchuk, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ Vladimir M. Kabuzan, *Narodonaselenie Bessarabskoi oblasti i levoberezhnykh raionov Pridnestrov'ya (konec XVIII – pervaya polovina XIX vv.)* [The population of the Bessarabian region and the left-bank regions of Transnistria (the end of the 18th – the first half of the 19th centuries)], Kishinev, "Shtiintsa", 1974.

¹⁵ Nikolai V. Babilunga, *Natsional'nyj sostav gorodskogo naseleniya Bessarabii v epohu imperializma* [The national composition of the urban population of Bessarabia in the era of imperialism], in "Izvestiya AN MSSR: Seriya obshchestvennykh nauk", 1979, № 3, p. 24-33; Idem, *Dinamika gorodskogo naseleniya Bessarabii v epohu imperializma* [Dynamics of the urban population of Bessarabia in the era of imperialism], in "Izvestiya AN MSSR: Seriya obshchestvennykh nauk", 1981, № 2, p. 53-61.

¹⁶ Stepanida F. Kustriyabova, *Polozhenie trudyashchihsya i demograficheskie protsessy v gorodakh Bessarabii (1918–1940)* [The situation of workers and demographic processes in the cities of Bessarabia (1918–1940)], Kishinev, "Shtiintsa", 1977.

¹⁷ Yakim S. Grosul, *Krest'yane Bessarabii (1812–1861)* [Peasants of Bessarabia (1812–1861)], Kishinev, Gosud. Izdatel'stvo Moldavii, 1956.

¹⁸ Yakim S. Grosul, Il'ya G. Budak, *Krest'yanskaya reforma 60–70 gg. XIX veka v Bessarabii* [Peasant reform 60–70s of 19th century in Bessarabia], Kishinev, Gosud. Izdatel'stvo Moldavii, 1956; Yakim S. Grosul, Il'ya G. Budak, *Ocherki istorii narodnogo hozyaistva Bessarabii (1812–1861 gg.)* [Essays on the history of the national economy of Bessarabia (1812–1861)], Kishinev, Kartia moldoveniaske, 1967.

¹⁹ Ivan I. Meshcheryuk, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie bolgarskih i gagauzskih siol v yuzhnoi Bessarabii (1808–1856)* [Socio-economic development of the Bulgarian and Gagauz villages in southern Bessarabia (1808–1856)], Kishinev, Redaktsionno-izdatel'skij otdel AN MSSR, 1970.

²⁰ Elena I. Druzhinina, *Yuzhnaya Ukraina 1800–1825 gg* [Southern Ukraine 1800–1825], Moskva, "Nauka", 1970; Eadem, *Yuzhnaya Ukraina v period krizisa feodalizma. 1825–1860 gg.* [Southern Ukraine in the period of feudalism crisis. 1825–1860], Moskva, "Nauka", 1981.

As for the Soviet period, Ol'ga V. Shcherbinina²¹ wrote about bourgeois falsifications, including the theme of German settlers. In the second half of the 20th century, German scholars published works devoted to various aspects of the past of the German colonists in Bessarabia (Alfred Ziebart²², Jakob Becker²³, etc.). Some authors who wrote about the German colonists themselves were their descendants (Alexander Suga²⁴).

The study of German issues became increasingly important in the post-Soviet period, in both the Republic of Moldova and elsewhere. Valentina Chirtoagă's work stands out among Moldovan specialists. She wrote the first dissertation research devoted to the study of various aspects of the lives of German colonists in Bessarabia²⁵. Two researchers from Germany, descendants of the Bessarabian Germans, Luminița Fassel²⁶ and Ute Schmidt²⁷, and a native of Russia, Viktor Disendorf,²⁸ attempted to summarise information about the Germans of Bessarabia.

²¹ Ol'ga V. Shcherbinina, *Kritika sovremennoi zapadnogeranskoi burzhuaiznoi istoriografii istorii Moldavii* [Criticism of modern West German bourgeois historiography of the history of Moldova], Kishinev, "Shtiintsa", 1984.

²² Alfred Ziebart, *Arzis, Bessarabien. Blick auf 150 Jahre Kolonistenleben und -schicksal 1816–1966*, Ludwigsburg, Eigenverlag des Verfassers, 1971.

²³ Jakob Becker, *Bessarabien und sein Deutschtum*, Bietigheim – Württemberg, Krug, 1966.

²⁴ Alexander Suga, *Die völkerrechtliche Lage Bessarabiens in der geschichtlichen Entwicklung des Landes*, Bonn, 1958.

²⁵ Valentina Chirtoagă, *Etnicii germani din Basarabia: evoluție demografică, socio-economică și cultural-spirituală (1814-1917)*. Teză de doctor în istorie [The German ethnic groups in Bessarabia: demographic, socio-economic and cultural-spiritual evolution (1814-1917). The Doctoral Thesis in History], Chișinău, 2018.

²⁶ Luminița Fassel, *Das deutsche Schulwesen in Bessarabien (1812-1940). Eine komparativ-historische und sozio-kulturelle Untersuchung*, München, Verlag Südostdeutsches Kulturwerk, 2000.

²⁷ Ute Schmidt, *Die Deutschen aus Bessarabien. Eine Minderheit aus Südosteuropa (1814 bis heute)*, 2 durchgesehene Auflage. Köln – Weimar – Wien, Böhlau Verlag 2004; Eadem, *Bessarabien. Deutsche Kolonisten am Schwarzen Meer*, Potsdam, Deutsches Kulturforum Östliches Europa, 2008; Eadem, *Bessarabiya. Nemeckie kolonisty Prichernomor'ya: ocherki* [Bessarabia. German colonists of the Black Sea region: essays], Odessa, Optimum, 2015.

²⁸ Viktor Disendorf, *Istoricheskaya demografiya nemetskogo naseleniya Rossiii SSSR (XVIII – nachalo XXI vv.)* [Historical demography of the German population of Russia and the USSR (18th – the beginning of the 21st centuries)], Rottenburg, 2010, http://wolgadeutsche.net/diesendorf/Ist_demograf.pdf (Accessed on 25.01.2022).

A series of doctoral thesis from Ukraine demonstrates the surge of interest in the history of German settlements in modern Ukrainian historiography. These works touch upon various aspects of the history and culture of the German colonists in Ukraine, and some cover the border areas of the Republic of Moldova.²⁹

Sergei Kretinin³⁰, a modern researcher from Russia, made several advances in examining German colonists' history. In his articles, Sergei V. Kapustin³¹ addressed ethnography and the history of the Bessarabian Germans.

Although the German presence in Bessarabia has been explored, issues still need to be addressed. One of them is connected with the history of personalities of German colonists, which is insufficiently covered. The traditional daily lifestyle of this ethnic-social segment of the Bessarabian population remains understudied.

The purpose of this study has been to focus briefly on the examination of 19th-century Russian works about German colonists in Bessarabia.

DYNAMICS OF SCIENTIFIC INTEREST IN THE HISTORICAL FATE OF THE GERMAN COLONISTS IN THE 19TH – EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

The historiography of the 19th century and early 20th century, devoted to the German settlers' historical destiny and everyday culture in Bessarabia, can be divided into several stages.

Stage I – the first half of the 19th century until the 1860s was characterised by episodic information about the Germans in this region. Territorial features, such as the positioning of German settlers on the periphery, also impacted this. However, it was precisely because of this fact that the

²⁹ Kateryna S. Lyah, *Nimets'komovni kolonisty Pivdnya Ukrayny v mul'tinatsional'nomu ototchenni: problema vzaemodiy kul'tur (XIX – pochatok XX st.)* [German-speaking colonists of Southern Ukraine in a multinational environment: the problem of cultural interaction (19th – early 20th centuries)], Donetsk, 2005.

³⁰ Sergei V. Kretinin, *Bessarabskie nemtsy: poslednie kolonisty Rossiiskoj imperii* [Bessarabian Germans: the Last Colonists of the Russian Empire], in "Rossiya – Germaniya", 2013, No 2(6), p. 65–69.

³¹ Sergei V. Kapustin, *Etnografiya Bessarabii glazami issledovatelej nemetskogo proiskhozhdeniya* [Ethnography of Bessarabia through the eyes of researchers of German origin] in the «Uchenye zapiski Orlovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta», 2017, no. 3(76), p. 23–28; Idem, *Coverage of the history and culture of life support of the German settlers of Bessarabia and the left bank of the Dniester in the late 20th - early decades of the 21st century in the printed scientific literature of Germany*, in "ABYSS", 2019, № 1(07), http://abyss.su/_media/abyss_issue/7/kapustin_statja_na_anglijskom.pdf (Accessed on 22.01.2022).

Bessarabian outskirts of the Russian Empire were recorded and explored in the 19th century on behalf of various government departments.³²

Pavel P. Svinyin's description of Bessarabia was one of the first published materials approached. It mentioned that "in addition to several Austrian subjects, scattered in the cities and villages of Bessarabian for various trades, 1743 families were resettled here from the Duchy of Warsaw in 1814; they were all of the Lutheran confession, except 121 Catholic families"³³.

The privileges granted to the Warsaw colonists encouraged the influx of German settlers for nearly the entire 19th century. If the region had 33,501 Germans in 1861, there were 42,681 in 1891 and 59,998 people in 1897³⁴. The German colonists' special status, long-term benefits, and the ban against dividing land plots contributed to the accumulation of land property³⁵. Subsequently, German colonists were labelled as the prosperous but closed and uncommunicative representatives of a foreign ethnic environment.³⁶

Stepan Kornilovich, who wrote about the region in the twenties of the 19th century, confirmed the words of Svinyin and noted that "several families from foreign lands were resettled to the region for agriculture and cultivation of vineyards; they were mostly from the Duchy of Warsaw, the Bavarian and Wertemberg kingdoms and Switzerland"³⁷. Kornilovich named several families of

³² Vyacheslav P. Stepanov, *Trudy po etnografii naseleniya Bessarabii XIX – nachala XX vv. Ocherki istorii etnograficheskogo izucheniya bessarabskikh ukrainsev* [Works on the ethnography of the population of Bessarabia in the 19th – early 20th centuries. Essays on the history of the ethnographic study of Bessarabian Ukrainians], Kishinev, 2001, p. 69.

³³ *Opisanie Bessarabskoi oblasti. Sostavleno vedomstva gosudarstvennoi kollegii inostrannykh del nadvornym sovetnikom Pavlom Svinyinyim, 1816 goda* [Description of the Bessarabian region. Compiled by the department of the State Collegium of Foreign Affairs by court adviser Pavel Svinyin, 1816], in "Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei", vol. VI, 1867, p. 206.

³⁴ Valentin S. Zelenchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 211. More accurate is the figure given by Sergei Sulyak – 60,206 inhabitants of German origin. See: Sergei G. Sulyak, *Naselenie Bessarabii v XIX v.: chislennost', natsional'nyi sostav, religioznaya prinalozhnost' (Po materialam dorevolutsionnykh issledovaniy)* [The population of Bessarabia in the 19th century: size, ethnic composition, religious affiliation (based on pre-revolutionary studies)], in *Trudy Ob'edinennogo nauchnogo soveta po gumanitarnym problemam i istoriko-kul'turnomu naslediyu. 2009*, Sankt-Peterburg, 2010, p. 61.

³⁵ Valentin S. Zelenchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 211–212.

³⁶ Nikolai D. Zabotkin, *Mirnoe zavoevanie nemtsami Yuzhnoi Bessarabii* [Peaceful conquest of southern Bessarabia by the Germans], Akkerman, 1910, p. 3.

³⁷ Stepan Kornilovich, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Bessarabii sobstvenno tak nazyvaemoi, ili*

German settlers in 1971: there were 4848 men and 4522 women.³⁸ The author also focused on the German occupations, listing all of the German colonies and presenting their economic characteristics³⁹. There are only positive reviews on the German farming tradition of the Germans near Daragan.

Stage II, the 1860s - 1880s. In the second half of the 19th century, a considerable amount of statistical literature included information about the German settlers. Outlying territories were specially studied, which explains the authorities' attention to their development. The comprehensive works of General Staff officer Aleksandr Zashchuk, which contain information about the German colonists, are evidence of this.⁴⁰

In 1862, historian E. Busch published a study⁴¹ that provided information on the number of German settlers in Russia. According to V. Disendorf, E. Busch's information was underestimated for Novorossia (which included Bessarabia) by 16.6%. Inaccuracies, in his opinion, are explained by the fact that Busch used the archives of the Evangelical Church, which did not consider the Germans of other faiths.⁴²

Friedrich Matthäi's book was published a few years later. A separate section is devoted to the German colonists of Bessarabia⁴³. A sombre work written in 1875

Budzhaka, s prilozheniem general'nogo plana ego kraya, sostavlennoe pri grazhdanskoi s'emke Bessarabii, proizvodivshei po vysochajshemu poveleniyu razmezhevanie zemel' onoi na uchastki s 1822 po 1828-i god [Statistical description of the so-called Bessarabia proper, or Budjak, with the application of the general plan of its region, compiled during the civil survey of Bessarabia, which, by the highest command, delimited its lands into sections from 1822 to 1828], Akkerman, 1899, p. 23.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 188–220.

⁴⁰ Aleksandr I. Zashchuk, *Materialy dlya geografii i statistiki Rossii, sobrannye ofitserami General'nogo shtaba. Bessarabskaya oblast'* [Materials for the geography and statistics of Russia, collected by officers of the General Staff. Bessarabia region], Sankt-Peterburg, 1862, ch. 1-2; Idem, *Etnografiya Bessarabskoi oblasti* [Ethnography of the Bessarabian region], in "Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei", T. 5, Odessa, 1863, p. 491–589.

⁴¹ E. H. Busch, *Materialien zur Geschichte und Statistik des Kirchen- und Schulwesens der Ev.-Luth. Gemeinden in Russland*, St. Petersburg, Commissionsverlag von G. Haessel, 1862.

⁴² Viktor Disendorf, *op. cit.*

⁴³ Friedrich Matthäi, *Die deutschen Ansiedlungen in Rußland. Ihre Geschichte und ihre volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung für die Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Studien über das russische Kolonisationswesen und über die Herbeiziehung fremder Kulturkräfte nach Rußland*, Leipzig, Hermann Fries, 1866, p. 37–67.

by General Staff Officer, a member of the Russian Geographical Society, Aleksandr F. Rittikh,⁴⁴ was a reaction of the military department to universal military service, introduced in the state in 1874. I. Logario⁴⁵ presented certain statistical information about the German settlers of the region. Academician Peter von Köppen, a well-known Russian statistician, made substantial contributions to the study of southern ethnography, detailing the areas of settlement, the number, and occupation of the Germans.⁴⁶

When discussing the later decades of the twentieth century, it is essential to mention Dmitrii I. Bagalei's historical study, dedicated to the colonisation of Novorossia. The whole section was devoted to foreign settlers, and German colonists were separately studied. The author emphasised that they differed from each other by their religious identity⁴⁷.

Stage III, between the 1890s and 1918, was the time of generalisation of the accumulated knowledge, the publication of several comprehensive works on the region's history and ethnography, and the creation of local scientific centres.

Pompei Batyushkov's book *Bessarabia...* was published towards the end of the 19th century; it was an example of Russian patriotic work.⁴⁸ Batyushkov's attitude toward German presence in Russia reflects the views of the Slavophile intelligentsia, which advocated depriving the German population of special privileges in the post-

⁴⁴ Alekandr F. Rittikh, *Plemennoi sostav kontingentov russkoi armii i muzhskogo naseleniya Evropeiskoi Rossii* [The tribal composition of the contingents of the Russian army and the male population of European Russia], St. Petersburg, 1875; Idem, *Etnograficheskaya karta Evropeiskoi Rossii* [Ethnographic map of European Russia], Sankt-Peterburg, 1875.

⁴⁵ I. F. Lagorio, *Statisticheskie svedeniya o Bessarabskikh nemetskikh koloniyah v 1861-1862 gg.* [Statistical information about the Bessarabian German colonies in 1861-1862], in "Zapiski Bessarabskogo oblastnogo statisticheskogo komiteta", T. I, Kishinev, 1864, p. 73-77.

⁴⁶ Peter I. Köppen, *Hronologicheskii ukazatel' materialov dlya istorii inorodtsev Evropeiskoi Rossii* [Chronological index of materials for the history of foreigners in European Russia], Sankt-Peterburg, 1861.

⁴⁷ Dmitrii I. Bagalei, *Kolonizatsiya Novorossiyskogo kraia i pervye shagi ego po puti kul'tury. Istoricheskii etyud* [Colonization of the Novorossiysk District territory and its first steps along the path of culture. Historical sketch], Kiev, 1889, p. 77-99.

⁴⁸ Batyushkov's book was perceived differently in scientific circles. A. I. Yatsimirsky, the modern Moldavian researcher Olga S. Lukyanets, criticized it for tendentiousness. See: Olga S. Lukyanets, *Russkie issledovateli i moldavskaya etnograficheskaya nauka v XIX – nachale XX v.* [Russian researchers and Moldovan ethnographic science in the 19th – early 20th centuries], Kishinev, 1986, p. 70.

reform period (late 70-80s of the 19th century). V. S. Zelenchuk gave another example of such an approach, which intensified in connection with Russia's accumulated socio-economic contradictions before World War I. For instance, Nikolai D. Zobotkin wrote in 1910 that "German colonisation in the Akkerman uyezd threatens with a complete collapse of the economy of other agricultural elements and is aimed at their displacement and enslavement."⁴⁹

Contemporary Moldavian historians have ambivalent attitudes toward Pavel A. Krushevan's personality. He is associated with Russian "imperial" nationalists, strong Russian state supporters⁵⁰, and bright, creative characters.⁵¹ However, P. Krushevan was undoubtedly a very talented person, endowed with numerous virtues and a man of his time – an odious monarchist. The detailed description of the German population of the region given in the almanack "Bessarabets", in a separate paper "Bessarabia", edited by P. A. Krushevan, is very indicative: "Hardworking workers, excellent agronomists and cattle breeders, the Germans live clean, even in wealth. Their long-standing resettlement on the steppes of Budjak did not in the least change their patriarchal Germanic habits at the end of the 18th century. They do not have a broad Russian prowess, capable of adopting everything and applying it to everything. The German peasant rarely looks beyond the boundary of his plot and knows only himself and the society of his village. Given this, their skill and diligence remain with them and are not instilled in the native population."⁵²

Vladimir N. Butovich is connected to the German settlers' topic, emphasising aspects and potential opportunities for cohabitation of numerous

⁴⁹ Valentin S. Zelenchuk, *op. cit.*, c. 212. With reference to Nikolai Zobotkin, *Mirnoe zavoevanie nemtsami Yuzhnoi Bessarabii* [Peaceful conquest of southern Bessarabia by the Germans,], Akkerman, Ekon. tip. I.A. Kara-Fedorova, 1911, p. 2.

⁵⁰ Igor P. Shornikov, *Obshchestvenno-politicheskaya i literaturnaya deyatel'nost' P. A. Krushevana* [Socio-political and literary activities of P. A. Krushevan]. Avtoreferat dissertatsii na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk. Special'nost' 07.00.02 – Otechestvennaya istoriya. Moskva, 2011, p. 33.

⁵¹ Irina Izhboldina, "Zhivaya starina" v proizvedeniyah russkikh literatorov Bessarabii kontsa XIX - nachala XX vv.: issledovaniya i materialy ["Zhivaya starina" in the works of Russian writers of Bessarabia in the late 19th – early 20th centuries: research and materials], Kishinev, 2012, p. 13.

⁵² *Bessarabiya. Graficheskii, istoricheskii, statisticheskii, ekonomicheskii, etnograficheskii, literaturnyi i spravochnyi sbornik. Izdanie gazety "Bessarabets" pod red. P. A. Krushevana* [Bessarabia. Graphic, historical, statistical, economic, ethnographic, literary and reference collection. Edition of the newspaper "Bessarabets" published by P. A. Krushevan], Moskva, 1903, p. 183.

ethnonational colonies on the territory of Bessarabia⁵³. These studies can also include the later work of Jakob Stach⁵⁴. Among the works of contemporaries of that period, which covered the history and culture of everyday life of the German colonists in southern Russia, reference must be made to the work of Jacob Prinz, published in German in Moscow in 1898.⁵⁵

Not only the Germans were interested in their compatriots – the works of Ivan Sergeev,⁵⁶ Petr Tkachev,⁵⁷ Andrei Fadeev,⁵⁸ and Grigorii Pisarevskii⁵⁹, which chronicled the history and culture of the Germans in Russia, were published in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The *Memoirs* of Andrei Fadeev presents a description of the German colonies, located, among other things, in Transnistria and further in Novorossia.⁶⁰ An interesting observation found in his memoirs leads to the conclusion that the influx of German colonists to Russia and, in particular, to Bessarabia was associated with the mystical hobbies of Emperor Alexander I: “The reason for this was the petition of Mrs Krüdener and other mystics addressed to Emperor Alexander, who often travelled abroad. They greatly influenced the Tsar and requested him to allow many inhabitants of all countries of Germany, consisting mainly of pietists, to move to Russia. They also asked him to provide them with special protection.”⁶¹ The information presented above cannot be considered an unequivocal description of the reasons for the migration of the German colonists to Russia. Nevertheless, it makes one wonder how much the fate of an entire ethnic-social community may depend on a subjective factor.

⁵³ Vladimir Butovich, *Materialy dlya etnograficheskoi karty Bessarabskoi gubernii* [Materials for the ethnographic map of the Bessarabian province], Kiev, 1916.

⁵⁴ Jakob Stach, *Ocherki iz istorii i sovremennoi zhizni yuzhnorusskikh kolonii* [Essays on the history and modern life of the South Russian colonies], Moskva, 1916.

⁵⁵ Jakob Prinz, *Die Kolonien der Brüdergemeinde. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Deutschen Kolonien Südrusslands*, Moskva, 1898.

⁵⁶ Ivan I. Sergeev, *Mirnoe zavoevanie Rossii nemtsami* [Peaceful conquest of Russia by the Germans], Peterburg, 1915.

⁵⁷ Petr N. Tkachev, *Nemetskie idealisty i filistery* [German idealists and philistines], in “Delo”, Sankt-Peterburg, 1867, No 12, p. 1–27.

⁵⁸ Andrei M. Fadeev, *Vospominaniya Andrey a Mihajlovicha Fadeeva. 1790-1867 gg.* [Memoirs of Andrei Mikhailovich Fadeev. 1790-1867], Odessa, 1897, in 2 parts.

⁵⁹ Grigorii G. Pisarevskii, *Iz istorii inostrannoi kolonizatsii v Rossii v XVIII veke (po neizvestnym arhivnym materialam)* [From the history of foreign colonization in Russia in the 18th century (According to unknown archival materials)], Moskva, 1909.

⁶⁰ Andrej M. Fadeev, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 47.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

On top of the “anti-German wave” during the First World War, the question of the loyalty of the Bessarabian Germans and the Germans in Russia became particularly relevant. Then the restrictions on their rights signed by Nicholas II came out.⁶² A series of anti-German sentiments swept through the ministries and departments and among the adherents of the country’s regime.⁶³

On February 2, 1915, the Emperor signed the Law “On the Restriction of Land Ownership and Land Use of Enemy Subjects”, which also applied to the Bessarabian Germans. During the war, radical approaches prevailed. The government focused on eradicating the German ethnic community in Russia, although at the expense of the agricultural economy.⁶⁴ This liquidation policy was especially active in the front-line zones, although it had little impact. Therefore, Karl Lindemann⁶⁵ emphasised that the Bessarabian Germans never thought their land could be taken from them.

It would be incorrect to claim that only extreme opinions against the German settlers in Russia were expressed in the literature of the time. There were

⁶² Natal'ya V. Savinova, *Rossiiskii natsionalizm i nemetskie pogromy v Rossii v gody Pervoi mirovoi voyny: 1914-1917 gg.* [Russian nationalism and German pogroms in Russia during the First World War: 1914-1917]. Avtoreferat dissertatsii na soiskanie uchenoj stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk. Special'nost': 07.00.02 – Otechestvennaya istoriya; <http://www.dissercat.com/content/rossiiskii-natsionalizm-i-nemetskie-pogromy-v-rossii-v-gody-pervoi-mirovoi-voyny-1914-1917-g> [Accessed: 25.12.2021]; Svetlana V. Obolenskaya, “Nemeckii vopros” i predstavleniya v Rossii o nemtsah v gody Pervoi mirovoi vojny [The “German question” and ideas in Russia about the Germans during the First World War], in “Rossiya i Germaniya”, Moskva, vyp. 2, 2001, p. 189.

⁶³ Nikolai Varadinov, *Istoriya Ministerstva vnutrennih del* [History of the Ministry of the Interior], Sankt-Peterburg, 1858, P. III, T. 1, p. 501 – 503; Ivan Sobolev, *Bor'ba s “nemetskim zasil'em” v Rossii v gody Pervoi mirovoi vojny* [The fight against “German dominance” in Russia during the First World War]. Avtoreferat dissertatsii na soiskanie uchenoj stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk. Special'nost': Special'nost': 07.00.02 – Otechestvennaya istoriya. Sankt-Peterburg, 1998; Sergei P. Sheluhin, *Nemetskaya kolonizatsiya na yuge Rossii* [German colonization in southern Russia], Odessa, 1915.

⁶⁴ Aleksandra Yu. Bahturina, “Luchshe pust' nemtsy razoryatsya, chem budut shpionit'”: nemtsy-kolonisty i rossiiskoe obshchestvo v gody “germanskoi” vojny [“Better let the Germans go bankrupt than spy”: German colonists and Russian society during the “German” war], p. 10, in <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/luchshe-pust-nemtsy-razoryatsya-chem-budut-shpionit-nemtsy-kolonisty-i-rossiyskoe-obshchestvo-v-gody-germanskoy-voyny/viewer> [Accessed on 04.01.2022].

⁶⁵ Karl E. Lindemann, *Prekrashchenie zemlevladieniya i zemlepol'zovaniya poselyan-sobstvennikov* [Termination of land ownership and land use of village owners], Moskva, Tipografiya K. L. Men'shova, 1917.

additional publications that took a more honest approach to the phenomena of German colonial presence in Russia. The works of Grigorii Pisarevskii⁶⁶, Semion Bondar'⁶⁷ and Karl E. Lindemann⁶⁸ are among them. However, because of the political climate and the previously prevailing public attitude, their voice was weak and had little impact on the overall situation.

Among balanced studies, the extract from Jakob Stach's book reveals the author's attempt to uncover the cause for the German colonists' poor mastery of the Russian language and avoidance of interaction with Russian peasants: "until the time of the Crimean War, and even until the sixties of the last century, there can be no question of the attitude of the colonists towards the Russian population, because in South Russia there was almost no Russian population, and the sparsely populated Russian cities very rarely communicated with the colonies, because at that time there was no means of communication. The only exceptions were the colonies located at the nearest distance from the cities: Odessa, Yekaterinoslav, and Elizavetgrad."⁶⁹

When studying the issue concerning the situation of German settlers in the region, one cannot disregard the policy of the official authorities about the German settlement, which became more complicated during the First World War. In this regard, Karl E. Lindemann's study, which reflected the situation of the German population by the decrees of February 2 and December 13, 1915, and July 10, 15 and August 19, 1916, is eloquent. The regulations had a considerable impact on the economic status of German settlers before the Bolshevik Revolution⁷⁰, as well as the development of an unfavourable attitude concerning colonists.

The second half of the 19th century, especially the end and beginning of the next century, is marked by the publication of several encyclopaedic works containing information about the Bessarabian Germans.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Grigorii G. Pisarevskii, *op. cit.*

⁶⁷ Semion D. Bondar', *Sekta menonitov Rossii* [Russian Mennonite sect], Sankt-Peterburg, Tipografiya V. D. Smirnova, 1916.

⁶⁸ Karl E. Lindemann, *op. cit.*, p. 65-66.

⁶⁹ Jakob Stach, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁷⁰ Karl E. Lindemann, *op. cit.*

⁷¹ *Rossiia. Polnoe geograficheskoe opisanie nashego Otechestva: nastol'naya i dorozhnaya kniga dlya russkikh lyudei. Novorossiia i Krym (Bessarabskaya, Hersonskaya, Tavricheskaya i Ekaterinoslavskaya gubernii, oblasti Vojska Donskogo i Stavropol'skoi gubernii)* [Russia. A complete geographical description of our Fatherland: a desktop and travel book for Russian people. Novorossia and Crimea (Bessarabian, Kherson, Taurida and Yekaterinoslav provinces, regions of the Don Army and Stavropol province)], Sankt-

CONCLUSIONS

Bessarabia in the 19th century never formed a single ethnocultural community. There is no reason to assume that this was done on purpose. While coexisting, the multicultural communities also kept their distance from one another. Having their privileges, the Warsaw and Transdanubian colonists lived relatively closed. The Jews lived in the same “chamber” within a different ethnic environment, which is also explained by their diverse confessions and occupation (trade, usury, possession, etc.).

The territory substantially constrained the life of the Bessarabian settler, particularly in the colony, which had a specific influence on the consciousness of both the individual inhabitant and members of the ethnic-social community. According to the modern researcher Olga S. Lukyanets, the interaction between German settlers and the local population increased throughout the interwar period. By the end of the 30s, “Bessarabian Germans more often came into contact with the region’s wealthiest part of the population”.⁷² The analysed data allows concluding that the conditionally selected stage – the first half of the 19th century until the 60s – was characterised by episodic information about the Germans of the region. Despite the voluminous and multifaceted works of the authors of that time (Aleksandr Zashchuk, E. H. Busch, Aleksandr F. Rittikh, Peter von Köppen, Dmitrii Bagalei and many others), the history and everyday life of the Germans in Bessarabia were covered episodically and superficially.

The second stage, lasting 60-80 years, can be characterised as a period of heightened interest in many elements of German settlers’ lives and daily lives, followed by a rise in hostility toward their presence from liberal and Slavophile authors. Negative manifestations can also be seen in the next stage, which spans the 1890s through 1918. Authors, who emphasised the importance of German settlers to the economic growth of Russian regions, argued against such one-sided views (Semion Bondar’, Grigorii Pisarevskii, Jakob Stach, Karl Lindemann and others). Simultaneously, various publications appeared at the time in which

Peterburg, 1910, vol. 14; Lev S. Berg, *Bessarabiya. Strana. Lyudi. Hozyaistvo* [Bessarabia. Country. People. Economy], Kishinev, Universitas, 1993, p. 116.

⁷² Olga S. Lukyanets, *Kollektivnye predstavleniya narodov Bessarabii drug o druge (pervaya polovina XX v.)* [Collective ideas of the peoples of Bessarabia about each other (the first half of the 20th century)], in *Etnograficheskie issledovaniya v Respublike Moldova*, Kishinev, 2006, p. 181.

researchers attempted to perform a detailed study of the region's people, including the lifestyle of the German colonists (Lev S. Berg). Furthermore, these generalising books often featured less specific content than those expressly devoted to German colonists. At the same time, they attempted to employ a complex approach (Aleksandr I. Zashchuk laid the foundation in *Ethnography of the Bessarabian Region*) that was to be developed in the future.

It is essential to add that modern researchers from Germany (Ute Schmidt), the Republic of Moldova (Valentina Chirtoagă) and Russia (Sergei Kretinin, Sergei Kapustin) are increasingly interested in studying the German colonists of Bessarabia. It gives hope that the study of their historical fate in Bessarabia will be continued. A comprehensive historiographical survey of the German colonists of Bessarabia also awaits its time.

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EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS OF SLAVIC CHARITABLE SOCIETIES ACTIVITY IN THE 19th- EARLY 20th CENTURIES (SAINTS CYRIL AND METHODIUS SLAVIC CHARITABLE SOCIETY OF ODESA)

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Abstract. *The study examines the educational activities of Slavic Charitable Societies, namely Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa, using source analysis and historiographical literature. The society was founded in Odesa in 1870 to assist southern and western Slavs who had become stranded in the southern region due to various circumstances. According to the Statute, the main activity was focused on educational matters. The society opened the Slavic reading room with a library and awarded special scholarships to the Slavs studying at Novorossiysk University in Odesa. A special educational institution for Slavic girls was later created. Educational activities included the establishment of free libraries as well as organising concerts, theatre performances, public readings, and Sunday classes.*

Keywords: *Charity, Slavic societies, educational activities, Odesa, Saints Cyril and Methodius Society.*

Rezumat: *Aspecte educaționale ale activității societăților caritabile slave în secolul XIX – începutul secolului XX (Societatea Caritabilă Slavă „Sfinții Chiril și Metodie din Odesa”). Studiul examinează activitățile educaționale ale societăților caritabile slave, în special a Societății caritabile slave „Sfinții Chiril și Metodie” din Odesa, folosind analiza izvoarelor și literatura de specialitate. Societatea a fost fondată în Odesa în anul 1870 pentru a ajuta slavii de sud și de vest, care au ajuns să fie blocați în această regiune din variate motive. Conform statutului, principala activitate a fost axată pe probleme educaționale. Societatea a deschis o Sală de Lectură slavă cu o bibliotecă și a acordat burse*

speciale slavilor care studiau la Universitatea „Novorossiysk” din Odesa. Ulterior, a fost creată o instituție de învățământ specială pentru fetele slave. Activitățile educaționale au inclus înființarea de biblioteci gratuite, precum și organizarea de concerte, spectacole de teatru, lecturi publice și cursuri duminicale.

INTRODUCTION

The charity has a rich history in Europe, dating back to ancient times, passing through the Middle Ages and continuing nowadays. Charitable foundations and societies arose for very different reasons. People who were motivated by their fame and desired to leave an imprint on history and their interests or political gain founded them. One might begin to see why the concept of charity is so deeply ingrained in the European mentality by exploring further into these motivations. Even in the countries where the practice of charity was discontinued for various reasons, this notion only briefly disappeared before re-emerging. The role those charitable organisations played in the ever-changing interaction between the state and society may be measured by how these processes took place.

The abovementioned processes were particularly noticeable in the 19th century. The famous British historian Norman Davies, author of *Europe. A History*¹ pointed out that the 19th century evolved through three precise stages, reaction (1815–48), reform (1848–71), and rivalry (1871–1914). In the first stage, the conservative fortress held out with varying success until it collapsed amidst the general revolutionary outburst of 1848. In the second stage, the powers reluctantly conceded that controlled reform was preferable to endless resistance. Significant concessions were made on all fronts. Constitutions were granted, and the last serfs were freed. Two of the three leading contenders for national independence were allowed the chance to succeed. The third and final stage saw Europe enter a time of intense rivalry, aggravated by diplomatic realignments, military rearmament, and colonial competition.

National charitable societies were established for political and philanthropic reasons in South-Eastern Europe, and they grew significantly in importance during intense rivalry. In particular, this applies to those Slavic Charities that emerged on the territory of the Russian Empire in the late 19th

¹ Norman Davies, *Europe: A History*, Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 1996, 1365 p.

century. Unlike France or Britain, which had colonies far beyond Europe, the Russian Empire was characterised by the phenomenon of “internal colonialism”, expressed in the intention to conquer neighbouring territories or extend its political influence. National charities were one of the factors of this policy.

SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE REVIEW

The activities of Slavic societies were underrepresented in historical literature. Among the most thorough investigations is Sergey Nikitin's research on *Slavic Committees in Russia. 1858 – 1878*, published in 1960.² Meanwhile, these societies included the best representatives of that time's intelligentsia: Osyp-Bodyansky, one of the Moscow Committee's initiators; Ishmael Sreznevsky, who was a member of the St. Petersburg Committee; Mykhailo Maksimovich, Andrey Linnichenko, Volodymyr Antonovich, Nicholay Rigelman, active members of the Kyiv Society. Some Russian historians studied the activities of the Slavic societies in the context of Slavophilism and pan-Slavism. Thus, historian Aleksey Popovkin believes that attempts to determine the chronological framework of Slavophilism narrowed the research of Slavic Charities. Thus, according to some Soviet historians, Slavophilism “disappeared” in the 1880s; however, the societies existed as early as 1917 and united classical followers of Slavophilism.³

Some foreign researchers also showed interest in this issue. David MacKenzie's works play an essential part in the American historiography of the Balkan Crisis. MacKenzie, the student of Philip Mosely, a notable Slavist scholar and one of the founders of American Soviet Studies, published the monograph *The Serbs and Russian pan-Slavism in 1875 – 1878*⁴ at Cornell University in 1967. Many Balkan experts have long held that Slavic committees and societies should be guided by the national interests of the Balkan peoples. Professor Slavenko Terzić's English article⁵

² Sergey Nikitin, *Slavyanskiye komitety v Rossii. 1858-1878* [Slavic Committees in Russia. 1858-1878], Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Moscow university, 1960, 364 s.

³ Aleksey Popovkin, *Deyatel'nost' slavyanskikh obshchestv v Rossii v kontekste sotsial'nogo razvitiya slavyanskikh narodov (1858 – 1917)* [The activities of Slavic societies in Russia in the context of the social development of the Slavic peoples (1858 – 1917)], in “Vestnik Tambovskogo universiteta. Seriya: Gumanitarnyye nauki” [Bulletin of Tambov University. Series: Humanitarian sciences], Vol. 6 (110), 2012, s. 246.

⁴ David MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878*, Ithaca – New York, Cornell University Press, 1967, 365 p.

⁵ Slavenko Terzić, *About eastern and western Panslavism (in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century)*, in “Istorijskiy chasopis” [Historical Review], 2006, vol. LIII, p. 317-332.

is essential for the historiography of the Slavic committees and organisations.

As for Ukrainian historiography, there are very few such studies. The history of charity in the southern region of contemporary Ukraine dates back to the 19th century; moreover, it is also closely related to the administrative and political system of these lands. Having come under the Russian Empire's rule in the late 18th century, the southern provinces were actively populated by different nationalities. The charity was actively used to support such a population. Some contemporary researchers conditionally divide charity into state, private and public charity.⁶

Several studies have been published in historical literature that covers the origins and activities of charity organisations in southern Ukraine. Among them is Lilya Bilousova's substantial work on *National societies in Odesa in the 19th – early 20th centuries*⁷. For the first time in history, Bilousova analysed and summarised information on the national associations of Odesa. Anna Gedyo's and Yuri Guzenko's works *The Role of Consular Offices in the Development of Charity in Odesa (late 19th – early 20th centuries)* and *The Formation and Activities of Public Charities on the Territory of Southern Ukraine in the late 19th – early 20th centuries (on the materials of Kherson province)*⁸ are also dedicated to the history of charity.

In recent years, some authors have published research dedicated to the Slavic Charitable Societies of Kyiv and Odesa⁹, in which they discuss the history of

⁶ Irena S. Grebtsova, *Stanovleniye gosudarstvennogo popechitel'stva i obshchestvennoy blagotvoritel'nosti v Odesse v kontse XVIII – 60-ye gg. XIX st.* [Formation of state guardianship and public charity in Odesa in the late 18th – 60's 19th century], Odesa, Astroprint, 2006, s. 270.

⁷ Lilya Bilousova, *Natsional'ni tovarystva v Odesi v XIX – na pochatku XX st.* [National societies in Odesa in the 19th – early 20th centuries], in "Ukrayins'kyi istorychnyy zhurnal" [Ukrainian historical journal], 2017, № 2, s. 46-63.

⁸ Anna Gedyo, *Rol' konsul's'kykh ustanov u rozvytkovi dobrochynnosti v Odesi (seredyna XIX – pochatok XX cm.)* [The role of consular offices in the development of charity in Odesa (late 19th – early 20th centuries)], in "Naukovyy visnyk Dyplomatychnoyi akademiyi Ukrayiny" [Scientific Bulletin of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine], Vol. 24, 2017, No.1, s. 163-170; Yuri Guzenko, *Stanovlennya i diyal'nist' hromads'kykh blahodiynykh ob'ednan' na Pivdni Ukrayiny v druhiy polovyni XIX – na pochatku XX st. (na materialakh Khersons'koyi huberniyi)* [The formation and activities of public charities on the territory of southern Ukraine in the late 19th – early 20th centuries (on the materials of Kherson guberniya)], Mykolayiv, Ilion, 2006, 232 s.

⁹ Volodimir Kotsiuk, *Profesor O. Kotlyarevs'kyi ta Kyivs'ke Slovo"yans'ke blahodiyne tovarystvo u 70-kh rokakh XIX st.* [Professor O. Kotlyarevsky and Slavic Charitable Society of Kyiv in the 70s of the 19th century], in "Visnyk Kam'yanets'-Podil's'koho

these associations. These societies' practical activities require additional investigation. Contrary to popular belief, they were not only limited to collecting voluntary donations and establishing scholarships for the poor southern and western Slavs who, by the will of fate, found themselves in the southern region and, in particular, in Odesa, in the 19th – early 20th centuries, but also worked in a variety of other areas.

Thus, this article aims to analyse the principles, directions and results of the educational activities of Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa (from now on – SCMSCSO). The exploration of certain understudied facets of the Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa makes this study unique. For various reasons, historians did not pay enough attention to this society. The presentation and interpretation of information based on the sources, in particular, the Charter of SS Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa (1870) and Reports of the Board of SS Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa for 1889 – 1910, give this article a distinct advantage.

THE FIRST IN THE SOUTH: THE ORIGIN AND PARTICULARITIES OF THE SLAVIC CHARITABLE SOCIETY OF ODESA

In Eastern Europe, the Slavic Charitable Societies' activities started in January 1858 with Emperor Alexander II's approval of the project aimed to establish the first Slavic Committee in Moscow and ended in the early second decade of the 20th century. The history of these societies is a picture of the functioning and development of a unique public social institution that brings hundreds of highly qualified specialists and influential people together, i.e. the Slavic scholars, economists, military and church figures, artists, writers, poets, doctors, and specialists in public affairs as well as administration of charitable organisations. During the

natsional'noho universytetu imeni Ivana Ohienka: Istorychni nauky" [Bulletin of Kamyanets-Podilsky National University named after Ivan Ogiienko: Historical Sciences], 2008, №1, s. 73-79; Tetiana Moiseieva, *Odes'ke slov'yans'ke tovarystvo imeni svyatykh Kyryla ta Mefodiya: formuvannya zasad diyal'nosti* [Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa: formation of principles of activity], in "Visnyk Odes'koho istoryko-kraeyznavchoho muzeyu" [Bulletin of the Odessa Museum of History and Local Lore], 2011, vol. 10, s. 203-206; Olexander Muzychko, *Odes'ke slov'yans'ke blahochynne tovarystvo imeni svyatykh Kyryla ta Mefodiya: osnovni etapy diyal'nosti* [Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa: main stages of activity], in "Problemy slov'yanoznavstva" [Problems of Slavic studies], Lviv, 2007, vol. 56, s. 311-312.

semicentennial period of activities, the Slavic committees and societies managed to gain considerable authority in the Slavic lands and implement several important regional and international projects in the field of Slavic studies and education.

Some historians attribute the reasons for the emergence of the Slavic societies to the general political situation. Thus, Slavenko Terzić believes that after the Crimean War, the Slavophiles shifted their focus to the relations between Russia and other Slavic countries, especially Orthodox ones. This idea was embodied in the creation of the Slavic committees.¹⁰ At the same time, the researchers believe that the Slavic committees served as civil society's structures promoting literacy in both Russia and the Slavic countries, the exchange of ideas between Russia and Slavdom, and raising Slavophile civic consciousness.¹¹

The idea of pan-Slavism was at the core of their work. Norman Davies points out that "in Russia, the pan-Slav movement was loaded with racial overtones. Arguing for the unification of all Slavic peoples under the aegis of the Tsar, it often assumed that political solidarity would emerge from the (non-existent) racial affinity of the Slavs. It received little support from Catholic Poles and Croats, who had both produced earlier versions of pan-Slavism, and who now countered with scientific papers showing that the Russians were slavified Finns. It was most appreciated amongst Serbs, Czechs, and Bulgars, all of whom looked to Russia for liberation. Russian nationalism, blended with pan-Slavism, exhibited unparalleled messianic fervour".¹² The Slavic societies' activities in the Slavic peoples' protection field became especially active during the Balkan crisis of 1875 – 1876.

This research aligns with respected historians' views that the general political situation influenced greatly the spread of pan-Slavism and the emergence of the Slavic societies. However, it should be noted that the process of public charity in the Russian Empire's southern provinces had its characteristics compared to the central areas. It was stipulated by the region's specific situation, which was evolving under the influence of numerous immigrants. Foreign colonists held a significant position among the settlers. Despite the successes in the social-economic development of the annexed southern territories (late 18th – early 19th centuries), migration and the development of the new lands had a negative side effect, i.e. the creation of a broad stratum of the poor and the needy, who were in dire need of social protection.¹³

¹⁰ Slavenko Terzić, *About eastern and western Panslavism ...*, p. 317.

¹¹ Aleksey Popovkin, *Deyatel'nost' slavyanskikh obshchestv v Rossii ...*, s. 236.

¹² Norman Davies, *Europe: A History ...*, p. 812.

¹³ Irena S. Grebtsova, *Stanovleniye gosudarstvennogo popechitel'stva ...*, s. 271.

As the South's principal port and border city, Odesa became a crossroads of active international and domestic migration flows and a permanent or temporary stay for the representatives of over one hundred nationalities, including foreigners. Odesa was also a major administrative, judicial, military, and educational centre. Seeking happiness, representatives of various nationalities and different social strata filled the city, bringing their funds, abilities and talents. Communities of different ethnic groups had united and formed several national societies to jointly pursue various social interests, including charity activities to assist the needy.

In general, various forms of charity developed in Odesa. Corporate associations became the most prominent in the late 19th century. Their assistance was usually directed to the members of the community. The distinctiveness of Odesa's philanthropy is defined by the presence of numerous foreign consulates, which contributed significantly to the establishment of organisations such as the Swiss Charitable Society, French, Greek, German, Austro-Hungarian Societies, etc. The primary purpose of all these associations was to assist their citizens who permanently or temporarily resided in the southern region.¹⁴

The SCMSCSO was established in 1870 to "encourage useful work in the field of Slavic science and art as well as to assist indigent Slavs". It was the fourth Slavic society to be founded on the territory of the Russian Empire. As previously stated, the first such society, the Moscow Slavic Committee, emerged after the Crimean War in 1858 and aimed to provide various aid to the Slavic peoples under Turkish and Austro-Hungarian rule. At the initiative of the Moscow Slavic Committee, the Slavic Congress was held in Moscow in 1867, which prompted the establishment of the Slavic Charitable Societies in the largest cities of the Russian Empire. Thus, in 1868, the Slavic committee was established in St. Petersburg, in 1869 in Kyiv, and 1870 in Odesa. All of them, except for the SCMSCSO, existed initially as the Moscow Committee's departments and only in the 70s of the 19th century turned into independent charitable societies.

According to Sergey Nikitin, the idea of creating a Slavic charity in Odesa came from the Odesa Slavs, i.e. the Serbs, the Bulgarians, and the Croats who lived in Odesa. Diplomat Mikhail Khitrovo, who hoped this organisation would become an active disseminator of Russian ideology among Balkan peoples, endorsed that idea.¹⁵

The Slavic Society's first chairman was Sergey Golubtsov, the Odesa Educational District Trustee, and its secretary was Viktor Grigorovich, a

¹⁴ Anna Gedyo, *Rol' konsul's'kykh ustanov...*, s.165.

¹⁵ Sergey Nikitin, *Slavyanskiye komitety v Rossii...*, s.52-53.

philologist and professor at Novorossiysk University. The society's composition was dominated by Novorossiysk University teachers, natives of Slavic countries living in Odesa. According to the SCMSCSO's Charter, approved on April 8, 1870, the society's activities (following the examples of the Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kyiv Committees) focused on providing financial assistance to the poor Slavs and assisting them in education.¹⁶ The tasks of the society were moral and financial support of the scholars as well as literary and artistic events for the population. Furthermore, the institution assumed the duty of working with local authorities to provide opportunities for migratory Slavs to earn a living.¹⁷

The Board of the Society tried to react quickly to any complications that arose in the Slavic lands. Thus, in 1872, financial aid was sent to the Czech Republic, which suffered from the floods, and material support was provided to the Serbs and the starving Galicians. The Board of the Society provided material assistance in the struggle for the Balkan Slavs' independence during the Balkan peoples' demonstrations against Turkish rule from 1875 – 1876. During the uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina, members of the society collected about 9,000 rubles via donations. The Odesa residents supported society's work during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 – 1878. The organisation assisted the wounded during the war in the Balkans (1912).¹⁸

Nonetheless, the society's members focused mainly on philanthropy. Valtazar Bogii, a Dalmatian native, a graduate of Vienna University, a history professor at Novorossiysk University, and an honorary member of the society, held a significant position in the Slavic society. He suggested that the organisation establish a library fund to acquaint the representatives of the Slavic peoples with each other's culture, lives and needs.¹⁹ All this was put into practice: the Slavic reading room with a library was opened at the society, and special scholarships were awarded to the Slavs who studied at Novorossiysk University. Aiding girls of Slavic heritage acquired an important place in the SCMSCSO's activities (the Bulgarians, the Serbs, the Poles, etc.). The society helped them obtain an education and, as a result, a profession as public and secondary school teachers in their

¹⁶ *Ustav Odesskogo slavyanskogo blagotvoritel'nogo obshchestva imeni svyatykh Kirilla i Mefodiya* [Charter of the Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa], Odesa, 1870, s. 2.

¹⁷ Derzhavnyy arkhiv Odes'koi oblasti (DAOO) [State Archive of the Odesa region], fond 273, list 1, file 1, p. 1-6.

¹⁸ DAOO, fond 273, list 1, file 7, p. 5.

¹⁹ *Tsirkulyar po Odesskomu uchebnomu okrugu* [Circular on the Odesa educational district], 1870, № 10, October, s. 339.

homeland. To that end, the Society established the "Slavic Maidens' Nursery" in November 1874, which, according to the Statute, was subordinated to the Ministry of Education, the Odesa Educational District Trustee, but was under the direct supervision of the SCMSCSO.

Interest on fixed assets, membership fees, scholarships on the Organization of the Southern Slavs' Education in Russia (located under the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the Bulgarian Board of Trustees as well as proceeds from public charities, etc. were the primary sources of institutional funding.²⁰ The SCMSCSO was notable for dedicating a substantial percentage of its charity operations to cultural and educational work, mainly among the poor in Odesa and its suburbs. This feature distinguishes the SCMSCSO from similar societies within the Russian Empire.

In the late 19th century, against the background of social reforms carried out throughout the Russian Empire, the intelligentsia paid increasing attention to people's educational levels. Some Writing Societies emerged in Kharkiv and Kyiv in the 60s and 80s of the 19th century; later, in the early 20th century, they became large cultural and educational centres.

Members of the Society organised concerts and theatre performances, public readings, Sunday classes, and opened free libraries. A similar idea arose among Odesa's intelligentsia. In the early 1860s, one of the popular newspapers, the Odesa Herald, announced its intention to establish the Literacy Society in Odesa and even began publishing lists of those wishing to join. Unfortunately, it never operated due to a variety of factors. Instead, the SCMSCSO's members took up the idea of cultural and educational activity among the people, which they accomplished through public readings and lectures and theatrical, literary, and musical evenings.

CONTENT AND FORMS OF EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

One of the most popular forms of educational activities was public readings. It was nearly the only extracurricular activity that could be used to improve the cultural level of the illiterate adult population (the government banned Sunday schools in 1862). The government issued the official permission to organize public readings in provincial cities in 1876, and similar readings existed in Kyiv and Kharkiv in the early 1880s. The idea of opening public readings in Odesa came from the former Governor-General of the region, SCMSCSO's member, Prince

²⁰ Tetiana Moiseieva, *Odes'ke slov'yans'ke tovarystvo...*, s. 204.

Alexander Dondukov-Korsakov. The permission was obtained in March 1882, and on April 25, the first reading took place.²¹

Later, a Committee on Public Readings was established under the society's Board, which included Sergey Znamensky (chairman), Ivan Karvatsky, and Gregory Afanasyev. The Committee drew up a program of readings, engaged teachers of educational institutions, and established contacts with the leaders of the public lessons in other cities in the southern region.

The organisation of public readings did not require large expenditures (the lecturers spoke for free), and key attention was paid to the requests of a large audience. The topics of the readings were quite diverse, and, according to the SCMSCSO's Board Reports, they had to list all of the public activities they had engaged in. Most of these reports were published and now are stored at the Scientific Library of I. I. Mechnikov Odesa National University; several reports are stored at the State Archives of the Odesa Region.²² The readings were intended mainly for the illiterate population and included general information on natural sciences, geography, literature, and history. Thus, of the 42 folk readings organised in 1885, 11 lectures were on historical topics and eight on literature; in 1889 (in two classrooms) – 22 and 20 lessons, respectively, with a total number of 65.²³ The report of the SCMSCSO's Board for 1890 stated, "the people are most interested in historical readings which concern the major reforms and certain historical figures' activities as well as actively attend readings of classical works by Alexander Pushkin, Nicolay Gogol, Mikhail Lermontov and others".²⁴ One may assume that the lecturers' personalities can also explain this. Members of the Society who were also professors at Novorossiysk University's Faculty of History and Philology mainly conducted the readings. As a result, much emphasis was placed on the readings' historical and literary themes.

Such activity of the Society's members in conducting public readings received a positive response from historians. In particular, the researcher

²¹ *Odessa. 1794 – 1894. Izdaniye gorodskogo obshchestvennogo pravleniya k stoletiyu goroda* [Odesa. 1794 – 1894. Publication of the city public administration for the centenary of the city], Vol. 1, Odesa, 1894, s. 766.

²² DAOO, fond 273, list 1, files 2, 6, 19.

²³ *Otchet pravleniya Odesskogo slavyanskogo blagotvoritel'nogo obshchestva im. sv. Kirilla i Mefodiya za 1889 g.* [Board Report of the Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa for 1889], Odesa, 1890, s. 7-9.

²⁴ *Otchet pravleniya Odesskogo slavyanskogo blagotvoritel'nogo obshchestva im. sv. Kirilla i Mefodiya za 1890 g.* [Board Report of the Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa for 1890], Odesa, 1891, s. 5.

Olexander Muzychko, while defining the periods in the Society's activities, refers to the period of 1890 – the 1910s as “educational” and connects it with the organisation of public readings.²⁵ It would seem that this period should have begun earlier – from 1882, with the actual start of the public lectures.

At the same time, it should be noted that there was a decrease in the number of visitors to public readings in 1888 - 1889. This tendency was explained in correspondence between the SCMSCSO's Board and the Office of the Interim Governor-General of Odesa²⁶ by a limited range of literature allowed for public readings. This led to frequent repetitions, e.g. in 1889, “Poltava” by Alexander Pushkin was read 11 times. To improve the level of public readings, the SCMSCSO's Board, with the support of the former interim Governor-General of Odesa, Christopher Roop, petitioned the Academic Committee of the Ministry of Public Education to expand the range of readings. Finally, permission for the new lessons was obtained, and the list of literature was updated with 95 new works, mainly on history, literature and geography.²⁷

The Committee on Public Readings members were constantly looking for new ways to improve the public readings. As the Committee's chairman, Sergey Znamensky, noted, “the people are drawn to new knowledge by the very nature of things and living conditions. They need this knowledge for self-determination, to improve their level of education, and to fill their leisure time. That's why we must ensure that the readings are meaningful and as productive as possible”.²⁸ To achieve this goal, the Committee introduced new forms of public readings: from the 1890s, special public lectures were organised to promote scientific knowledge. These lectures gave in-depth information on the same topics covered in the regular public readings.²⁹ For this purpose, the Lecture Committee was created at the Odesa People's Auditorium. Its tasks included disseminating information about the lectures, making them as accessible as possible for the people in terms of both content and payment (the entrance fee was from one to five kopecks), providing the lectures with visual material, and establishing

²⁵ Olexander Muzychko, *Odes'ke slov'yans'ke blahochynne tovarystvo...*, s. 311.

²⁶ DA00, fond 5, list 1, file 1961, p. 1-5.

²⁷ *Tsirkulyar po Odesskomu uchebnomu okrugu* [Circular on the Odesa educational district], 1890, №8, August.

²⁸ *Otchet pravleniya Odesskogo slavyanskogo blagotvoritel'nogo obshchestva im. sv. Kirilla i Mefodiya za 1903 g.* [Board Report of the Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa for 1903], Odesa, 1904, s. 11-12.

²⁹ Alexey Markevich, *O nashey narodnoy auditorii (pis'mo v redaktsiyu)* [About our people's audience (letter to the editor)], in “Odesskiy listok” [Odessa leaf], 1896, 16 September.

feedback with the visitors through interviews and written wishes.³⁰

The public lectures were distinctive in that they were organised in the form of systematic courses in individual disciplines, and various specialists, mostly university teachers, usually attended them. Starting from 1897, the Lecture Committee began signing up students for the lectures that began in September, one to two months before the start of the courses. At the same time, free attendance was also practised. When registering to attend the lectures, students had to indicate their age, education, occupation, place of residence and subjects of interest. Based on the subscription materials, the Lecture Committee compiled bulletins using tables. Later, the publications were distributed to the Committee Members. Based on these newsletters, the lecturers gathered course programs, considering listeners' level of education and interests.

During 1897 – 1900, the Lecture Committee organised and conducted 406 lectures on 11 subjects (literature, history, geography, cosmography, anatomy, physics, chemistry, botany, geology, economics, and law); the average number of visitors was 600-700 people per each lecture.³¹ Interestingly, in contrast to the folk readings, where classes in history and literature were of primary interest, in public speeches, physics courses (64 lectures in three years), chemistry (66 lessons), and geography (58 lectures) were the most popular. It should also be noted that this type of educational activity gradually replaced popular readings starting from the first years of the 20th century.

Literary-musical and dramatic evenings organised by the SCMSCSO at public auditoriums became extremely popular among the population. It began in January 1893, during Petr Tchaikovsky's stay in Odesa, when he responded to the SCMSCSO's invitation and attended the first literary and musical evening at the Exchange Committee Hall. Tchaikovsky personally led the folk audience's amateur orchestra during the evening's musical part, which featured the composer's works.³²

In general, literary and dramatic evenings as forms of cultural and educational activities were aimed at acquainting the working people with the biography and works of several prominent Russian and Ukrainian writers, i.e. Nicolay Gogol, Alexey Tolstoy, Lev Tolstoy, Vasil Zhukovsky, Mikhail Lermontov,

³⁰ *Otchet o deyatel'nosti Lektsionnogo komiteta pri Odesskoy gorodskoy auditoriy za 1897 – 1900 uch. g.* [Report on the activities of the Lecture Committee at the Odesa city audience for 1897 - 1900], Odesa, 1901, s. 5-6.

³¹ *Ibid*, s.18.

³² *Otchet pravleniya Odesskogo slavyanskogo blagotvoritel'nogo obshchestva im. sv. Kirilla i Mefodiya za 1893 g.* [Board Report of the Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa for 1893], Odesa, 1894, s. 28.

Alexey Ostrovsky, and Ivan Turgenev. As a rule, the evenings consisted of two significant parts: lectures on the life path and significance of a poet or writer's work and reading or staging excerpts. If the evening was literary and musical, the composer's biography was usually told in the first part, and his works were performed in the second. By 1891, there had been 55 literary, musical, and dramatic evenings.³³ The Society continued to organise free literary evenings in the early 20th century that had already been "illustrated with playful light pictures". In 1911, 2,000 visitors attended 18 readings.³⁴

Since the end of the 1890s, the SCMSCSO's cultural and educational activities have been supplemented by several new activities. The Society staged works by Ukrainian and Russian writers to popularise them. The SCMSCSO created a special Theatrical Committee led by Sergey Krapivin and a permanent acting troupe of nine people (Nicolay Klensky was the director). The Committee compiled performance programs and enlisted the help of some professional actors. For example, in 1909, 34 performances with 12,000 visitors took place at public auditoriums.³⁵ The most popular among the general public were Mark Kropyvnytsky's "Stupid Fools", Taras Shevchenko's "Nazar Stodolya", Mykhailo Starytsky's "Bogdan Khmelnytsky" and "Oh, do not go, Hrytsia, to the party" as well as Ivan Tobilevych's "Sava Chaly". In the early 20th century, the popularity of such performances increased by more than 50%: in 1899, the ratio of the Russian and Ukrainian authors' performances was approximately equal; then, in 1902, 20 performances out of 25 were works of Ukrainian authors.³⁶

Funds collected during the evenings and performances (entrance fee was 5 kopecks) went to the Committee's needs to pay for public readings and charity. For example, in 1887, two literary evenings dedicated to Alexander Pushkin's works were held. A part of the raised funds (100 rubles) went toward constructing a monument of this great poet in Odesa.

The administration of the public auditoriums tried to involve teachers and lecturers of various secondary and higher educational institutions to conduct public readings and lectures as well as literary and musical evenings. The teachers of Novorossiysk University, namely historians Gregory Afanasyev, Alexey

³³ *Otchet pravleniya Odesskogo ... za 1891 g.* [Board Report of the Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa for 1891], Odesa, 1892, s. 4.

³⁴ DAOO, fond 273, list 1, file 19, p. 1-5.

³⁵ *Otchet pravleniya Odesskogo ... za 1910 g.* [Board Report of the Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa for 1910], Odesa, 1911, s. 5.

³⁶ *Otchet pravleniya Odesskogo ... za 1902 g.* [Board Report of the Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa for 1902], Odesa, 1903, s. 17-18.

Markevich, literary historian Alexander Kirpichnikov, philologist Nicolay Mandes, and lawyer Andrey Borzenko actively cooperated. Such Odesa Community Members as Dmytro Syharevych, Anton Syniavsky, and Sergey Singaivsky were regular participants of the SCMSCSO events. In his memoirs, Anton Syniavsky wrote about citizens' participation in public readings: "The teacher of St. Paul school, Ivan Rudenko and the inspector of the same school Anton Kryzhanovsky began wider cultural and educational semi-legal work. Anton Syniavsky, a teacher of Higher Courses and military school for women, worked at the auditoriums of the "People's Readings" since its foundation. Rudenko was in charge of the audience, and Kryzhanovsky and Syniavsky worked as lecturers. The first one lectured on literature, while Syniavsky lectured on history and economics, mainly to a working-class audience".³⁷ Dramatic artists were also involved in organising literary, musical and dramatic evenings.

The members of the SCMSCSO paid particular attention to improving the material and technical base. Visual material, musical breaks, and the free distribution of literature were all actively used during readings, lectures, and performances. They were inspired by the slogan "it is not the literate who can read, but the one who truly reads" (words of an activist in the field of spreading education among people, a member of the SCMSCSO, a professor of Novorossiysk University Alexander Kirpychnikov). In 1886, the SCMSCSO founded Saints Cyril and Methodius Bookstore. The book store aimed to provide books to public audiences and distribute and sell popular literature during the readings (the cost of one copy ranged from one to 15 kopecks).³⁸ In the mid-1890s, some bookstores were established in Odesa's suburban villages and towns. One of the essential activities was the publication of brochures based on the public lectures to make them popular with a broader audience. Most of them were on historical and local lore. Some copies were distributed free of charge, some were transferred to the reading rooms, and some were sold.

The SCMSCSO established free reading rooms for those who could not afford to buy books, even for a nominal fee. It should be noted that, at first, visitors were only allowed to borrow books from the reading room. Later, books were loaned out for home reading on a small deposit. It significantly expanded the circle of the readers. The first public reading room was opened as far back

³⁷ Anton Syniavsky, *Dmytro Syharevych. Vybrani pratsi* [Dmytro Syharevych. Selected works], Kyiv, Naukova dumka, 1993, s. 44.

³⁸ Yuri Karvatsky, *Gorodskaya auditoriya dlya narodnykh chteniy v Odesse* [City auditorium for public readings in Odesa], Odesa, 1895, s. 20-21.

as 1885 at the city auditorium, then moved to a specially designated space at the City Public Reading Room.³⁹

The activities of the SCMSCSO in the field of education were not limited to Odesa. The Ministry of Public Education issued a permit for public readings in villages in 1888, then in county towns in 1894. In 1893, the SCMSCSO began preparations for the public assignments in suburban villages. The Bourgeois Society of Odesa allocated funds to organise some public readings in the country. Permission to hold the lessons was obtained in 1894, and the first public readings were held in five suburban villages in October-December of that year, attended by 15,000 people. Noting that the public lessons are almost the only "window of culture in the countryside", the general meeting of the SCMSCSO considered it necessary to establish local committees for the public readings. Reading organisers attempted to make them as valuable and informative as possible. On Ivan Rudenko's initiative, several field meetings of the Commission were held in 1903, which village teachers and priests attended to gain experience.

Subsequently, the SCMSCSO succeeded in extending the geography of cultural and educational events and the number of visitors. Thus, in the early 20th century, approximately 200 folk readings and literary evenings were held near the villages of Velikiy Fontan, Dalnik-1, Dalnik-2, Nerubayske, Seredniy Fontan, Gnilyakove, Fomina Balka, Kriva Balka and Usatove, with an average audience of up to 100 people.⁴⁰ The topics of the folk readings were as close to the programs of the public tasks at the local auditoriums as possible.

In educational work, the SCMSCSO maintained contacts with the Charitable Societies and Organizations of Odesa, whose public figures were involved in its activities. Special mention should be made of the SCMSCSO's ties with the Ukrainian society "Prosvita", which collaborated on a literary and musical evening in Taras Shevchenko's memory at the city public auditorium in 1906. However, it should be noted that the general content and direction of the activities organised by the Society lacked an unmistakable national character and aimed at broadening the broad horizons of the population.

Mention should be made of the SCMSCSO's cooperation with the educators from other regions. Thus, in 1886 the exchange of illustrative material was established with the Commissions of People's Readings in Kherson, Melitopol,

³⁹ *Ibid.*, s. 41-43.

⁴⁰ *Otchet pravleniya Odesskogo slavyanskogo blagotvoritel'nogo obshchestva im. sv. Kirilla i Mefodiya za 1907g.* [Board Report of the Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa for 1907], Odesa, 1908, s. 8-12.

Sevastopol, Kerch, Chisinau, and Tiraspol. In 1889, the SCMSCSO Commission established a Recommendation Bureau on the Selection of Textbooks for the Readers of Different Ages, led by Professor Alexander Kirpichnikov. The Recommendation Bureau took care of compiling catalogues and selecting books for the reading rooms at the public auditoriums: libraries were built for rural schools in Kherson and Poltava provinces, an orphanage in Kherson, and Vinnytsia parish school. The total number of free publications sent annually on demand was about 1,500 units.

The SCMSCSO was awarded a gold medal for fruitful work organising public readings. One of its most active members, Yuri Karvatsky, was elected to the Commission of Public Readings of the Ministry of Education. However, as Ivan Rudenko rightly noted, the accurate recognition of the educators of Odesa came from the gratitude expressed by visitors to the public auditorium: "for many people, the auditorium is a temple, the god of which is science. Sow what is wise, kind, eternal, and then the best of the listeners who seek to grow in themselves the seeds of science laid down with your help will thank you from their hearts".⁴¹

CONCLUSIONS

Thus, Saints Cyril and Methodius Slavic Charitable Society of Odesa, which functioned within the southern region of the Russian Empire, had two activities defined in the Society's Charter and functioned simultaneously. The first was focused on providing financial assistance to needy Slavs. This trend was also seen in the activities of other societies. The second one, cultural and educational work became the Odesa Society's defining feature that distinguished it from Kyiv or Moscow Societies.

The society was unique in that it was founded by local representatives of South Slavs who sought to help their compatriots.

The central and local governments supported them, hoping that the society would become an active disseminator of the Russian ideology among the Balkan peoples. Odesa would become their place of residence after the resettlement. The SCMSCSO's success in many respects was ensured by the community members' interest, as the endeavour, especially at first, was free and required much dedication and enthusiasm. Local intelligentsia, particularly Novorossiysk University professors who moderated many such events, played an undeniable role in this.

⁴¹ *Otchet o deyatel'nosti Lektsionnogo komiteta...*, s. 95.

Unlike other societies, where educational work was reduced to elementary lectures on social nature and had a practical focus, the SCMSCSO practised various forms of education: at first, it was folk readings, then public lectures, as well as literary, musical and dramatic evenings. The work of the bookstore and libraries at the public auditoriums that had found recognition among the poor of the city became crucial in the society's activities. It is important to note that the SCMSCSO's cultural and educational activities were not limited to Odesa but extended to some suburban villages. Moreover, the society willingly shared its achievements with educators from other regions.

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THE METAMORPHOSES OF THE TERRITORIAL ORGANISATION OF LOCAL AUTHORITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA IN THE POST-COMMUNIST DECADES: FROM THE “SOVIET RIGOR” TO THE “DEMOCRATIC INCERTITUDE”

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Abstract: *This paper aims to elucidate the process of reorganising the territorial dimension of the local authority in the Republic of Moldova from the proclamation of independence up to the present. The primary data collection method was the content analysis of the official documents and statistics, legal papers, and scientific literature. The study analyses the territorial organisation of the local power in those three decades after the fall of communism. Based on the content analysis of the relevant normative acts, official documents, statistical data, and specialised papers, the evolutions and involutions of this period were revealed. As a result, it was concluded that during the three decades of post-communist transition, several attempts were made to reform the territorial organisation of the local authority. These reformist attempts were uninspired and incorrectly performed, being ostensibly rejected by both political actors and officials from state and local public authorities. Generally, the administrative reforms and restructuring at the local level and, implicitly, of the territorial organisation of the local authority were carried out according to the political objectives of the governors, not having strategies with clearly established aims at their base. The opinion of the imminent necessity of reforming the territorial organisation of the local authority in the Republic of Moldova as a mandatory condition for the efficient functioning of democracy at the local level was formulated and argued.*

Keywords: *Post-communist transition, territorial organisation, local authority, Soviet system, reform, Republic of Moldova, autonomy.*

Rezumat: Metamorfozele organizării teritoriale a autorității locale din Republica Moldova în deceniile post-comuniste: de la „rigoarea sovietică” până la „incertitudinea democratică”. Acest articol își propune să elucideze procesul de reorganizare a dimensiunii teritoriale a autorității locale din Republica Moldova de la proclamarea independenței până în prezent. Metoda primară de colectare a datelor a fost analiza conținutului documentelor și statisticilor oficiale, lucrărilor legale și literaturii științifice. Studiul analizează organizarea teritorială a puterii locale în acele trei decenii după căderea comunismului. Pe baza analizei de conținut a actelor normative relevante, documentele oficiale, datele statistice și lucrările specializate, au fost dezvăluite evoluțiile și involuțiile acestei perioade. Drept urmare, s-a ajuns la concluzia că, în cele trei decenii de tranziție post-comunistă, au fost făcute mai multe încercări de reformare a organizării teritoriale a autorității locale. Aceste încercări reformiste au fost neinspirate și efectuate incorect, fiind respinse în mod evident atât de actori politici, cât și de oficiali de la autoritățile publice locale și de stat. În general, reformele administrative și restructurarea la nivel local și, implicit, a organizării teritoriale a autorității locale au fost îndeplinite în funcție de obiectivele politice ale guvernanților, nefiind strategii cu scopuri clar stabilite la baza lor. Opinia despre necesitatea iminentă a reformării organizării teritoriale a autorității locale din Republica Moldova, drept condiție obligatorie pentru funcționarea eficientă a democrației la nivel local, a fost formulată și argumentată.

INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS

On the 27th of August, 1991, the Republic of Moldova gained independence. The Moldovan political elite, formed in the Soviet party schools, initiated the transition from the planned economy and the socialist society to the market economy and democratic society. The emphasis was on the institutionalist approach to the phenomenon, the descending path of democracy-building, the maintenance of the territorial organisation of the local power, and Soviet administrative practices.

Despite more or less scientifically founded actions in the last three decades, the local authority system in the Republic of Moldova has not yet identified a feasible solution regarding its territorial administration.

This paper aims to shed more light on the territorial dimension re-organisation of local power in the Republic of Moldova since the proclamation of independence until now. The primary data collection method was the content analysis of official documents and statistics, legislative acts and literature.

The paradigm of territorial organization of public authority served as the

scientific foundation for the examination of issues concerning the distribution of public power, and was based on the following assertions:

a) In contemporary society, the power of the people takes place at different levels and in various forms;

b) The population of local communities, as a part of the people, directly or through the authorities created by these collectivities, exercises public control within limits provided by the existing normative framework;

c) The public authority of each local collectivity is a component of the public administration, which, together with the state authority, forms a unitary system of shared governance;

d) The Constitution and state legislation provide the legal basis for public authority, granting elected authorities of local collectivities the required competence to carry out their jurisdiction.¹

The process of the territorial re-organisation of the local public authority in the three decades of independence, under their evolutionary aspect, went through three distinct stages:

1) The maintaining of the territorial-administrative centralised delimitation of the Soviet origin (1991-1998);

2) The building of the territorial system of exercising the local authority in the spirit of the principles of local autonomy (1999-2003);

3) The return to the centralised territorial organisation of the local public authority (2003 up to the present).

From this point forward, the specific tendencies of each stage have been thoroughly examined.

MAINTAINING THE CENTRALIZED TERRITORIAL-ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET ORIGIN (1991-1998)

The administrative configuration of the state represents the result of a long evolutionary process. Each stage of previous development reflects the traditions, habits, and cultural values, as well as the economic and spiritual activities specific

¹ Sergiu Cornea, *Dimensiunea teritorială a puterii locale: identificarea unei paradigme de investigare* [Territorial Dimension of Local Power: Identification of a Paradigm for Investigation], in *Perspectivile și Problemele Integrării în Spațiul European al Cercetării și Educației* [The Prospects and Problems of Integration into the European Space of Research and Education], Vol. I, Cahul, 2018, p. 15.

to that period.²

The evolution of the territorial organisation of the local public authority in the Republic of Moldova represents an original synthesis of its experiences accumulated under different foreign occupations. Along with the national practices, foreign methods and administrative systems were imposed by force, with the greatest damaging impact coming from the Soviet Union, the consequences of which may still be felt today. Because of these influences of Soviet origin, the Republic of Moldova has always had two contradictory tendencies that concurred in terms of the country's development opportunities: one of neo-communist origin that opposed democratic reforms and supported the preservation of Russian influence, and another liberal one that favours the democratic progress and has as its main objective European integration.³ These two movements significantly influenced the actions and policies of the forms of governing that have changed in the Republic of Moldova over the past three decades.

The communist ideology viewed territorial administration of the public authority as a division of the state's territory into sections, according to its class nature, with the duties and functions of the state matching the arrangement of state institutions in the system. Based on the class perspective, the concept of the territorial-administrative organisation of the Soviet state was defined as such: "the separation of the territory of the unionist republics into distinct parts (regions etc.), according to the roles and functions of the socialist state, to facilitate the establishment of Soviet state bodies and public organisations to ensure their operation".⁴ The unionist republics' administrative-territorial organization had to be perfected to successfully support the realisation of the grand objectives of the communist edification outlined in the Program of the Communist Party of the

² Lucica Matei, *Republic of Moldova: Toward a European Administration*, in Saltanat Liebert, Stephen E. Condrey, Dmitry Goncharov (Eds.), *Public Administration in Post-Communist Countries. Former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and Mongolia*, Boca Raton – London – New York, CRC Press, 2013, p. 194.

³ Dorin Cimpoeșu, *Evoluția și trăsăturile regimului politic post-totalitar din Republica Moldova (1990-2012)* [The Evolution and Characteristics of the Post-Totalitarian Political Regime in the Republic of Moldova (1990-2012)], in "Limba Română", 2012, nr. 7-8 (205), p. 48-49.

⁴ R. S. Pavlovskiy, M. A. Shafir, *Administrativno-territorialnoe ustroystvo SSSR*, [Administrative-Territorial Organization of the USSR], Moskva, Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo yuridicheskoy literaturyi, 1961, p. 10-11.

Soviet Union.⁵

The Soviet Juridical Law and the works of the researchers of those times did not differentiate between the concepts of local territory delimitation and administrative-territorial organisation. This aspect was facilitated by the official rejection of the idea of local self-administration and by the institutionalisation of all the Soviets, including the local ones, as bodies of state authority.⁶ The communist regime appealed to the excessive politicisation of all the administrative structures by controlling and abusively subordinating them to party organs.⁷

The territorial-administrative organisation of the Soviet state was based on the following general principles:

1) Establishment of administrative institutions in towns and industrial centres to consolidate the governance of society by the working class.

2) Establishment of administrative borders having in mind the natural, historical, and economic conditions to maximise the working force and ensure the administration of the economic structure.

3) Comprehensive analysis of the national compound and the social characteristics of the population to contribute to the subsequent consolidation of friendship among the peoples of the unitary Soviet state.

4) Consolidation and maximum proximity of the state apparatus towards the population by creating conditions for the development of local initiative, activism, and self-administration of the masses.⁸

The administrative standardisation was characteristic of the Soviet period as it asserted the uniformity of all republics and regions without consideration for their identity and historical particularities. Without regard for local specificities, identical names were imposed for administrative entities, public functions, and organisational charts. The Soviet system of administration was also excessively and essentially fragmented in what regards its territory. After the World War, the

⁵ A. V. Luzhin, *Improving the Administrative-Territorial Structure of the Soviet State*, in "Soviet Law and Government", 1963, no. 1 (4), p. 21.

⁶ S. A. Avakyan (Red.), *Munitsipalnoe pravo Rossii* [Municipal Law of Russia], Moskva, Prospekt, 2009, p. 98.

⁷ Cătălin Turliuc, *Organizarea administrativ-teritorială și puterea locală în România „democrației populare” 1947-1965* [The Administrative-Territorial Organization and the Local Power in Romanian "Popular Democracy" 1947-1965], in "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie «A. D. Xenopol»", T. XLIII-XLIV, 2006-2007, p. 603.

⁸ R. S. Pavlovskiy, M. A. Shafir, *op. cit.*, p. 14-15.

number of districts of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova varied from 18 to 60 units.⁹

The historical experience of the territorial-administrative re-organisation in the Soviet time shows that the Soviet elite considered the territorial-administrative organisation as one of the means of implementing the political and social-economical duties of the time. The reason for all the Soviet territorial-administrative transformations was determined by the party's desire to create a local administrative system that was efficient and adapted to the concrete historical development stage that could implement most efficiently the priority duties that were inherent to the respective time. Consequently, the territorial-administrative organisation changed along with the priority duties of the shifting exercising authority. The concrete principles that guided the territorial-administrative re-organisations were the following: a) the ability of the local authorities within their competence and the duties established by their superiors to maintain the situation in the administered territory under control, b) saving material resources and rational use of the staff, c) the correspondence between the territorial-administrative districts to economic regions, d) the establishment of the territorial-administrative capitals of units in towns that were first industrially significant for the corresponding territory.¹⁰

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the dissolution of the political and administrative Soviet system, a territorial organization of local public authority comparable to the system was developed. At that moment, the political class was aware that the territorial organisation of the Soviet regime could put a break to the economic and social development of the Republic of Moldova. Therefore, the Druc Government (May 25, 1990 – May 28, 1991) emphasized the importance of consolidating the country's territorial-administrative structure. First, there was the issue of eliminating the nomenclature of Soviet structures, which in every union ranged from 300 to 500 people. Three options were proposed: 9, 12,

⁹ Sergiu Cornea, *Organizarea teritorială a puterii locale din Republica Moldova: concept, mecanisme, soluții* [Territorial Organization of Local Power in the Republic of Moldova: Concept, Mechanisms, Solutions], București – Brăila, Editura Academiei Române – Editura Istros a Muzeului Brăilei "Carol I", 2017, p. 335-336.

¹⁰ S. A. Elizarov, *Formirovanie i funktsionirovanie sistemyi administrativno-territorialnogo deleniya BSSR (1919-1991 gg.)* [The Formation and Functioning of the System of Administrative-Territorial Division of the BSSR (1919-1991)], Gomel, GGTU im. P. O. Sukhogo, 2009, p. 199-200.

or 24 districts. The first step was to include historical, demographic, natural, economic, specialization, workforce, and other factors, but not nationality.

The Supreme Soviet of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Moldova approved the Decision Regarding the Perfecting of the Territorial-Administrative Organization of the Republic in 1990. It required the parliamentary commission for issues relating to local self-administration to make recommendations regarding the necessity of territorial units having high demographic potential as well as an economic and financial solid foundation. In July 1991, after eight months of debate, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted the *Law regarding the bases of the local administration No. 635-XII of 10.07.1991*. The Parliament's decision to apply the *Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the basis of the local self-administration no. 636 of 10.07.1991*, clearly provisioned that

“on the first stage until the adoption of the Law regarding the Republic of Moldova territorial-administrative organisation, the actual state authority became plural and extended to the competence of the basic territorial-administrative units, such as villages and towns. At this stage, the executive authority consolidated vertically by creating an intermediary mechanism for the functioning of the new self-administrative organs: till the forming of the districts, the actual borders were kept”.

The second stage anticipated the consolidation of the new administrative system. To avoid endangering the administration of current affairs, the government issued Decision No. 357 on July 22, 1991, establishing a temporary *Regulation regarding the functioning of the local self-administered organs in the Republic of Moldova during the transition period (until the finishing of the new territorial-administrative units)*. The Regulation did not mean essential changes for the organisation and functioning of the local public authorities. However, it merely meant a terminology change: The Soviets of People's Deputies became the City / Village Councils, and the executive committees were renamed “Primărie” (Town Hall). Although it was but temporary, the respective regulation was applied until the end of 1994.

The Parliament permanent commission for the local economic self-administration enforces the provisions of the *Law regarding the bases of the self-administration no. 635-XII of 10.07.1991*, as well as the launch of a new system of local public administration, organised into work groups, and has elaborated and brought forth three projects of Law: a) regarding the administrative organisation of the territory (that provisioned the annulment of the 40 units and a new delimitation of the territory in 7 or 9 units), b) regarding the local public administration, conceived in the spirit of the European traditions, based upon the Law practices

of some states having a long experience in the field and respecting the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, c) regarding the local elections, based on some democratic traditions in election organization in nations with well-developed representative democracies. However, the respective projects were included on the parliamentary agenda because their activity was also blocked. The parliamentary group "Village life", the future Agrarian Democratic Party, vehemently opposed the reformation of the territorial organisation of the public authority of Soviet origin, delaying the administrative reform until the parliamentary elections in 1998. As a consequence, the parliament self-dissolved in February 1994.¹¹

This period was marked by the influence of the following opposite tendencies: a) the democratisation of the political system created favourable conditions for the initiation of eventual reforms; b) on the one side, public opinion became aware of the necessity to reform the local public administration, including the territorial organisation of the public authority, and, on the other hand, there was a tough resistance from the side of those opposing the reform; c) keeping the traditional relations inherited from the past between the central local public authorities and the local public administration.¹²

On the 29th of July 1994, the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova was adopted. The Constitution laid forth the guiding principles for public administration in the territorial administrative units in article 109. On the 7th of December 1994, the Parliament adopted the *Law regarding the territorial-administrative organisation of the Republic of Moldova no. 306-XIII of 07.12.1994*, which provisioned that the territory of the Republic of Moldova was organised into the following territorial-administrative units: districts, towns, cities, villages, and autonomous territorial units having a special statute.

With some exceptions, this Law did not bring anything new to the system of the territorial organisation of the public authority in the Republic of Moldova by establishing the 40 districts that had been in place since the Soviet era. The elements of novelty were introduced by *Law no. 306-XIII of 07.12.1994*. They consisted of the following: a) the concept of the municipality was introduced to

¹¹ Victor Popa, *Cadrul legal al administrației publice locale în Republica Moldova* [Legal Framework of Local Public Administration in the Republic of Moldova], in *Cartea Albă. Situația autonomiei locale în Republica Moldova*, Chișinău, Ed. Cartier, 2000, p. 5-6.

¹² Aurel Simboreanu, *Reforma administrației publice în Republica Moldova* [Public Administration Reform in the Republic of Moldova], Chișinău, Museum, 2001, p. 68.

replace that of town subordinated to the republic (the statute of the municipality was given to the four big towns: Chişinău, Tiraspol, Bălţi, and Bender), b) by art. 4, paragraph 2, the notion “commune” was legislated, which is specific to the administrative space of the Republic of Moldova, but which was not observing art. 110 of the Constitution, c) the concept of locality was given up for the former central districts and some rural, more industrially developed places (Ghindeşti, Bucovăţ, Bîruiţa, Costeşti) by changing their status into towns;¹³ d) The minimum requirements for the formation of a territorial-administrative independent unit were established by article 12, line 2, and included having a population of at least 1000 people as well as sufficient financial resources to support the local town hall and the other social institutions, e) the Law established the correct writing of the names of localities in Romanian. The Soviet system was therefore preserved for the territorial-administrative organization of the public authority by the law that was enacted at the end of 1994, and autonomous territorial entities (Găgăuzia) based on ethnic criteria that comprised three districts were also formed (dolay).

The separation into districts was specific for this period. Due to the war in 1992, the districts Camenca, Dubăsari, and Slobozia were divided into two parts, being differently subordinated. After creating Gagauzia *de facto*, there were two districts named Vulcăneşti.

In conclusion, the structure of the territorial delimitation of the public authority itself remained unchanged throughout the first years following the independence declaration, despite changes to the local administration system. The political elite at that time considered the issue of optimising the territorial organisation of the public administration as secondary in comparison to political and economic changes. The local authority was not interested in reshaping the territorial delimitation, as it was moreover interested in consolidating positions in the administered territories. Therefore, a contradiction appeared between the radical changes of political nature, on the one hand, and the rigid territorial organisation of the public authority, on the other. The affirming of the market economy, the parliamentary system, and the delimitation of the state powers should be accompanied by transforming the territorial distribution of the public authority.

¹³ Sergiu Palihovici, *Reforma administraţiei publice locale în Republica Moldova: unitatea şi lupta contrariilor* [Local Government Reform in the Republic of Moldova: Unity and Struggle of Opposites], in “Moldoscopie. Probleme de analiză politică”, 2005, nr. 4, p. 29.

The failure in implementing a system of territorial organisation of the public authority according to the rigours of the democratic society occurred because the governors following individual and group interests made considerable efforts to preserve the actual situation that advantaged them by offering them safe positions and a specific social position.

THE EDIFICATION OF THE TERRITORIAL SYSTEM ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY (1999-2003)

Favourable conditions for the democratic reform of the territorial organisation of the public authority were established following the 1998 parliamentary elections and the formation of a majority of 3 democratic parties. In November 1998, the parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted the *Law regarding the territorial-administrative organisation of the Republic of Moldova, no. 191 of 12.11.1998*, which initiated the reform of the public authority territorial organisation and the local self-administration. The law was part of a new legislative package aimed at implementing local autonomy.

According to the provisions of Law no. 191-XIV of 12.11.1998, the Republic of Moldova was divided into 11 counties (Bălți, Cahul, Chișinău, Edineț, Lăpușna, Orhei, Soroca, Tighina, Ungheni, Gagauz Autonomous Territorial Unit and municipality of Chișinău), and the statute of municipality, according to article 8 of the same Law, was given to the towns Bălți, Bender, Cahul, Căușeni, Chișinău, Comrat, Dubăsari, Edineț, Hâncești, Orhei, Râbnîța, Soroca, Tiraspol, and Ungheni. The 11 counties started from the premise that they had a distinct administrative structure and different authorities; they could be divided into four categories: 1) counties; 2) the municipality of Chișinău; 3) Găgăuzia; 4) the places on the left side of the Dniester.¹⁴

The average county surface was 3,1- 4 thousand km² (meaning 9% of the territory), and the inhabitants' number varied from 240 to 400 thousand, except for the county of Taraclia.¹⁵

The number of local authorities (except those at the left of Dniester) decreased to 644, of which 12 municipalities, 43 towns, and 589 villages with

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁵ *Reforma administrației publice: controversile problemelor care bat la ușă* [Public Administration Reform: the Controversies of Door Knocking Problems], in "Administrarea publică", 1998, nr. 3, p. 17.

1.533 places. It was created by unifying areas with less than 2.500 inhabitants, the minimum necessary number to make a local authority, unlike 1.000 inhabitants, as the previous Law provisioned.

In the process of making the reform in 1998, the economic potential and the production force, the existence and the degree of development of the social infrastructure to create identical development conditions in each newly formed county were considered.

It can be mentioned that when the reform was made in 1998, there still were many differences in various fields between communities. The district Hâncești was 2.6 times larger than district Ialoveni. By the number of inhabitants, the Orhei district (136.000) was 4.3 times bigger than Basarabeasca (32.000). And most of the existent districts did not cover their expenses, not even 30% until 1999.

The premises for the transborder cooperation with the Romanian and Ukrainian local authorities were created as the result of the reform implementation, and concrete steps were realised according to this.

Although the territorial organisation of public authority, as it was provisioned in 1999, functioned for a limited amount of time, making it impossible for impartial evaluations to uncover its distinguishing features, it may nonetheless highlight certain functional deficiencies of that system.

Law no. 191-XIV of 12.11.1998 during the time was modified nine times. In October 1999, under the pressures of the Bulgarian minorities in the former district Taraclia, the Parliament created a new county with the same name and a population of only 44 thousand inhabitants.

The new territorial delimitation of the local authority diminished many of the existent differences but did not abolish them. For instance, Orhei county was, by surface, larger than Cahul, Tighina, or Taraclia. There also were discrepancies regarding the population: the Bălți and Orhei counties had a population of over 400,000 inhabitants, and the people of Taraclia were under 50,000. The local authorities were disproportionally shared across the counties: 251 in Bălți, 81 in Tighina and 26 in Taraclia.¹⁶

The major issues of the reform are the following: a) the decentralisation of functions was not followed by financing, b) instead of a real decentralisation of the functions with their sharing in the local administration, many public services were concentrated in the capitals of the new counties or even kept in the towns

¹⁶ Sergiu Palihovici, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

that were district centres in the past, c) the discrepancy between the system of localities as created in the Soviet period following the model of districts and the logic of the new model of counties.¹⁷

The lack of communication between policymakers and the population insufficiently informed regarding the objectives, the scopes, and the stages of realising the reform, as well as the lack of professional experience of the public servants of all kinds, substantially influenced the efficiency of the taken measures. It should be mentioned that counties began to function under the burst of the economic crisis that limited them financially and prevented them from operating at their best.

THE RETURN TO THE CENTRALISED TERRITORIAL ORGANISATION OF THE LOCAL PUBLIC AUTHORITY (2003-PRESENT)

The next stage starts with implementing the provisions of the *Law regarding the administrative-territorial organisation of the Republic of Moldova no. 764-XV of 27.12.2001*. This law was adopted rapidly without consultations with the people, the local public authorities, or international organisations.

The Law established the number of local authorities, how to create and abolish them, and how to determine and change their borders. In essence, the former districts were recreated and took the place of counties. The number of necessary inhabitants to make the administrative-territorial unit decreased from 2.500 to 1.500, which led to a considerable increase in their numbers.

Due to this reform, the local authorities' number considerably increased from 647 to 901, and the districts' number from 12 to 32. In this way, the Republic of Moldova returned to the Soviet model of territorial organisation of the local authority. The following data can illustrate the high similarity between the Soviet system and that after the reform. In 1988, in Soviet Moldova, there were 827 local soviets and 903 local collectivities (without Transnistria) after the counter-reform. Also, in 1988 there were 40 districts, and at present, there are 40 districts if the three internal divisions of Gagauzia and five of Transnistria are taken into account.¹⁸

¹⁷ Valeriu Prohnitchi, *Reorganizarea administrativ-teritorială: o componentă esențială a unei descentralizări de succes în Republica Moldova* [The Administrative-Territorial Reorganization: an Essential Component of a Successful Decentralization in the Republic of Moldova], in "Guvernare și democrație", 2011, nr. 1, p. 43.

¹⁸ Ion Osoian, et al., *Studiu analitic privind structura administrativ-teritorială optimală*

The elaboration and adoption of a counter-reform law not even three years after the reform in 1999 should have had serious reasons. Those who started the counter-reform made serious points for it, and in short, they are as follows:

- The election promises of the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (CPRM).
- “The requests of the citizens”, which reached an astonishing number of 650 thousand. The figure claimed by 650,000 supporters is exaggerated because it constituted 18 per cent of the country’s population; according to official data (which did not consider emigrants), the population of the Republic of Moldova in 2001 was 3 635 112 people. According to a study done in November 2001 by the Institute of Public Policy, the subject of changing the local public administration system was not one of the numerous issues that respondents wanted to see resolved in the first place.¹⁹
- The “administrative-territorial organisation” would contradict the Constitution that provisioned the delimitation of the Republic of Moldova into districts, towns, and villages.
- By reducing the distance between localities and district centres, the return to districts would make it easier for citizens to interact with public district authorities. Counties as territorial-administrative entities did not justify their existence.
- The need to strengthen the authority vertically.
- Putting an end to the degradation of the former district centres.
- Reducing the number of public servants in the local public administration.²⁰

pentru Republica Moldova [Analytical Study on the Optimal Administrative-Territorial Structure for the Republic of Moldova], Chişinău, Expert-Grup, 2010, p. 52.

¹⁹ Igor Boţan, *Revizuirea organizării administrative a teritoriului Republicii Moldova* [The Revision of the Administrative Organization of the Territory of the Republic of Moldova], <http://www.e-democracy.md/monitoring/politics/comments/200304081/>

²⁰ Sergiu Cornea, *Antireforma teritorial-administrativă din anul 2003: cauze şi consecinţe* [Administrative-Territorial Anti-Reform of 2003: Causes and Consequences], in *Modernizarea administraţiei publice în contextul democratizării sistemului politic şi proceselor integraţioniste. Materialele conferinţei internaţionale „Ştiinţa politică în RM: realizări şi perspective”. 15-16 octombrie 2010* [Modernization of Public Administration in the Context of Democratization of the Political System and Integrationist Processes. The Materials of the International Conference “Political Science in the Republic of Moldova: Achievements and Perspectives”. October 15-16, 2010], Chişinău, CEP USM,

The counter-reform of 2003 is a relevant example that, in most cases, choosing one or another way of territorial organisation of the public authority is not necessarily dependent on factors that have to do with science but on a group and political interests, traditions, and mentalities. In this way, the territorial organisation of the local authority was realised according to the territorial structures of the party that governed. They were created based on the principle of the administrative organisation of the territory until the reform of 1999. It was a means to pay those who worked for the communists in the election campaign but were left out of jobs. Also, placing the representatives of the CPRM in the structures of the local public administration was meant to consolidate their positions in the territory.²¹

Regarding the counter-reformists' claim that administrative-territorial organization in counties contravened the Constitution, which specifies the delimitation of the Republic of Moldova into districts, towns, and villages, it should be noted that the Constitutional Court ruled that the use of the concepts of village, municipality, and district did not contradict the principles of local autonomy, delimitation, as stipulated by article 109 of the Constitution, or the constitutional principles of territory organisation.²²

The re-animation of the former district centres was intended to place the public authorities at an intermediate level and the state's decentralised services. Many district centres were created for ideological reasons or within the logic of the Soviet Union's hyper-centralization, with no rationale or economic justifications. Spending public finance to re-animate old structures does not make sense.

The *Law no. 764-XV of 27.12.2001* (article 2) stipulates that "dividing of the territory of the country into administrative-territorial units is meant to ensure the realisation of the principles of local autonomy, decentralisation of public services,

2010, p. 62-63.

²¹ Tudor Osoianu, *Reforma judiciară și de drept în Republica Moldova – condiție necesară în vederea integrării ei europene* [Judicial and Legal Reform in the Republic of Moldova – a Necessary Condition for its European Integration], <https://ipp.md/old/public/files/Publicatii/2002/decembrie/Osoian.doc>

²² *Hotărârea Curții Constituționale cu privire la controlul constituționalității unor prevederi din Legea nr. 191-XIV din 12 noiembrie 1998 „Privind organizarea administrativ-teritorială a Republicii Moldova” nr. 50 din 05.10.1999* [The Decision of the Constitutional Court on the Control of the Constitutionality of Some Provisions of Law no. 191-XIV from November 12, 1998 "On the Administrative-Territorial Organization of the Republic of Moldova" no. 50 from October 05, 1999].

eligibility of the local public administrative authorities, ensuring the access of the citizens to the organs of the authority and their consulting on local matters of special interest". It is evident that apart from the basic principles of the local public administration enumerated in article 109 of the Constitution, the legislator introduced a new one: ensuring the citizens' access to the organs of the authority. The respective principle is only mentioned in the text of the Law and not explained. After studying the content of the Law, one can conclude that not only was the actual access of citizens to the public authorities (we assume it is about the institutions of the local authority) taken into account but also the territorial sizes of the districts were reduced to decrease the distance between the capitals of communities and the local collectivities. In this way, a deliberate error in interpreting the subsidiarity principle was made. More adequately, from the point of view of contemporary administrative science, the principle of the people's access to quality public services should have been stipulated; that would have meant not decreasing the distance in km to the public services but offering them directly at the population's place of residence. Local autonomy not only presupposes the access of the citizens to public authorities but also their access to quality public services for the following reason: the local authorities should diversify their methods and ways of interaction with the people and come closer to the people by fully satisfying the necessities of the population.²³

Regarding the consideration of the reduction of the number of public servants, it is necessary to see that tripling the number of intermediary authorities could not contribute to a reduction in the number of public employees. The apparatus of the County Council had 34 units (the maximum), except for the district of Taraclia, which had 14.5 units and the organisational charts of the apparatus of the district's president had 21 units. But the territorial units are already 32, not 10. And the number of local authorities reached 901 from 254; it is more than until the 2003 local elections. After implementing the counter-reform, the number of district counsellors grew from 344 to 1.284, and the number of employees in the apparatuses of the district presidents was 4640 compared to 2060 in the structures of the county councils. The number of employees in rural city halls grew from 6534 to 9306, and that of the city halls from 989 to 1173.²⁴ It was evident that the number of public servants increased

²³ Sergiu Cornea, *Organizarea teritorială a puterii locale...*, p. 436.

²⁴ *Reforma teritorială din Moldova: costurile unui experiment* [The Territorial Reform of

considerably, and the declarations regarding the reduction of the numbers of public servants were a propaganda trick.

The situation after the counter-reform in 2003 confirmed the intentions of the governors to consolidate the verticality of authority, meaning to suppress the local autonomy and subordinate the local authorities to the central ones. It can be stated that the counter-reform was designed from the outset to undermine local financial autonomy and the entire public finance system. After returning to districts, the discrepancies existent at the local level became more acute. According to IDIS “Viitorul”^{*} experts, the local public finance system had the following particularities: A) it did not encourage local initiative but obedience, b) the structure and size of local budgets were not determined by local needs and were not correlated with the economic potential of localities, c) capital investments were allocated discreetly (“capital investments” usually represented, electoral transfers, approved at the highest level, and without any objective and democratic supervision), d) the parallel existence of the normative framework and the local realities.²⁵

The counter-reform emphasised the territorial fragmentation of intermediary authorities. Găgăuzia districts Cahul and Taraclia are fragmented in several territorial parts. For instance, the village Alexandru Ioan Cuza is wholly isolated from the rest of the district Cahul, a fact that complicates the day-to-day activity of the inhabitants and does not allow its inclusion in the projects of district development.

The real purpose of the actions taken by the governing party within the counter-reform in 2003 was to rehabilitate the old administrative system in command to promote the group’s interests to the detriment of the national interest. When drafting the new law, as Tudor Osoianu claims, the legislator was led by a study on the dynamics of any election in the last 11 years for each locality. According to this study, the localities were divided into “ours”, those where the communists have absolute chances of success and “the others”. In other words, the inclusion of a locality in one district was based not on economic but political

Moldova: the Costs of an Experiment], in “Forum”, 2003, nr. 10, p. 19.

^{*} Institute for Development of Social Initiatives “Viitorul” (Chişinău, Republic of Moldova) – an independent think tank, established in 1993.

²⁵ *Factorul politic al finanţării infrastructurii la nivel local* [The Political Factor of Infrastructure Financing at Local Level], in “Policy Brief”, nr. 3, martie 2008, Chişinău, IDIS “Viitorul”, 2008, p. 1-2.

criteria.²⁶ In other words, the territorial organisation of the public power was carried out following the territorial structures of the ruling party, which were created based on the principle of the administrative organisation of the territory up to the 1999 reform and was a means of rewarding those who worked for the communists in the electoral campaign but ran out of posts. Also, it was intended to place PCRM representatives in local public administration structures to consolidate their positions in the territory. In this regard, the politician Nicolae Andronic said: "Voronin buried the reform to find positions for the electoral agents because all district executives are a hiding place for those who do nothing. Thus, the power secures them and their families with workplaces, gives them cars, and they can create a disturbance at will".²⁷

The Soviet practice of placing local party secretaries in charge of local administrative structures was revived. Last but not least, the propagandistic goal of discrediting everything that was done before the PCRM came to power was also pursued.

Afterwards, starting in December 2006, the legal context of the local authority was completed by the following legislative acts: The *Law regarding the local public administration no. 436-XVI of 28.12.2006*; the *Law regarding the administrative decentralisation no. 435-XVI of 28.12. 2006*; the *Law regarding the regional development in the Republic of Moldova no. 438 of 28.12.2006*; the *Law regarding the public function and the statute of the public servants no. 158-XVI of 04.07.2008*. The respective Laws provisioned a more precise distribution of responsibilities among the different levels of public authorities, creating more favourable conditions to exercise local autonomy under decentralisation, consolidating the administrative capacity of the territorial communities, and modernisation of the policies and procedures of personnel for the public authorities.²⁸ However, the respective legal provisions were implemented within

²⁶ Tudor Osoianu, *op. cit.*

²⁷ Pavel Păduraru, *Interviu. NICOLAE ANDRONIC: „Dacă vom vorbi numai despre Plahotniuc, ne vom trezi cu numai două partide”*. 12 Mai 2017 [Interview. Nicolae Andronic: "If we only talk about Plahotniuc, we will wake up with only two parties." May 12, 2017], in <http://www.timpul.md/articol/nicolae-andronic-daca-vom-vorbi-numai-despre-plahotniuc-ne-vom-trezi-cu-numai-doua-partide-109208.html>

²⁸ Aurel Sîmboteanu, *Interconexiuni teoretico-metodologice și aplicative în evoluția reformei administrației publice din Republica Moldova* [Theoretical-Methodological and Applicative Interconnections in the Evolution of the Public Administration Reform in

the constraints of a Soviet-style territorial organisation, which significantly diminished their impact on local collectivities in the Republic of Moldova.

In conclusion, the solutions offered by the political class to the challenges of the territorial organisation of local power were not developed based on strategic approaches but were primarily dictated by subjective factors – first, the group and political interests of the ruling majorities that did not necessarily coincide with the strategic development interests of the Republic of Moldova.

“Re-organisations” and “restructurings” were more commonly employed to remove disloyal officials or those of “different political colour” and place their followers in vacant positions, based on simulated competitions and without integrity or professionalism tests.

After 2009, governments returned to the notion of territorial organisation of local authorities, recognizing the Republic of Moldova's excessive fragmentation. However, neither of these pro-European governments reformed the territorial organisation of the public administration, as they enjoyed *de facto* the advantages offered by the centralised system of territorial distribution of the public authority that they criticized.

THE IMPACT OF THE EXCESSIVE TERRITORIAL FRAGMENTATION AND THE NECESSITY OF THE REFORMATION OF THE TERRITORIAL ORGANISATION OF THE LOCAL PUBLIC AUTHORITY

As mentioned above, the territorial organisation of the public authority in the Republic of Moldova was inherited from the former Soviet Union. Around the time when Soviet Moldova declared its independence, the territory was delimited into 40 districts that included 881 rural soviets, 21 towns, and 49 urban-type units. Each division had in medium 76 000 inhabitants, some a lot under the general average.²⁹

In 2019, the total number of local collectivities was 898. The formal equality of the local collectivities contradicts their significant quantitative and qualitative differences. The asymmetric territorial organisation of the public authority takes place under the following aspects: a. by surface, b. by the number of inhabitants,

the Republic of Moldova], in “Administrarea publică”, 2015, nr. 2, p. 12.

²⁹ *RSS Moldovenească. Orânduire administrativ-teritorială la data de 1 aprilie 1988* [Moldavian SSR. Administrative-Territorial Arrangement on April 1, 1988], Chișinău, Cartea Moldovenească, 1988, p. 5.

c. by the degree of urbanisation, d. by the level of wages per capita, e. by the level of expenses per capita.³⁰ If the municipalities of Chişinău, Bălţi, and UTA Găgăuzia are excluded and just the 32 divisions are considered, the following picture emerges: the average number of local communities in a district is 26.7, and the average number of people in a district, according to the census in 2014, is 65 575 inhabitants. A local collectivity's average population is 2 476 people. The difference between the district with the highest average number of residents returning to becoming a local collective - Ialoveni with 3 726 - and the district with the lowest number of inhabitants - Şoldăneşti with 1 597 - is 2.3 times. If we ignore the population of the capitals of the divisions, the average number of the people of the local collectivities diminishes. For instance, if the population of Cahul – 28 763 is removed from the overall population of 105 324, the average number for a local collective is 2 069.³¹

Most of these territorial collectivities are unable to financially support themselves through locally collected taxes. Consequently, the local authority cannot ensure the necessary public services, and the population is obviously deprived of these services. In this way, the actual territorial organisation of the local authority blocks the realisation of the decentralisation process and the increase of the role of the local authorities in administering public affairs. In the operation of the reformation of the public authority system, the responsibilities of the local public authorities were extended. Still, the territorial organisation of the local public authority remained the same. For this reason, the local public authorities cannot realise the decentralised functions efficiently and provide qualitative services to the people. A vast number of tiny local collectivities without a stable financial and economic foundation, or even the ability to develop one, yet responsible for resolving the most crucial social concerns, contribute to the chaos of the whole local public authority structure.

The Republic of Moldova is very heterogeneous regarding economic and social development associated with persistent territorial shakes, and the activity is mainly centred on several cities. There are two parallel economic realities: for the entire country, except for the capital, the economy is primarily agricultural, while in Chisinau, and partially Balti, it is more based on services and the

³⁰ Flavius Mihalache, Alin Croitoru, *Organizarea teritorială a spațiului rural în contextul reformei administrative* [Territorial organization of rural area in the context of administrative reform], in "Revista Transilvană de Științe Administrative", 2014, nr. 2(35), p. 54.

³¹ Sergiu Cornea, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

manufacturing industry.³²

Besides the social and economic polarisation correlated with essential regional disparities, the Republic of Moldova also meets an increasing discrepancy between the rural and urban communities. It is determined mainly by the high concentration of economic activity and the qualified workforce in the capital and some towns, the unstable economic and social development of the regions, the continuous and excessive orientation of the rural areas towards agriculture, the lack of alternative jobs in economic fields that result in the emigration of the workforce, as well as the absence of reforms.³³

Due to the territorial discrepancies, one of the biggest challenges to stable development for the Republic of Moldova is the non-uniform repartition of wages per region. The current disparities are reminders of the Soviet time because of the non-uniform industrialisation and the incomplete urbanisation of the country that were amplified in the transition process.³⁴ Structural flaws cause regional disparities in the economic and social systems, which must be addressed to eliminate unequal territorial development. By reducing the territorial disparities, the public authority is challenged because such distinctions have the specific potential for instability. The territorial disparities encourage economic discrepancies that can quickly turn into social contrasts and amplify social differences that can create chaos in the entire public authority system.

CONCLUSIONS

The endeavours to reform the territorial organisation of the public authority in the Republic of Moldova during the three decades of independence were influenced by a series of factors that disrupted the process: a) the fights within the political elite regarding the political and geopolitical orientations, b) the contradictory considerations given by historical experience on the issue of territorial

³² Iurie Morcotîlo, *Dezvoltarea regională și două realități paralele. Analiza distribuției geografice a creșterii economice în Republica Moldova* [Regional Development and Two Parallel Realities. Analysis of the Geographical Distribution of Economic Growth in the Republic of Moldova], Chișinău, Expert-Grup, 2014, p. 5-6.

³³ World Bank, *Briefing book from development partners of Moldova*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2015, p. 21, in <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/225381468279259511/Briefing-book-from-development-partners-of-Moldova>

³⁴ Iurie Morcotîlo, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

delimitation of the public authority, c) issues related to the role and place of national minorities within the new realities, d) the segregationist tendencies in the South and East of the republic, e) the centralised reflections of the political class inherited from the former system.

The political forces that initiated reforms on the matter of territorial organisation of the public authority had a normative approach to the process and the anticipated results. The adopted juridical regulations demonstrated the legislator's lack of a coherent view on the legal matter. The solutions offered by the political elite to the challenges related to the territorial distribution of the local public authority were not elaborated based on some strategic approaches in time. Still, they were primarily taken under subjective circumstances; firstly, the group and political interests of the majority that governed did not necessarily collide with the strategic interests of the development of the Republic of Moldova.

The Republic of Moldova is a fragmented state in terms of public authority and territorial organization. This territorial distribution of public power system is not efficient but out of use; it did not allow the efficient functioning of the public authorities, which affected the social and economic development of the territorial communities. Generally, the actual system became a break in the social-economical and spiritual development of the local collectivities and the Moldovan society as a whole.

The necessity to reform the territorial delimitation of the public authority is dictated by the existence of a whole complex of contradictions and issues in the territorial organisation of the public administration that needs a systematic approach to be solved. The experience of the last three decades showed that it was impossible to build a democratic society based on the Soviet values and mechanisms of territorial distribution of the public authority.

To overcome the territorial fragmentation of the Republic of Moldova, the following algorithm is suggested:

- maintaining the organisation of local public authority on two levels;
- temperate consolidation of level I local collectivities through voluntary merger;
- significantly reduce the number of intermediate territorial collectivities by creating four comparable and viable regions (North, Centre, East, and South), according to the population number and available resources;
- create the conditions for amplification and expansion of inter-communal cooperation;
- create the conditions for deeper cross-border cooperation.

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4. Cornea Sergiu, *Antireforma teritorial-administrativă din anul 2003: cauze și consecințe* [Administrative-Territorial Anti-Reform of 2003: Causes and Consequences], in *Modernizarea administrației publice în contextul democratizării sistemului politic și proceselor integraționiste. Materialele conferinței internaționale „Știința politică în RM: realizări și perspective”. 15-16 octombrie 2010* [Modernization of Public Administration in the Context of Democratization of the Political System and Integrationist Processes. The Materials of the International Conference "Political Science in the Republic of Moldova: Achievements and Perspectives". October 15-16, 2010], Chișinău, CEP USM, 2010, pp. 59-72.
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21. Turliuc Cătălin, *Organizarea administrativ-teritorială și puterea locală în România „democrației populare” 1947–1965* [The Administrative-Territorial Organization and the Local Power in Romanian “Popular Democracy” 1947-1965], “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie «A. D. Xenopol»”, T. XLIII–XLIV, 2006–2007, pp. 597-604.

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ELECTION PROGRAMS AND POLITICAL SLOGANS IN KAZAKHSTAN

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Abstract: During each election campaign, political parties use election programs and slogans to identify the direction, aims, and tasks of the political party, as well as the means of implementation and activities to be addressed. The slogan of each election campaign is necessary to create a party image. This article examines the election programs and slogans of the Republic of Kazakhstan's political parties from 1999 through 2021, covering the key concepts, views, and slogans of each election campaign. As a result, the review of the election platforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan's political parties exposes social issues. Finally, a comparative table of the approach to social challenges by the five political parties in Kazakhstan is provided.

Keywords: Kazakhstan, election programs, slogans, political parties, campaign, democracy, nationalism.

Rezumat: *Programe electorale și sloganuri politice în Kazahstan.* În timpul fiecărei campanii electorale, partidele politice folosesc programe și sloganuri pentru a identifica direcția, scopurile și sarcinile partidului politic, precum și mijloacele de implementare și activitățile care trebuie abordate. Sloganul fiecărei campanii electorale este necesar pentru a crea o imagine de partid. Acest articol examinează programele electorale și sloganurile partidelor politice din Republica Kazahstan din 1999 până în 2021, acoperind conceptele, punctele de vedere și sloganurile cheie ale fiecărei campanii electorale. Analiza platformelor electorale ale partidelor politice din Republica Kazahstan dezvăluie existența unor probleme sociale. În final este oferit un tabel comparativ al abordării provocărilor sociale de către cele cinci partide politice din Kazahstan.

INTRODUCTION

On January 10, 2021, the eighth parliamentary elections in the history of independent Kazakhstan were held. Five political parties of Kazakhstan participated in the elections: ADAL, Ak Zhol Democratic Party, Ayl People's Democratic Patriotic Party, Nur Otan Party and People's Party of Kazakhstan. The Nationwide Social Democratic Party decided not to participate in the elections to the Mazhilis (the lower house of the bicameral Parliament of Kazakhstan) and Maslikhats (local representative bodies in the Republic of Kazakhstan) and announced a nationwide boycott of the electoral event. The electoral programs and main slogans of political parties participating in the electoral race of 2021 were analysed and compared to the previous elections. The electorate expects the parties to fulfil their election promises such as keeping commitments, focusing on public opinion, and serving the common good.¹ When studying the election programs of political parties, scientists use different methods: multi-methods approach²; expert surveys, conventional content analysis and computer-assisted content analysis³; coding⁴; quantitative content analysis⁵; mixed-methods analysis⁶; sociolinguistic perspective⁷; optimal-tax method⁸; and historical and

¹ Annika Werner, *Voters' Preferences for Party Representation: Promise-Keeping, Responsiveness to Public Opinion or Enacting the Common Good*, in "International Political Science Review", Vol. 40, 2019, No. 4, p. 486.

² Anders Todal Jenssen, Toril Aalberg, *Party-Leader Effects in Norway: A Multi-Methods Approach*, in "Electoral Studies", Vol. 25, 2006, No. 2, p. 248-269.

³ Andrea Volkens, *Strengths and Weaknesses of Approaches to Measuring Policy Positions of Parties*, in "Electoral Studies", Vol. 26, 2007, No. 1, p. 108-120.

⁴ Franz Urban Pappi, Nicole Michaela Seher, *Party Election Programmes, Signalling Policies and Salience of Specific Policy Domains: The German Parties from 1990 to 2005*, in "German Politics", Vol. 18, 2009, No. 3, p. 403-425.

⁵ Thomas Meyer, Marcelo Jenny, *Measuring Error for Adjacent Policy Position Estimates: Dealing with Uncertainty Using CMP Data*, in "Electoral Studies", Vol. 32, 2013, No. 1, p. 174-185.

⁶ Paul Chaney, *Mixed-Methods Analysis of Political Parties' Manifesto Discourse on Rail Transport Policy: Westminster, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Elections 1945-2011*, in "Transport Policy", Vol. 35, 2014, p. 275-285.

⁷ Josep A. Mas Castells, Eva M. Mestre-Mestre, *Latest Language Policy Proposals in Education in the Valencian Country*, in "Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences", Vol. 178, 2015, p. 151-156.

⁸ Jacobs Bas, Jongen L. W. Egbert, Floris T. Zoutman, *Revealed Social Preferences of Dutch Political Parties*, in "Journal of Public Economics", 2017, No. 156, p. 81-100.

conceptual analysis.⁹ The programs of political parties that run in parliamentary elections are often the most influential elements on the voters¹⁰. When studying party election manifestos, a quantitative dimension can be used to assess a party's position, and a qualitative dimension can be used to assess the effectiveness of a program.¹¹ Romanov and Novoselova¹² studied the pragmatic effectiveness of threat statements in political communication, especially the use of threats in pre-election programs and intimidating voters to vote for a certain politician. During electoral campaigns, parties often focus on five major issues: pensions, corruption, finance, healthcare and safety.¹³

In addition, political slogans are considered in different contexts: ideological/cultural analysis¹⁴; viewpoint of logic¹⁵; emotions in political slogans¹⁶; neuropsycholinguistic study¹⁷; and multimodal analysis.¹⁸ There is a slogan technique in Communist propaganda.¹⁹ The slogan serves a variety of temporal functions, and its repetitive and ritualistic nature has a psychological impact on people's

⁹ Ian Budge, *Issue Emphases, Saliency Theory and Issue Ownership. A historical and Conceptual Analysis*, in "West European Politics", Vol. 38, 2015, No. 4, p. 761-777.

¹⁰ Anna Makhorkina, *Ukrainian Political Parties and Foreign Policy in Election Campaigns. Parliamentary Elections of 1998 and 2002*, in "Communist and Post-Communist Studies", Vol. 38, 2005, No. 2, p. 251-267.

¹¹ Vlastimil Havlík, Hana Vykoupilová, *Two Dimensions of the Europeanization of Election Programs. The Case of the Czech Republic*, in "Communist and Post-Communist Studies", Vol. 41, 2008, No. 2, p. 163-187.

¹² Aleksey Romanov, Olga Novoselova, *Discursive Realization of Threat in Pre-Election Communication*, in "Russian Journal of Linguistics", Vol. 24, 2020, No. 2, p. 419-448.

¹³ Ana Kores Maiken, *Powerful Posters – A Multimodal Analysis of Slovenia's 2018 Parliamentary Elections*, in "Ars et Humanitas", Vol. 14, 2020, No. 1, p. 105-124.

¹⁴ Xing Lu, *An Ideological/Cultural Analysis of Political Slogans in Communist China*, in "Discourse & Society", Vol. 10, 1999, No. 4, p. 487-508.

¹⁵ Xia Nianxi, *Political Slogans and Logic*, in "Diogenes", Vol. 56, 2009, No. 1, p. 109-116.

¹⁶ Jeroen Vaes, Maria Paola Paladino, Chiara Magagnotti, *The Human Message in Politics: The Impact of Emotional Slogans on Subtle Conformity*, in "The Journal of Social Psychology", Vol. 151, 2011, No. 2, p. 162-179.

¹⁷ Serhii Maksymenko, Bohdan Tkach, Lesia Lytvynchuk, Liana Onufriieva, *Neuro-Psycholinguistic Study of Political Slogans in Outdoor Advertising*, in "Psiholingvistika", Vol. 26, 2019, No. 1, p. 246-264.

¹⁸ Kores Maiken Ana, *Powerful Posters – A Multimodal Analysis of Slovenia's 2018 Parliamentary Elections*, in "Ars et Humanitas", Vol. 14, 2020, No. 1, p. 105-124.

¹⁹ Harold D. Lasswell, Dorothy Blumenstock, *The Technique of Slogans in Communist Propaganda*, in "Psychiatry", Vol. 1, 1938, No. 4, p. 505-520.

memory and perception of reality.²⁰ Makhlaiuk²¹ approves that dynastic names and unofficial imperial nicknames during the Seven Dynasties served as political slogans symbolizing adherence to a particular political line. According to Hartig²², political slogans have not been sufficiently studied in political communication. Koc and Ilgun²³ suggest that irony and metaphor are the most commonly used rhetorical devices in political party slogans. Panov²⁴ argues that it can be called nationalism if it is accompanied by political aspiration. According to the scientist, slogans like “Russia for Russians”, and “Beat Jews and rescue Russia” have an obvious political connotation. Many people who follow the ideology seek personal power and profit, but as profits fall, they abandon the idea and slogans.²⁵ The popular political slogan “Power to the people” shows the essence of democracy and participation.²⁶ Chinese city residents have long clunky political slogans and these slogans are eventually transformed into attractive thematic public service advertising posters around the country.²⁷ Karmazin²⁸ considers slogans as an organizational feature of Chinese politics and believes that leadership slogans are significant in terms of propaganda, ideological innovation, policy and strategic direction, structuring politics and maintaining the Communist Party of China’s unity.

²⁰ Tom Dickins, *The Political Slogan in Communist Czechoslovakia (1948–89)*, in “Central Europe”, Vol. 15, 2017, No. 1-2, p. 58-87.

²¹ Alexander V. Makhlaiuk, *Dynastic Names and Unofficial Imperial Nicknames during the Severan Dynasty*, in “Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, Istoriya”, Vol. 63, 2018, No. 3, p. 872-897.

²² Falk Hartig, *Political Slogans as Instruments of International Government Communication – the Case of China*, in “The Journal of International Communication”, Vol. 24, 2018, No. 1, p. 115-137.

²³ Erdogan Koc, Ayse Ilgun, *An Investigation into the Discourse of Political Marketing Communications in Turkey: The Use of Rhetorical Figures in Political Party Slogans*, in “Journal of Political Marketing”, Vol. 9, 2010, No. 3, p. 207-224.

²⁴ Petr Panov, *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Russia: What Kind of Nationalism is Produced by the Kremlin?* In “Journal of Eurasian Studies”, Vol. 1, 2010, No. 2, p. 85-94.

²⁵ Katya Vladimirov, “Red East”: *Soviet Central Asia in the 1920s*, in “Journal of Eurasian Studies”, Vol. 1, 2010, No. 2, p. 127-133.

²⁶ Martin Gosim Chukwu, *Giving ‘Power to the People’ in a Nigerian Hospital: From Evaluation Over to Evaluation with Stakeholders*, in “Action Research”, Vol. 16, 2018, No. 4, p. 361-375.

²⁷ Yang Jincai, *Narrating the Chinese Dream: A Cultural Interpretation of “Chinese Dream Series” in Urban Public Service Advertising*, in “Interdisciplinary Studies of Literature”, Vol. 1, 2017, No. 4, p. 15-27.

²⁸ Aleš Karmazin, *Slogans as an Organizational Feature of Chinese Politics*, in “Journal of Chinese Political Science”, 2020, No. 25, p. 411-429.

There is very little research on the parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan. Daly²⁹ argues that Kazakhstan's parties are striving to support the middle class. Mishra³⁰ investigates the process of democratization in Kazakhstan and assesses the indicators. Bhuiyan³¹ argues that Kazakhstan's opposition political parties are weak and disorganized, and their leaders are not quite capable of mobilizing favourable public opinion. Sayabayev³² examines the evolution of political parties in the Republic of Kazakhstan from 1991 to 2016. Several researchers consider the party system as an important element of Kazakhstan's political modernization.³³

In Kazakhstan, brief periods when electronic voting was used, but they had to reject it and return to traditional paper voting due to a lack of confidence from the nongovernmental sector.³⁴ The non-governmental sector, particularly the public associations, has the potential to affect this result. Golosov³⁵ examines and explains the processes of party creation in the post-Soviet states of Central Asia. Akhmetova et al.³⁶ identify some effective slogans that emanate optimism about the party (e. g. "Power – under the strict control of the law! Support the "Ak Zhol" Party!" - could be effective; "Responsibility, experience, fatherland!"; "Well-being for all" - radiates party optimism).

²⁹ John C. K. Daly, *Kazakhstan's Emerging Middle Class*, Silk Road paper. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2008, p. 63-69, in https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/48483/31_Kazakhstan%20middle%20class.pdf (Accessed on 28.04.2020).

³⁰ Mukesh Kumar Mishra, *Democratisation Process in Kazakhstan: Gauging the Indicators*, in "India Quarterly", Vol. 65, 2009, No. 3, p. 313-327.

³¹ Shahjahan Bhuiyan, *Political Leadership and its Role in Achieving Good Governance in Kazakhstan*, in "International Journal of Public Administration", Vol. 35, 2012, No. 6, p. 379-388.

³² Daniyar Sayabayev, *Sociopolitical Associations in Independent Kazakhstan: Evolution of the Phenomenon*, in "Pacific Science Review B: Humanities and Social Sciences", Vol. 2, 2016, No. 3, p. 94-99.

³³ Marat Baypakov, Akhan Bizhanov, Rustem Kadyrzhanov, *The Party System as an Element of Political Modernization of Kazakhstan*, in "Central Asia and the Caucasus", Vol. 19, 2018, No. 3, p. 34-48.

³⁴ Maxat Kassen, *Politicization of E-voting Rejection: Reflections from Kazakhstan*, in "Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy", Vol. 14, 2020, No. 2, p. 305-330.

³⁵ Grigori V. Golosov, *The Five Shades of Grey: Party Systems and Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Central Asian States*, in "Central Asian Survey", Vol. 39, 2020, No. 3, p. 285-302.

³⁶ Laila Akhmetova, Tatiyana Lifanova, Aleksey Verevkin, Dmitriy Shorokhov, Sergey Lifanov, *Factors and trends of increasing role of mass media in democratic elections in Kazakhstan*, in "Media Watch", Vol. 11, 2020, No. 2, p. 394-407.

The lack of research on this subject makes it difficult for the methodological approach to conduct a complete analysis of the problem. First, election programs for 1999 and 2004 are rather hard to find. The majority of the election programs on political parties' official websites are for the 2021 elections. There are 2016 programs in some of them. Secondly, all election programs are in Kazakh and Russian and they are not translated into English. Thirdly, there is a variety of research and expert studies on this subject available in both Kazakh and Russian. Therefore, for some researchers, these instances pose a methodological challenge.

In light of the foregoing thoughts and perspectives, the election programs and slogans of political parties in the Republic of Kazakhstan were approached from three angles. The first section was an examination of how political party policies and campaign slogans reflect societal challenges. Second, a comparison chart for the five contemporary political parties was constructed, referring to the primary indicators of societal difficulties. The third angle defines the most pressing societal challenges.

DATA AND METHOD

The electoral system of Kazakhstan has changed many times. The election system in 1991 was majority rule. The majority system was replaced by a mixed electoral system in 1998. These rules were applied during parliamentary elections in 1999 and 2004. The Mazhilis election system was amended again in 2007, becoming fully proportional. Following the Constitutional referendum in 2022, locally called the Republican referendum, the electoral system for parliament has changed once more. Mazhilis elections will be held using a mixed electoral system.

There were many parties on the political scene of Kazakhstan, and some of them participated in the legislative elections. The following political parties and public associations participated in the 1999 legislative elections: Otan (Fatherland; from 2006 to 2022, Nur Otan, currently AMANAT) Communist Party of Kazakhstan (liquidated in 2015 by a court decision), Agrarian Party of Kazakhstan (dissolved in 2006 and merged with the presidential Nur Otan Party), Civic Party of Kazakhstan (dissolved in 2006 and merged with the ruling Otan Party), the Democratic Party Azamat, the People's Congress of Kazakhstan, Alash, the Renaissance Party of Kazakhstan (formerly the Rukhaniyat Party, which in 2013 merged with the Adilet Democratic Party to form the Birlik Party), the Republican Labor Party, the Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan and the People's Cooperative Party of Kazakhstan.

In 2004, there were 12 political parties, four of which were in two electoral blocs: Otan; Ak Zhol; Asar (Kazakh custom of mutual assistance; merged with the Otan Party in 2006); the Agrarian-Industrial Union of Workers (bloc of the Agrarian Party of Kazakhstan and the Civic Party of Kazakhstan); the Opposition Union of Communists and DCK (united the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan - on March 13, 2018, DCK was recognized as an extremist organization by the decision of the Yesil District Court of Astana); the Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan (since 2020, People's Party of Kazakhstan); the Auyl Social Democratic Party; the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (since 2006, Adilet Democratic Party); the Party of Patriots of Kazakhstan (in 2015 merged with the Auyl Social Democratic Party), and the Rukhaniyat Party.

Since 2007, seven political parties have been actively participating: Nur Otan People's Democratic Party, the Nationwide Social Democratic Party, Ak Zhol Democratic Party, Auyl Social Democratic Party, the Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan, the Party of Patriots of Kazakhstan and the Rukhaniyat Party. In 2012, the Auyl Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan participated with changed party names, the Auyl People's Democratic Patriotic Party and the Adilet Democratic Party. Following the merger, the Adilet Democratic Party and the Rukhaniyat Party formed the Birlik Party in 2016.

As mentioned above, five political parties participated in the 2021 legislative elections: ADAL (Birlik was renamed ADAL; later on, April 26, 2022, the AMANAT and ADAL parties merged); Ak Zhol Democratic Party; Auyl People's Democratic Patriotic Party; Nur Otan Party; and People's Party of Kazakhstan. Therefore, it can be argued that there are five officially registered political parties in Kazakhstan: Ak Zhol Democratic Party; AMANAT; Auyl People's Democratic Patriotic Party; People's Party of Kazakhstan; and Nationwide Social Democratic Party. Ak Zhol Democratic Party is liberal-conservative; AMANAT is social conservatism; Auyl People's Democratic Patriotic Party - social democracy, agrarianism, patriotism, centre-left; People's Party of Kazakhstan - socialism and leftist ideas; and the Nationwide Social Democratic Party - social democracy.

This analysis is based on the Russian-language election programs that are posted online by political parties in the Republic of Kazakhstan. The research covered Kazakhstan's legislative elections in 1999, 2004, 2007, 2012, 2016, and 2021. A descriptive method appropriate to the nature of the study problem was used after evaluating the scientific literature. To increase understanding of the components, relationships, and conditions of political parties, a systematic review of electoral

programs and scientific literature was conducted. The ideas and principles of systems analysis form the research's methodological foundation. Methodologies such as comparative, conceptual, and historical analysis were also employed.

ADAL POLITICAL PARTY

Since 2004, the Adilet ("Justice") Democratic Party (renamed on 2006) has functioned as the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (DPK). During these years, DPK served all Kazakhstanis as a truly democratic party of law and justice, and freedom. During the 2004 elections, they focused on the need to pass a "Teachers Law" and the issue of combating corruption. A topic on the agenda was also the approval of the law "On Lobbying." The party took part in the 2012 election with the "For Justice!" election program.³⁷ The program for this year is based on 17 steps to justice and four priorities. "Oil to the people!" was the party's main campaign slogan throughout this election campaign. "To jail for corrupt officials! Adilet – to the Parliament!"³⁸ Maksut Narikbaev (2002-2012) and Tolegen Sydykhov (2012-2013) functioned as the party's presidents for several years. Adilet belongs to the category of "Soft Opposition."³⁹

Rukhaniyat ("Spirituality") Party operated in Kazakhstan from 1995 to 2013. Before Rukhaniyat, the party was called the Party of the Revival of Kazakhstan, and it participated in the 1999 campaign. In the 2004 elections, the party considered it necessary to implement the reforms defined in the Strategy "Kazakhstan-2030". The campaign slogan for this year is Freedom, Justice, and Humanity. In addition, the party drew attention to the development and state support of small and medium-sized businesses. Under the slogan "Stability, justice and spiritual revival!",⁴⁰ Rukhaniyat advocated the preservation of the spiritual,

³⁷ *PUT' K SPRAVEDLIVOSTI. Predvybornaja platforma partii "Adilet"* [THE WAY TO JUSTICE. Election Platform of the Adilet Party], in https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31095066#pos=5;-116 (Accessed on 28.04.2021).

³⁸ Anna Kuzhnikova, *Teledebaty kandidatov v deputaty proshli kak obychno – ne v priamom efire* [TV Debates of Candidates for Deputies were Held as Usual – Not Live], in https://rus.azattyq.org/a/election_debaty_osdp_azat_nurotan_akzhol_adilet_knpk/24450286.html (Accessed on 28.04.2021).

³⁹ Anthony Clive Bowyer, *Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan*, Silk Road Paper. May 2008, Washington, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2008, p. 12.

⁴⁰ Altynshash Zhaganova, *Stabil'nost', spravedlivost' i duhovnoe vozrozhdenie!* [Stability,

national, cultural, and civil integrity of the people of Kazakhstan which were the priority areas of the 2007 party program. The party presidents in different years were Altynshash Zhaganova (1995-2000; 2012-2013), Serikzhan Mambetalin (2010-2012) and Serik Sultangali (2013). Rukhaniyat, according to Heinrich⁴¹, is a marginalized, small pro-presidential party that continues to be submissive.

Adilet and Rukhaniyat decided to merge the Birlik ("Solidarity") Party into a new movement in 2013. During the 2016 election campaign, they participated in the election program "Clean Thoughts! Clean Deeds! Clean Environment!"⁴² The key program slogans were: "The main concern of the Birlik Political Party is the people of Kazakhstan, their hopes, interests, and aspirations. We are a party confident that the progress, prosperity, and strength of Kazakhstan lie in the unity of its citizens. We should be together! We are for the cleanliness of the environment, justice and spiritual revival of the people. We are ready to contribute to the common cause for all Kazakhstanis - to build a free, strong and prosperous Kazakhstan."⁴³

In anticipation of the 2021 campaign, the decision was made to rename the political organization from Birlik to Adal ("Honesty"). According to the party's website, the party's main objective and purpose is a person, a citizen of Kazakhstan, and his needs, concerns, law, and justice. It is especially noticeable that law and justice derive from the Adilet Party's concept. The election program consists of five key priorities⁴⁴: a decent life for all citizens; entrepreneurship is the basis of a successful state; development of the agro-industrial complex and food security; strong regions – a strong country; a state for the people. On April 26, 2022, it united with the AMANAT Party, ending its existence.

justice and spiritual revival!], in https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30114042#pos=5;-88 (Accessed on 28.04.2021).

⁴¹ Andreas Heinrich, *The Formal Political System in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan: A Background Study*, Working paper, Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen, 2010.

⁴² *Chistyye pomysly! Chistyye dela! Chistaya sreda! Predvybornaya programma politicheskoy partii "Birlik"* [Pure thoughts! Pure business! Pure environment! Election program of the Birlik Party] in <https://nomad.su/?a=3-201602240009> (Accessed on 21.05.2021).

⁴³ Andrey Chebotarev, *Parlamentskie vybory v Kazahstane-2016: osobennosti i itogi* [Parliamentary Elections in Kazakhstan-2016: Features and Results], in <http://ea-monitor.kz/novosti-evraziyskogo-soyuza/parlamentskie-vybory-v-kazahstane-2016-osobennosti-i-itogi> (Accessed on 22.05.2021).

⁴⁴ *Predvybornaya programma politicheskoy partii "ADAL"* [The election program of the Political Party "Adal"], in <https://adalpartiyasy.kz/program> (Accessed on 28.04.2021).

A good living for all residents, according to the party, entails issues such as new social guarantees, free and high-quality education, a healthy nation, and a favourable environment. A decent life for citizens can be achieved through the development of the driving force of the economy – entrepreneurship. To this end, the party’s goal is to create better conditions for the development of private entrepreneurship. The development of rural areas is the guarantor of the country’s stability and food security. Villagers should have access to infrastructure, education, and health care based on clear standards and norms of security. Regional development approaches must be revised to allow for the competitive advantages of different regions. According to the parties’ vision, a compact state apparatus makes quick, open, and just decisions. Therefore, they must establish a state for the people rather than a state for the wealthy.

AK ZHOL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The Ak Zhol (“Bright Path”) Democratic Party is a right-wing political party in Kazakhstan that positions itself as a “constructive opposition”. The party was founded in 2002 on the foundation of the public association “Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan”. Bulat Abilov, Alikhan Baimenov, and Oraz Zhandosov founded the party. Azat Peruashev is the current Chairman of the party and Head of the Ak Zhol Parliamentary Fraction. The party made political appearances and took part in all of the Parliamentary election campaigns (Table 1).

Table 1. Ak Zhol Democratic Party election programs and slogans over the years

Title Years	Election programs	Slogans
2004	A decent life for everyone today! [Dostojnuju zhizn’ – vsem i segodnja!]	Everyone promises, and we do [Barlygy uade beredi, al biz zhasajmyz] Our time has come! [Bizdin uakyt keldi!] People are more powerful than power - the people are not slaves of power! Ak Zhol Kazakhstan! [Bilik halyktan uly emes - Halyk biliktin kuly emes! Ak zhol Kazahstan!]
2007	You are worthy of your dream!	Kazakhstan should become a country of equal opportunities

	[Ty dostoin svoej mechty!]	[Kazakhstan ten mumkindikter eline ajnaluy tiis] Not seeing success is blindness, not seeing shortcomings is not compassion [Zhetistikti kormeu – sokyrylyk, Kemshilikti kormeu – zhany ashymagandyk]
2012	Change to move forward [Peremeny, chtoby dvigat'sja vpered]	Moving forward – changes [Alga zhetelejtin – ozgerister] Peace, tranquillity and security to every Kazakhstani home, every Kazakhstani family! [Mir, spokojstvie i bezopasnost' kazhdomu kazahstanskomu domu, kazhdoj kazahstanskoj sem'e!]
2016	Ak Zhol - time to work [Ak Zhol – vremja rabotat']	Ak Zhol - time to work [Ak Zhol – vremja rabotat'] It is necessary to put state bodies at the service of common people! [Nuzhno postavit' gosudarstvennye organy na sluzhbu prostym ljudjam!]
2021	Change is inevitable [Peremeny neizbezhny]	Change is inevitable [Peremeny neizbezhny]

As can be seen from the election platforms⁴⁵, Ak Zhol speaks about a decent life in 2004, a dream in 2007, and changes starting from 2012. The first election program of the party consisted of the following sections: challenges and responses; power to the people; a wealth of the nation; the fate of the earth; hope and solidarity; spirit and mind; clean country; the world and us. In 2007, to achieve the dream, the party proposed six programs: “Decent jobs and wages”; “Quality of human resources”; “Affordable and decent housing”; “Decent life of the villagers”; “Culture and spirituality”; “Equality before the law and the fight against corruption”. The 2012 election program set ten key tasks: reducing unemployment; social justice; increasing population incomes; affordable homes for the

⁴⁵ *Election platforms of the Ak Zhol Democratic Party from 2014 to 2016*, in <https://akzhol.kz/ru/election-platforms> (Accessed on 20.06.2021).

many; affordable and humane medical care; modern and quality education; creating a modern productive economy; reducing pressure on business and giving a mass character to entrepreneurship; a decent life - not only in large cities but in villages and regions; transparency and accountability of power to society; development of Kazakhstan's spiritual and cultural sectors; fight against corruption and judicial and law reform; and security for everyone; acting as a reliable barrier to extremism and terror and implementing an effective foreign policy.

In 2016, the party also set 10 key tasks: protection of business and giving mass character to entrepreneurship; market reforms and the creation of a productive economy; an educated and healthy nation – a strong and ambitious workforce; development of the employment system and reduction of unemployment; housing construction as an economic force; the agro-industrial complex is a reliable support of the country; transparency and accountability of power to society; improvement of Kazakhstani people's spiritual and cultural life; fight against corruption; judicial and law reform, and security for every home. For each of us, national interests and independence are the most important ideals. It is notable that the Ak Zhol Democratic Party consistently carried forward its ideals and developed its priorities over time.

According to official figures, and as stated on the Ak Zhol Democratic Party's official website (2020)⁴⁶ the party won one mandate and 12.04 per cent of the vote in the 2004 Mazhili elections. The party earned 3.09 per cent of the vote in the 2007 Mazhilis elections but was not elected to parliament. Ak Zhol has a parliamentary faction in the Mazhilis and has been a parliamentary party since 2012. The party obtained 7.47 per cent of the vote and 8 deputy mandates, according to the 2012 election results. Following the 2016 elections, the party was given seven mandates. These are all the outcomes of both active campaigning and the impact of election programs and slogans.

In its 2021 campaign, the Ak Zhol Democratic Party⁴⁷ proposes a program of such changes:

1. Independence and the national idea of “Alash” provide an opportunity for everyone to create their own path and their own destiny. It is a responsibility for the future of our descendants.

⁴⁶ *Party official website*, in <https://akzhol.kz/en/party/> (Accessed on 28.04.2021).

⁴⁷ *Peremeny neizbezhny* [Changes are inevitable], election program of the Ak Zhol Democratic Party for 2021, in <https://akzhol.kz/ru/peremeny-neizbezhny-2/> (Accessed on 28.04.2021).

2. Democracy and parliament ensure that government agencies are transparent and accountable to society.

3. Combat corruption and de-offshorization: combat corruption and return to the country multibillion-dollar funds stolen from the people.

4. The quality of education and health care, as well as the affordability of housing and respectable work, determine social justice.

5. In terms of the material content of political reforms, a market economy and support for entrepreneurship are required.

6. A balanced foreign policy: the foreign policy of the Republic, including participation in integration associations, should be based primarily on the national interests of the country, as well as a multi-vector policy in relations with the main actors in the international arena.

AUYL PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PATRIOTIC PARTY

Additionally, a “Soft Opposition” is the Auyl (“Village”).⁴⁸ This party was founded in 2000, and its first Chairman was Gani Kaliyev (until 2015). In 2015, Auyl was united with the Party of the Patriots of Kazakhstan. The Chairman of the party is Ali Bektayev, deputy of the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Chairman of the committee on agrarian issues and the development of rural territories. The party is also an active participant in the parliamentary elections (Table 2), but due to insufficient votes from the electorate, the party is not represented in the country’s Mazhilis.

Table 2. Auyl People's Democratic Patriotic Party election programs and slogans over the years

Title Years	Election programs	Slogans
2004	No data	No data
2007	Village rich country-happy country [Auyly baj el – bakytty el]	We believe in the future of every beautiful village in Kazakhstan! [Biz keleshegi korkem Kazahstannyn ar auyly men selosynyn bolashagy bolatynyna senemiz!]

⁴⁸ Anthony Clive Bowyer, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

2012	The fate of the village – the fate of the people [Auyl tagdyry – halyk tagdyry]	The fate of the village – the fate of the people [Auyl tagdyry – halyk tagdyry]
2016	Let us return to the traditions of the village! [Vernem tradicii aulu!]	Let us return to the traditions of the village! [Vernem tradicii aulu!] We are a party of spiritual creation and moral progress! [My - partija duhovnogo sozidanija i npravstvennogo progressa!]
2021	The voice of the village must be heard! [Golos sela dolzhen byt' uslyshan]	It's time to support Auyl! [Nastolo vremja podderzhat' Auyl!]

The Auyl Social Democratic Party represented the interests of village workers in the 2004 elections. An important part of the program was devoted to the development of the agricultural sector of the economy. Concerning the social sphere, special attention was paid to improving the living conditions in the village, and steps are suggested to enhance the party's reform agenda.⁴⁹

A separate section of the Auyl Party's 2012 election platform focuses on the development of the village, including strengthening the social protection of pensioners and large families in the village; the development of a diversified economy; forms of ownership and management; state support for the agro-industrial complex; protection of the domestic market of Kazakhstan; unemployment reduction; keeping youth in the village through the development of agricultural production; the development of small and medium-sized businesses; the restoration and development of the socio-cultural and communal infrastructure in the village; and the development of programs for the effective systematic use of pasture lands. The program also reflects issues of social development of the state, land relations, continuity of generations, security, health, and strengthening the international authority of the Republic of Kazakhstan.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Murat O. Nassimov, *Kazahstan Respublikasy saylaw nauhandaryndagy sayasi zharnama: zhenis strategiyasy* [Political Advertising in the Election Campaigns of the Republic of Kazakhstan: A Winning Strategy], Kazan, Buk, 2015, p. 46.

⁵⁰ *Ekspertnyy doklad. Dosrochnnyye parlamentskiye vybory v Respublike Kazakhstan* [Expert

The 2016 election program consisted of five sections⁵¹: Great culture – great future; Village – the golden cradle of the country; Social development is the basis of spiritual progress; Specific assistance to a specific Kazakh family; Make way for the young. The party's election program also states that the Aul People's Democratic Patriotic Party intends to "develop and implement the state program "Village Infrastructure", which provides for the integrated development of rural areas and the development of social and engineering infrastructure of the village". These are road and housing construction, construction of kindergartens, schools, hospitals, cultural institutions, land development, electrification, water supply, gasification, telephone and Internet, etc.⁵²

The Aul People's Democratic Patriotic Party⁵³ presents its Kazakhstan development model in its election program for 2021 as follows: preserved traditional spiritual values and national culture; high standards of quality of life in the village and no social disproportion between the village and the city; the country is provided with all the necessary food products of its own production. The feeding hands of Kazakhstan connect the ideas of development: the village must live with dignity, keep to the roots, and have social equality as a prosperous society.

NUR OTAN PARTY

Nur Otan ("Radiant Fatherland") is the ruling and largest pro-presidential party in Kazakhstan. The party was founded in 1999 as the Otan ("Fatherland") Party on the initiative of Kazakhstan's first President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who is also its leader. He was also its leader until January 28, 2022. The party has been

report. Snap parliamentary elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan], in https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31105118#pos=4;-70 (Accessed on 28.04.2021).

⁵¹ Farida Sharafutdinova, *Chto obeshchaiut partii Kazahstantsam posle vyborov* [What the parties promise to Kazakhstanis after the elections], in <https://otyrar.kz/2016/02/chto-obeshhayut-partii-kazaxstancam-posle-vyborov/> (Accessed on 12.05.2021).

⁵² Talgat Isenov, *Partiia "Aul" razvernula agitatsionnuu deiatel'nost' svoih shtabov* [The Aul Party deployed the campaigning activities of its headquarters], in <https://kazpravda.kz/news/politika/partiya-auil-razvernula-agitatsionnuu-deyatelnost-svoih-shtabov> (Accessed on 08.06.2021).

⁵³ *Golos sela dolzhen byt' uslyshan!* [The voice of the village must be heard!], in <https://auly.kz/project2> (Accessed on 12.05.2021).

known as AMANAT since 2022 (given for storage; entrusted for storage). Kazakhstan's President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, led the party until April 26, 2022. Yerlan Koshanov, the Chair of the Mazhilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, now leads the party.

Bader⁵⁴ rated Nur Otan as a hegemonic political party. Boban also concludes that Nur Otan is a new subtype of the hegemonic party.⁵⁵ Kubicek⁵⁶ argues that the Nur Otan Party is a merger of various pro-presidential parties. According to Isaacs⁵⁷, Nur Otan Party provides a stabilizing function in the long term, but the extent depends on the regime dynamics. In addition, Isaacs and Whitmore⁵⁸ assess Nur Otan as a distinctive type of dominant party. Nur Otan Party supports the democratic principles of interethnic relations and cooperates with the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan⁵⁹. After the Zhanaozen conflict, President Nazarbayev ordered the government, together with the ruling Nur Otan Party, to draft a "National Concept for the Social Development of Kazakhstan."⁶⁰ The party's unique task and main slogan are innovative development, rising living standards, and social stability.⁶¹ The Nur Otan Party has participated in all legislative

⁵⁴ Max Bader, *Hegemonic political parties in post-Soviet Eurasia: Towards party-based authoritarianism?* in "Communist and Post-Communist Studies", Vol. 44, 2011, No. 3, p. 189-197.

⁵⁵ Davor Boban, *The presidential-hegemonic party and autocratic stability: The legal foundation and political practice in Kazakhstan*, in "Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta u Zagrebu", Vol. 67, 2017, No. 1, p. 55-83.

⁵⁶ Paul Kubicek, *Are Central Asian leaders learning from upheavals in Kyrgyzstan?*, in "Journal of Eurasian Studies", Vol. 2, 2011, No. 2, p. 115-124.

⁵⁷ Rico Isaacs, *Nur Otan, informal networks and the countering of elite instability in Kazakhstan: Bringing the 'formal' back in*, in "Europe-Asia Studies", Vol. 65, 2013, No. 6, p. 1055-1079.

⁵⁸ Rico Isaacs, Sarah Whitmore, *The limited agency and life-cycles of personalized dominant parties in the post-Soviet space: The cases of United Russia and Nur Otan*, in "Democratization", Vol. 21, 2014, No. 4, p. 699-721.

⁵⁹ Elnura Assyltaeva, Zhengisbek Tolen, Gulnar Nassimova, *Kazakhstan as a model for regulating interethnic relations*, in "Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences", 2014, No. 114, p. 291-297.

⁶⁰ Dossym Satpayev, Tolganay Umbetaliyeva, *The protests in Zhanaozen and the Kazakh oil sector: Conflicting interests in a rentier*, in "Journal of Eurasian Studies", Vol. 6, 2015, No. 2, p. 122-129.

⁶¹ Maulen Ashimbayev, *"NUR OTAN" – Elbasy party*, in Rogov Igor (Ed.), *Formation and development of present statehood of Kazakhstan (First-Hand knowledge)*, Nur-Sultan, Directorate of administrative buildings of the Administration of the President and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2019, p. 114-129.

elections (Table 3) and dominates all branches of government in Kazakhstan.

Table 3. Nur Otan Party election programs and slogans over the years

Title Years	Election programs	Slogans
1999	No data	No data
2004	Kazakhstani way 2009 [Kazahstanskij put' – 2009]	A lot has been done, let us continue together! [Sdelano nemalo, prodolzhim vmeste!]
2007	For the prosperity of Kazakhstan and the Kazakhstani people: we will improve the living standards of every Kazakhstani citizen [Za procvetanie Kazahstana i blagopoluchie kazahstancev: kak my uluchshim zhizn' kazhdogo grazhdanina strany]	Only together! Only forward! [Tol'ko vmeste! Tol'ko vpered!]
2012	Kazakhstan. Goals-2017. National Action Plan [Kazakhstan. Celi 2017. Nacional'nyj plan dejstvij]	Our choice is Nur Otan! Forward, Kazakhstan! [Bizdin tandauymyz – Nur Otan! Alga, Qazaqstan!] Let us build the future together! [Postroim budushhee vmeste!]
2016	Kazakhstan - 2021: Unity. Stability. Creation [Kazakhstan – 2021: Edinstvo. Stabil'nost'. Sozidanie.]	Kazakhstan is our common home. Kazakhstan is our fortress. Nursultan Nazarbayev is our Leader [Kazakhstan – nash obshhij dom. Kazakhstan – nasha krepost'. Nursultan Nazarbaev – nash Lider]
2021	The way of change: A decent life for everyone! [Put' peremen: Dostojnuju zhizn' kazhdomu!]	Having overcome the challenges, we will win together! [Preodolev ispytaniya, pobedim vmeste!]

In the 1999 elections, the Otan Party, which supported the government's reform program, said they would act quickly to break the deadlock.⁶² The election program of 2004 was dedicated to the 5-year development of Kazakhstan and outlined its purposes and tasks. They also paid great attention to the role of the party in the political system, improving the electoral legislation and strengthening interethnic harmony. In this campaign, the party supported economic integration.⁶³ The 2007 election program included many spheres, such as economics, social conditions, youth policy, women's rights, sports, art, literature, language, and country defence. Particular and special attention is paid to: Kazakhstanis' income increase; limiting price increases, fighting inflation; improving health care; pension provision: every pensioner's well-deserved care; development of the social protection system; support for motherhood and family; employment; effective protection of rights; development of education; housing provision; communal infrastructure; development of local government – development of regions; uncompromising fight against corruption; increasing the efficiency of government bodies; reliable protection of citizens from the republic; road safety; improving the judicial system; developing a competitive knowledge-based economy; advanced science - based on a competitive economy; effective use of revenues from the exploitation of mineral resources; support for small and medium-sized businesses; village development; ensuring stability and interethnic harmony; further democracy of society; development of cultural and moral values; language policy; creation of a favourable ecological environment; increasing the country's defence capability; and strengthening the position of Kazakhstan in the region and the world.⁶⁴

In 2012⁶⁵, special attention was paid to economic growth despite the crisis, quality of life, people's unity, national security and international authority, etc. As indicated in the electoral program, education and science are the basis for a suc-

⁶² Murat O. Nassimov, *Kazakhstan Respublikasy sajlau...*, p. 39.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁶⁴ *Narodnaia platforma narodno-demokraticeskoi partii "Nur Otan"* [People's Platform of the Nur Otan People's Democratic Party], in https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30188766 (Accessed on 20.04.2021).

⁶⁵ *Kazakhstan. Tseli 2017. Natsional'nyy plan deystviy. Predvybornaya platforma Partii "Nur Otan"* [Kazakhstan. Goals 2017. National Action Plan. The Pre-Election Platform of the Nur Otan Party], in https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31099365#pos=3;-52 (Accessed on 04.05.2021).

successful future and the health of the nation – the strength of the country. New requirements that have been proposed for economic growth include transition to an innovative economy – a knowledge economy; creating a favourable investment climate; supporting domestic business; affordable work and decent wages. Support for motherhood and childhood, social support for the low-income population, a decent life for pensioners, the success of the youth is the success of the country, and comfortable living conditions are the guiding principles of the new social policy.

In the 2016 election program, a clear plan of action was determined with five institutional reforms, a new economic policy, Nurly Zhol (“Bright Path”), and the construction of an open Eurasia. They identified the directions of economic transformation, new social policy, security and stability. The direction of economic transformation consists of six points: a new strategy for the development of basic industries; innovation for all - a response to new technological challenges; privatization and support for effective owners; the middle class is a resource for the country’s overall development; a new investment policy; and economic security. The new social policy also consists of six points: an effective social state; support of socially vulnerable segments of the population; provision of employment; new housing policy; health care and education - to the best world standards; and a new labour policy. Important for security and stability are the following: the peaceful foreign policy of Kazakhstan; the fight against corruption; and the protection of interethnic peace and harmony.⁶⁶

The electoral program for 2021⁶⁷ is a continuation of the reform course of the Nur Otan Party. The program identifies the new challenges of our time: geopolitical tensions; increasing instability in the global economy; limited resources; uncontrolled migration; widespread increase in mass protests; a sharp increase in populism; and the development of digital technologies. The electoral program consists of four parts: equal opportunities for all; an intelligent, healthy and thrifty nation; sustainable development of the economy and regions; and accountable government and responsible citizens.

⁶⁶ *Kazakhstan – 2021: yedinstvo. Stabil'nost'. Sozidaniye* [Kazakhstan – 2021: Unity. Stability. Creation], in <https://nomad.su/?a=3-201602230010> (Accessed on 04.05.2021).

⁶⁷ *Put' peremen: Dostoyneyu zhizn' kazhdomu!* [The Path of Change: A Worthy Life for Everyone!], in https://nurotan2021.kz/upload/iblock/c57/Programme-2025-Nur-Otan_ru.pdf (Accessed on 06.05.2021).

PEOPLE'S PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN

The People's Party of Kazakhstan emerged as a result of the split of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in 2004. The party's official name from 2004 to 2020 was the Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan. The party is also an active participant in the legislative elections (Table 4) and, following the results of the 2012 and 2016 elections, was elected to parliament. Vladislav Kosarev was the party secretary from 2004 to 2013. Aikyn Konurov has served as Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan since 2013 and afterwards as Chairman of the People's Party of Kazakhstan. On March 28, 2022, at the XIX Extraordinary Party Congress, Ermūhamet Ertisbaev was elected Chairman of the People's Party of Kazakhstan. Aikyn Konurov is the first deputy chairman.

Table 4. *The People's Party of Kazakhstan's election programs and slogans over the years*

Title Years	Election programs	Slogans
2004	No data	No data
2007	Our party follows the course of Lenin-Kunaev! [Nasha partija sleduet kursom Lenina-Kunaeva!]	In authority – power, we have – truth [U vlasti - sila, u nas – pravda] We believe that Kazakhstan will reach the peak of civilization [Kazahstan orkeniettin biik shynyna shygatynyna senemiz]
2012	Let's give the people back the right to the future [Vernjom narodu pravo na budushhee]	Right to Work! People is Power! Justice! [Pravo na trud! Vlast' naroda! Spravedlivost'] Peace. Labour. January. [Mir. Trud. Janvar'.] Live by conscience [Zhit' po sovesti]
2016	For our common cause! [Za nashe obshhee delo!]	The Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan is a party of the Leninist type. [Kommunisticheskaja Narodnaja partija Kazahstana – partija leninskogo tipa]

		We oppose Western individualism, depredation and lack of culture [My vystupaem protiv zapadnogo individualizma, stjazhatel'stva i beskul'tur'ja]
2021	People, land and justice! [Narod, zemlja i spravedlivost']	Right to Work, People's Power and Justice [Pravo na trud, vlast' naroda i spravedlivost']

In the 2004 elections, the party recognized the existence of many different forms of ownership but openly declared that it did not accept market transformations of a capitalist nature. The program emphasizes the need to strengthen the social protection of the population. As indicated in the 2007 election platform⁶⁸, working in the Parliament and Maslikhats, the party does not allow the looting of natural resources; poverty in a rich country; increased prices for products and services; the disenfranchisement of self-employed citizens; dismissal of persons of pre-retirement age; robbery of landowners; the fusion of business and government; escalating corruption and suppression of small businesses.

The party advocated in its 2012 election program⁶⁹ people's representation and control, justice and social guarantees, and state responsibility. The election program for 2016⁷⁰ consists of six points: the Preamble; principles and tasks of People's Communism; the Crisis of World Capitalism; we oppose Western individualism, depredation, and lack of culture; the true values of communist upbringing; and the purposes of the People's Communists.

In the 2021 election program⁷¹, the renamed party has set the following tasks: building a social state as a new core for the development of Kazakhstan;

⁶⁸ *Predvybornaia platforma Kommunisticheskoi Narodnoi partii Kazakhstana* [Election platform of the Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan], in <https://centrasia.org/newsA.php?st=1184922420> (Accessed on 21.06.2021).

⁶⁹ *Predvybornaia programma Kommunisticheskoi narodnoi partii Kazakhstana* [Election program of the Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan], in https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31095092 (Accessed on 21.06.2021).

⁷⁰ *Predvybornaia programma Kommunisticheskoi narodnoi partii Kazakhstana* [Election program of the Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan], in <https://nomad.su/?a=3-201602290018> (Accessed on 21.06.2021).

⁷¹ *Predvybornaia programma Narodnoi partii Kazakhstana* [Election program of the People's Party of Kazakhstan], in <https://qhp.kz/Docs/PredvibProgram.pdf> (Accessed on 20.06.2021).

changing the economic strategy for modern realities; providing transparency of the government's work and its focus on the result. The party will present ten popular initiatives that will become the basis of a new social course. These include the availability and quality of education and medicine, a decision on the Kazakhstanis' housing issue, state-guaranteed decent old age to retire for Kazakhstanis, an economy in the interests of the people, not the capitalists, agriculture to become an engine of economic growth and ensure the country's food security, conducting a credit amnesty for individuals and legal entities at the expense of the banks themselves, fair taxation, transparency and control over the effectiveness of government decisions, independence of the judicial system and preservation of the cultural heritage of the people.

CONCLUSIONS

Some peculiarities can be found in the election programs and slogans of the political parties in the Republic of Kazakhstan. For example, before the unification of the Birlik (ADAL), Rukhaniyat mainly practised freedom and humanity. The Ak Zhol Democratic Party has always positioned itself as a "constructive opposition", a party of business and a follower of the Alash movement of the early 20th century. The Auyl People's Democratic Patriotic Party always represents the interests of the village workers. The Nur Otan Party must prepare each election program for 5 years and is interconnected with party programs (for example, the Nur Otan Party's 2019 adopted program until 2030 includes 10 goals for the decade of welfare society). People's Party of Kazakhstan is mainly against capitalism. In addition, you can see that many of the election programs of 2021 are interconnected with the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's State of the Nation Addresses "Constructive public dialogue – the basis of stability and prosperity of Kazakhstan" and "Kazakhstan in a new reality: time for action".

Generally, there are more similarities than differences in the election programs of political parties in Kazakhstan. For example, there is a lot of talk about the fight against corruption, justice, spiritual renewal, a decent life, and change. Therefore, these issues are relevant to Kazakh society.

Table 5 provides a comparative picture of all societal challenges expressed in the electoral platforms of the five major political parties:

Table 5. Societal challenges expressed in the electoral programs

	Ak Zhol Democratic Party	AMANAT	Auyl People's Democratic Patriotic Party	People's Party of Kazakhstan	Nationwide Social Democratic Party
1999	The party has existed since 2002.	Quick actions to get out of a deadlock, etc.	The party has existed since 2000.	The party has existed since 2004.	The party has existed since 2007.
2004	Improvement of the political system; adoption of the state program of political reforms; direct and equal distribution among all citizens of Kazakhstan of state revenues from the sale of subsoil wealth; state industrial policy; improving market housing affordability; efficiency of qualitative economic and social parameters; protection of workers' rights; a state program to protect motherhood and childhood; a state program of social assistance for the disabled; secondary education for free; genuine free	Achievement of the national standard of quality of life; improving the well-being of the people; development of the economy; strengthening the security of the state; social protection of the population; specific tasks in the political, economic, environmental, social, and cultural spheres, etc.	Interests of rural workers; development of the agricultural sector of the economy; improvement of living conditions in rural areas; and measures to improve social policy, etc.	Restoration of real people's power; adoption of a new Code on Parliamentary Elections; social security of the population, etc.	The party has existed since 2007.

	medical care; a twofold increase in wages, etc.	Improving the quality of life of every Kazakhstanian and the social well-being of all sectors of society; maintaining social stability, encouraging high civic engagement, and bolstering Kazakh patriotism; increase in the average monthly income of the population by more than 2 times; constantly raising the minimum wage, outstripping the rate of inflation; keep inflation within tight limits, etc.	Improving the financial situation of all rural residents, ensuring their well-being; developing the agricultural sector of the economy, etc.	Encourage people to take charge of the affairs of society themselves; the authorities' responsibility towards the people; participation of the people in the government of the state; production of domestic consumer goods; lowering the retirement age, etc.	Positive changes in medicine and education; pension and benefit increases; implementation of key mechanisms for further improving the welfare of the population; free and quality education and medicine, etc.
2007	Decent jobs and Wages; quality of human resources; affordable and decent housing; a decent life for the villagers; culture and spirituality; equality before the law and the fight against corruption.				
2012	Introduction of parliamentary investigation of executive bodies' actions; legislative protection of the status, interests and powers of parliamentary opposition parties; gradual introduction of the election of akims in settlements (including cities) directly	Simultaneously counteract the crisis and perform electoral commitments; improving the quality of life of rural residents; creation of the state education accumulation system; expanding the availability of higher,	Protecting the interests of peasants; speaking more openly about the life of the people; the land must be given to the peasants who cultivate it; continuity of generations -	Equitable distribution of profits from fossil wealth to improve the living conditions of the majority of the population; expanding the production of consumer goods; state-established prices for essential	A legal and responsible state, a competitive and socially oriented economy, and a fair and patriotic society; fair elections, free press and television, the ability of citizens to gather and unite to express their opinion, the election of local authorities and judges;

	by their residents; ensure the safety of every Kazakhstan home, etc.	technical, and vocational education for the population; improvement of the Unified National Health System; support for motherhood and childhood, etc.	development of Kazakhstan; the state language is the basis of the state; public health is the main value of Kazakhstan; Kazakhstanis should live without worries, etc.	goods and utilities; the introduction of public control over their observance; popular representation and control; social guarantees and responsibility of the state, etc.	preservation and development of the languages of ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan, their original culture, etc.
2016	Raising the salaries of teachers and successful scientists; ensuring decent living conditions for people with disabilities; increasing house construction, including the construction of social housing for the low-income segments of the population and young families, sold or rented at below market prices; adopting and implementing special programs for the development of regions with an unfavourable environmental situation or with a negative balance of migration; further development of the	Pave the way for the future of children; structural reforms in almost all spheres of the country's economic and social development; strengthen the identity and unity of the nation; updating the system of targeted social assistance; rental housing development; fighting corruption, etc.	Actual problems of the village and issues of social well-being of the villagers; problems of efficiency; problems of efficient land use, poor use of modern innovative technologies, development of new varieties and breeds in animal husbandry; integrated development of rural areas - development of social and engineering infrastructure of rural settlements; an increase in the scale of	Carrying out socio-economic reforms; the country's movement towards progress and prosperity; ideological opposition to any radicalism; social stability and interethnic harmony, etc.	ensuring that citizens have access to all of their political rights; creating in cities and rural settlements of an elective system of local self-government, which has all the powers to resolve local issues; abolition of private ownership of agricultural land; providing free and perpetual agricultural plots for the intended use to any villager who requests one, as well as town people's plots in the suburbs for homebuilding and gardening; development of approaches to the return of strategic sectors of the economy to the state in accordance with the law; the

	representative branch of power - the Parliament and maslikhats in relations with executive authorities at all levels, etc.		construction of social housing for young families, etc.		conversion of the state's whole educational system to a free one, etc.
2021	Expanding the use of the state language; restoring historical justice; prohibition of the sale and lease of land to citizens and companies of neighbouring countries; approval and control of the spending of all public funds in Parliament; The billions of money that authorities withdrew from offshore accounts should be returned to the nation; there should be no poverty in Kazakhstan; no one should be homeless, etc.	Creation of equal opportunities for all Kazakhstanis to realize their full potential; the growth of the well-being of Kazakh families, a happy childhood for children, a confident future for the younger generation and care for the elderly; solution of housing issues of the family; accessible education for all youth; providing young people with work and housing; support for people with special needs; cultural and intellectual society; sustainable development of the economy and regions; secure jobs, etc.	Providing each village with high-quality roads, centralized water supply, gasification and Internet; addressing the rural unemployment issue; developing an index of family well-being to improve the quality of life in rural areas; a ban on the sale and lease of agricultural land to foreign citizens and non-resident persons, etc.	Dissolution of the social insurance fund; reducing the cost of housing for young families and socially vulnerable segments of the population; return to the solidarity pension system; lowering the retirement age to 60; rational approach to attracting foreign investment; monitoring compliance with the prohibition of land ownership by foreigners; openness of government activity; preservation of the cultural heritage of all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, etc.	Refused to take part in the election.

During the study, it was noted that the election programs of political parties from the previous years were practically absent from the official websites. One can only get familiar with all the election programs of the Ak Zhol Democratic Party and the programs Nur Otan Party for 2016 and 2021. Research had to rely on information from other websites, like <https://online.zakon.kz>, <https://nomad.su>, and <https://centrasia.org>. In addition, all official websites (except the Ak Zhol Democratic Party website, which provides information in English) and election programs are in Kazakh and Russian.

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WOODROW WILSON'S "FOURTEEN POINTS": BETWEEN THE DIPLOMACY AND PROPAGANDA (ORIGINS OF THE LIBERAL PARADIGM)

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Abstract: *The study investigates the sources and peculiarities of President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" in the context of the diplomatic and propaganda attack of the Entente states on Austria-Hungary and Germany. On January 5, 1918, the President of the United States proposed a liberal model of post-war reconstruction, which contradicted the old ideas of monarchical and colonial powers. Particular attention was paid to the content analysis of Point X, which dealt with complex national issues of the Austria-Hungarian Monarchy. Some aspects of US propaganda activity in the confrontation with the Central Powers during the final stages of World War I are also explored.*

The liberal peace program that US President Woodrow Wilson made at the end of the war was only partially implemented, particularly in terms of the political self-determination of nation-states that appeared in the region or expanded territorially as a direct consequence of the collapse of Austria-Hungary. However, the United States, like the Entente states, failed to transform the "chaos" of national aspirations in the region into a Danube Federation, following the example of Switzerland.

Keywords: *Fourteen Points, Woodrow Wilson, propaganda attack, Austria-Hungary, Romanian issue, Danube Federation.*

Rezumat: *Cele „Paisprezece puncte” ale lui Woodrow Wilson: între diplomație și propagandă (originile paradigmei liberale).* În articol, autorii investighează sursele și particularitățile formării celor „Paisprezece puncte” ale președintelui Woodrow Wilson în contextul atacului diplomatic și de propagandă al statelor Antantei împotriva Austro-

Ungariei și Germaniei. Într-un discurs programatic din 5 ianuarie 1918, președintele Statelor Unite a propus un model liberal de reconstrucție a lumii postbelice, care contrazicea vechile idei ale puterilor monarhice și coloniale. O atenție deosebită a fost acordată analizei de conținut a punctului X, care s-a ocupat de probleme naționale complexe ale monarhiei Austro-Ungare. De asemenea, au fost explorate unele aspecte ale activității de propagandă a SUA în confruntarea cu puterile centrale în etapele finale ale Primului Război Mondial.

Programul liberal de pace pe care președintele american Woodrow Wilson l-a elaborat la sfârșitul războiului a fost implementat doar parțial, în special în ceea ce privește autodeterminarea politică a statelor naționale apărute în regiune sau extinse teritorial după prăbușirea Austro-Ungariei. Cu toate acestea, Statele Unite, la fel ca statele Antantei, nu au reușit să transforme „haosul” aspirațiilor naționale din regiune într-o Federație a Dunării, urmând exemplul Elveției.

INTRODUCTION

The First World War was a period of tragic trials for all humankind, and 1918 brought many surprises to the battlefields and the diplomatic front, as well as a completely different vision on how to end the global conflict and, most importantly, the foundation for a post-war world where needed. In some ways, the world has become truly global as it has become increasingly interconnected. Multinational European continental empires of the old type, based on monarchical, anti-democratic principles, seemed a geopolitical anachronism in the context of the irreconcilable struggle of the “avant-garde of democracies” advocated by the Triple Entente States – the United States, Great Britain and France. It was necessary to “end” colonialism in this context, attempting to bring in a new global era of free trade with its rationality and economic interdependence among nations. All of these factors of post-war political change should have gradually outweighed the irrationality of the war.

According to Larry Wolff (2020), a contemporary American researcher of President Wilson’s administration policy, Eastern Europe, invented by travellers and philosophers during the Enlightenment, was “found” on the map again in the first decades of the XX century due to US President’s geopolitical intervention. In the speech “Fourteen Points” in early 1918, it was precisely then that the concept of national self-determination¹ was revived, including the oppressed peoples of Austria-Hungary, as a valuable guideline of the Modern era.

¹ Larry Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020, 304 p.

Another one of Wilson's beliefs in collective security as a panacea, as Henry Kissinger correctly admitted, implied the integration of countries around the world against aggression, injustice, and, "most importantly, excessive selfishness".²

President Woodrow Wilson considered the construction of a future "no-war" world order from such liberal and somewhat idealistic positions. He attempted to develop and present a political mechanism for such a global restructuring in the Fourteen Points program.

Wilson's program included a section on the issue of Russia's "pacification". "Uncontrolled Bolshevism" was already posing a growing threat to Western democracies. Well-known British expert Halford Mackinder did not doubt in 1919 that the Bolsheviks would strengthen and gradually transform into a Eurasian force that the West would still have to face.³

Today, more than a century after the end of the First World War, there is a need to return to historical documents to understand the contradictory spirit of the era. This mystery defined the new twentieth century as the century of extremes. The people of the early 21st century need to investigate the liberal contexts of the Great War more closely. This is where content analysis of the most important documents, which together form humanity's "diplomatic memory," will prove helpful. Such unexpected wartime documents undoubtedly contributed to President Woodrow Wilson's Peace Program as part of a complex diplomatic game.

The idea and difficulties of forming a peace program were discussed in detail in the work of the American researcher Lawrence Gelfand⁴, devoted to the activities of "The Inquiry". However, the researchers have not conducted a detailed linguistic analysis of the Fourteen Points. One of the authors of this research produced the first attempt at a textual study of Point X. Despite this, the results of this study were not available to a broader range of researchers due to language limitations.⁵ Let us note the importance of analysing the Fourteen Points program in the context of the US propaganda deployment after joining the war on the side

² Henry Kissinger, *Diplomatiya* [Diplomacy], Moskva, "Ladimir", 1997, s. 201.

³ *Democratic ideals and reality. A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction by the Right Honorable Sir Halford J. Mackinder*, Washington, National Defense University Press, 1942, XXIII, 227 p.

⁴ Lawrence Gelfand, *The Inquiry. American preparation for peace, 1917-1919*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1963.

⁵ Volodymyr Fisanov, *Punkt X myrnoyi prohramy prezydenta Woodrow Wilsona: sprobna tekstolohichnoho analizu* [Point X of the Peace Programs of President Woodrow Wilson: a test of textual analysis], in *Problemy istoriyi mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn, Zb. naukovykh prats'*, Chernivtsi, 1993, s. 5-10.

of the Entente. Walter Lippmann, who was one of the actual authors of Fourteen Points, reflects these aspects in the fundamental work *Public Opinion*. It was Lippmann who, after the war, summarised the impact of the press on education, which was particularly important when preserving democracy in crisis conditions. It was necessary to strengthen Americans' psychological resistance to rumours and lies and examine the state of mind capable of filtering information.⁶

Ukrainian researchers Pavlo Guy-Nizhnik⁷ and Tetyana Pron⁸ analysed some aspects of the diplomatic activity of US President Woodrow Wilson before and during WWI. The study of the Fourteen Points has been significantly improved in light of the 100th anniversary of their release.

As modern American researcher Thomas J. Knock notes in his close look at Woodrow Wilson's political thought during a critical phase of the October 1918 Armistice negotiations, Wilson told an anxious Democratic senator, "I am now playing for 100 years hence." Furthermore, the author writes that it was "profoundly ironic that Donald Trump's challenges to long-standing international commitments and certain standards of behaviour should have coincided with the one-hundredth anniversary of events such as the Fourteen Points address and the struggle over American membership in the League of Nations".⁹ US scholars and experts who have analysed the results and the legacy of Wilson's political thought on American international policy and post-war world order at a reasonably high scientific and analytical level have extensively discussed Wilson and Wilsonianism. Contemporary research, in particular, is primarily dedicated to studying modern dimensions and challenges to the liberal international order at the global and regional levels whilst also showing various points of view. For example, Jacopo Perazzoli, a contemporary Italian researcher, analysed different receptions of Wilsonism in the modern European context, beginning with the first attempts to implement the liberal-democratic grand design, which would end the

⁶ Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, New York, The Free Press, 1965, p. 57.

⁷ Pavlo Guy-Nizhnik, *Politychni pohlyady Woodrow Wilsona u doprezydents'kyi period yoho zhyttya ta diyal'nosti* [Woodrow Wilson's political views and activities during his pre-presidential years], "Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsional'nykh doslidzhen' im. Ivana Kurasa NAN Ukrainy", Kyiv, 2008, Vyp. 39, s. 67-77.

⁸ Tetyana Pron', *Alter ego zovnishn'oyi polityky i dyplomatiyi prezydenta SShA Tomasa Woodrow Wilsona (1912-1920)* [The alter ego of foreign policy and diplomacy President of the United States Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1912-1920)], Naukovyy visnyk Uzhhorods'koho universytetu, seriya "Istoriya", Vyp. 2, 2013, s.62-67.

⁹ Thomas J. Knock, *To end all wars. Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order*, New Edition, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2019, p. VIII.

concert of old European states. He also investigated its influences on the Euro-Atlantic scenario during the 20th century.¹⁰ In his influential article on President Wilson's attitude to the principle of "self-determination" of nations, American researcher Trygve Throntveit noted that even the bare phrase "self-determination" is absent from the text of his famous Fourteen points and almost all his public pronouncements of the war years.¹¹ In this case, the author explores not so much the content of the points themselves but the reasons for their ineffectiveness between the two world wars, resulting in the eventual loss of peace in Central Europe.

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that considerable attention has been paid in this article to the "Balkan" issues, which were reflected in the text of "Fourteen Points" since it was the region where the interests of Austria-Hungary and Russia collided on the eve of World War I. This marked the beginning of a "broad geostrategic strip" stretching from the western coast of modern-day Albania down to the eastern borders of Afghanistan, with the Caucasus and the Anatolia and Central Asian¹² territories included, were further acts of geopolitical confrontation between the states within the Great Game originated and persisted in various nuances in the early twenty-first century.

ARGUMENTATION

As a result of the unsatisfactory study of the sources of formation of the text of the US peace program itself, a more detailed analysis of previously known and new documentary sources is required, which should first concern the "Fourteen Points" themselves as well as the contextual diplomatic and memoir documents of World War I. Many years of research on First World War documentary sources prompted the authors to turn first to the textual analysis of the Tenth Point of President Wilson's speech in Congress on January 8, 1918. Let us recollect that it concerned one of the critical issues concerning future Central Europe's territorial structure—the future of the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire.

¹⁰ Jacopo Perazzoli, *Wilson and Wilsonianism in the 20th Century: Influences and Receptions in the Euro-Atlantic Scenario*, 2021, in https://www.academia.edu/43851031/Wilson_and_Wilsonianism_in_the_20th_Century_Influences_and_Receptions_in_the_Euro-Atlantic_Scenario (Accessed 12.02.2022).

¹¹ Trygve Throntveit, *The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination*, "Diplomatic History", 35, no. 3, June 2011, p.446.

¹² Artem Ulunyan, *Balkaziya i Rossiya 1900-1914* [Balkasia and Russia 1900-1914], Moskva, "MAIN", 2002, s. 10.

In one of his famous pamphlets, *The Crank*, Arthur Ponsonby, a well-known critic of the war from the Union of Democratic Control, criticised the British government for the chaos and imbalance in the policy of war goals. "One week we are fighting for France, the next to preserve the Balance of Power, again we are fighting to crush militarism, and yet again to establish a healthy military system here at home, and so on."¹³ It was President Wilson who, at the end of the war, proclaimed the United States' peace program and made the allies' military and political goals much more structured and understandable to public opinion in warring and neutral countries, especially regarding Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁴

This study attempts to interpret US President Woodrow Wilson's speech to Congress on January 5, 1918, as a result of the President's legal and diplomatic activity and that of experts. According to researchers, resources that describe, in this case, rigorous preparatory and expert actions exist in addition to the document. This most laborious and "dim side" of diplomatic document production and evaluation is intended to be covered as thoroughly as possible in this study.

The examination of the known sources of Wilson's administration final Program Paper reveals that one of the key phrases of the famous French historian Paul Leger concerning the autonomy of the nationalities of Austria-Hungary was included in the text. In his fundamental work on Austria-Hungarian problems, the scientist wrote that only a new *modus vivendi* between different races could save the country from political anarchy. That is why, in his view, there was an urgent necessity to "transform the current dualistic monarchy into a federal state where local autonomy of different national groups would be respected and recognised".¹⁵ However, President Wilson did not like the proposed version of the memorandum. Based on Leger's thesis, analysts have taken this into account in subsequent work. A classified letter from Arthur Balfour, the head of the Foreign Office, contained the formula that suited official Vienna. Informing Wilson about secret negotiations with an Austrian representative, the politician said that, while opposing the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, Britain expressed the wish that, in the future, the peoples of the Empire be "given an opportunity for autonomous development".¹⁶

¹³ Arthur Ponsonby, *The Crank written in 1916*, London, George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1940, p. 18.

¹⁴ See Alexandr Sych, *Post War (WWI) Central and Eastern Europe: Time of Civilizational Choice*, in "Codrul Cosminului", XXV, 2019, No. 1, p. 146-147.

¹⁵ Paul Louis Leger, *Austria – Hungary. The history of Nations Series*, Ed.-in-Chief H.C. Lodge, Philadelphia, 1906, p. 457.

¹⁶ *The Mirage of Power. British foreign policy. 1902-1922*, vol. 3, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul PLC, 1972, p. 609.

The preceding paragraph was the result of meticulous, analytical work combined with extensive editing: "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations¹⁷ of the world we wish to see safeguarded and assured must be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development"¹⁸. However, this text did not satisfy the President and was therefore not final. While trying to reassure Vienna, Wilson decided to demonstrate a commitment to preserve the status quo rather than undermine Austria-Hungary's sovereignty. The President revised the wording in part referring to the possibility of "free autonomous development of peoples", replacing the expression "must be accorded" with "should be accorded". As a result, the tone was softened, and Viennese politicians should have considered Wilson's proposal solely as a suggestion rather than a requirement.

Secondly, the word "world" disappeared from the phrase "among the nations of the world". While saving the first variant, the possibilities of double reading the text were significantly narrowed. After all, the expression "nations of the world" was interpreted exclusively as "states of the world", implying that it was about Austria-Hungary.

In addition, on Lippmann's advice, the document's final form included the word "peoples". In a previous memorandum written by Professor Robert Kerner, an expert on Czech issues, the terms "nations" and "races" were suggested. However, preference was given to the term "peoples", which the experts used in the final memorandum presented to President Wilson.¹⁹ Subsequently, the Americans changed their focus, having to support the liberation movement of the peoples of the Danube Empire.

The final version of paragraph X was as follows: "The peoples of Austro-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous develop-

¹⁷ Note that the word "nation" in English has, as we know, various meanings: 1) people, nation; 2) state, country. Thus, the phrase "community of nations" means "community of states". It is clear that the Danube monarchy cannot be regarded as a nation. In this case, it was impossible, if necessary, to read "among the nations" as "between the nations", and this did not suit official Washington. By removing the term "world", it was feasible to refer to the word "peoples" with the preposition "whose" and read the text as follows: "Peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among other nations ...". Thus, the content of what was written changed radically.

¹⁸ Arthur S. Link (ed.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Nov. 11, 1917 – Jan. 15, 1918*, vol. 45, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 481.

¹⁹ Betty Unterberger, *The United States, revolutionary Russia, and the rise of Czechoslovakia*, Chappell Hill, 1989, p. 95.

ment”.²⁰ The content of the text could be interpreted in two ways, as the editors of the President’s speech anticipated. Diplomatic circles and observers immediately questioned whom or what Wilson was referring to when he spoke about a guaranteed place in the world community – Austria-Hungary or the peoples that inhabit it.

It is worth noting that this understanding was not readily evident to the contemporaries. Subsequently, some of the researchers made the mistake of trying to interpret the text of the paragraph in their own way. Speaking of contemporaries, the opinion of the Ambassador of France to the United States, Jules Jusserand, is worth mentioning. In a confidential letter to the State Department, the diplomat asked to clarify whose place “among nations” the President hoped to see as safe and secure. He himself believed that these were the Danube monarchy’s people. Wilson’s response stated, “The French ambassador correctly interpreted my peace proposals regarding Austria-Hungary”.²¹ In Washington, such an interpretation was “held” as if it were for domestic use, considering the possible changes in the political situation in the Central European region. At that time, Wilson’s version of interpretation (for Jules Jusserand) could not be widely publicised. Considering the current realities, Washington did not mean exclusively peoples since the subject of international law was still the Austria-Hungary, with which the United States hoped to deal. After all, they still hoped for secret contacts with official Vienna in the western capitals, expecting to conclude a separate peace with the Habsburgs. After reading the Fourteen Points, Austrian politicians accepted it, with reservations, as the basis for future peace talks. It is no coincidence that the famous American researcher Victor Mamatey wrote in his time that, in this case, we are witnessing a highly successful “turn of the psychological war”. “Everyone was able to read the text as they want to,” he wrote.²²

Before moving on to other subjects, it is worth looking at Point X’s sources, which were influenced by two elements. The first is the Mises-Lippmann Memorandum. The second is mentioned in Balfour’s letter to Wilson.

1. Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations ... (as compared to the Memorandum of Experts: “Austria-Hungary may be free to take its rightful place among the nations”).

²⁰ Arthur S. Link (ed.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Jan. 16, 1918 – March 1918*, vol. 46, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 527, 537.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

²² Victor Mamatey, *The United States and East-Central Europe, 1914- 1919. A study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda*, Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 180.

2. Again, the text of the Point: "The peoples ... should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development". Here is an extract from Balfour's letter: "...Our strong desire is to see the various nationalities of which the Empire is composed are given an opportunity for autonomous development ..." Some of Leger's ideas may have had an influence.

As his daughter recalls, Wilson had his "special method" of preparing speeches. At first, he made notes of the speech essence on small pieces of paper, partly printed on a typewriter, partially handwritten, and then inserted them over. The final text was printed on a typewriter on sheets of thin paper with "some corrections neatly entered between the lines".²³ This is precisely how the President's previous version of the Fourteen Points text looked.

In May-August 1918, when the national movement in Austria-Hungary intensified, and it became apparent that Vienna would not make concessions to the Entente countries, the diplomats read the Tenth Point quite differently. On August 19, Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote to Wilson that the US could support a separate declaration by Austria-Hungarian nationalities seeking to free themselves from German domination. They could count not only on our sympathy, he wrote, but also on material assistance. At the same time, Lansing believed it was possible to establish close contacts with revolutionary organisations and groups opposed to the Austria-Hungarian government, seeking national independence by armed means. "If such a course is approved, the politician said, then Austria-Hungary should be aware that during the peace talks, we will oppose the existence of the empire in its present form and at its current borders".²⁴

As well-known publicist Lippmann later acknowledged, the peace program was to establish lines of understanding between the Allies, on the one hand, and the informal circles in Germany and the "subject peoples of Austria-Hungary", on the other.²⁵ Lansing, in addition, has always been critical of the President's speech in Congress, in particular the Tenth Point, as it proposed to "federalise" the Habsburg Empire. In his memoirs, he wrote that he did not dare to include the issue of independence for Austria-Hungarian nationalities, namely the Czechs, Ruthenians, and southern Slavs, in the US peace program because the President, except Poland ... intended to preserve a dualistic Monarchy in that way. "I didn't

²³ Eleanor McAdoo Wilson, *The Woodrow Wilsons*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1937, p. 246.

²⁴ *The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, vol. I, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1940, p.140.

²⁵ Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, New York, London, The Free Press, 1965, p. 136.

consider it a wise decision,” – the diplomat wrote.²⁶

Thus, what Wilson wrote to Jusserand in the confidential letter cited above, could become possible only in the summer of 1918. Diplomatic circles preferred the following wording: “The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among other nations we hope to see protected and guaranteed, should be given the freest opportunity for autonomous development.” Washington expressed a desire to see the nationalities of the Habsburg Empire as equal members of the international community at a time when the collapse of the Danube monarchy, although expected, was not yet so obvious. Later, Lippmann criticised Wilson’s strategy in Central Europe, outlined in Fourteen Points. Italy’s thesis ignores “strategic considerations”. Serbia has been promised sea access, but Jugo-Slavia is not mentioned since “the unity of the Austria-Hungarian Empire” is prioritised. There is no mention of Czech Slovaks at all. Romania remains “face-to-face with Hungary” within its old borders.²⁷

Bulgarian diplomat Stefan Panaretov wrote in his diary on January 8, 1918 (on the day Wilson spoke) the following: I said that the Serbs were not satisfied with the message, especially Point X, which did not aim to destroy Austria and accomplish the Yugoslav dreams.²⁸

In point ten, Woodrow Wilson rejected, as historian Charles Neu noted, the division of Austria-Hungary into a series of independent states instead of asking for internal autonomy for various nationalist groups within the Empire.²⁹

It is worth mentioning Wilson’s interest in making his Fourteen Points and other speeches widely publicised and recognised as a peace settlement program. Through the staff of his information service, the President instructed George Creel to translate and disseminate presidential messages to ordinary people, first and foremost, in Germany and Russia in a “short and acceptable manner.” Dennis Cashman, an American researcher, paints a striking picture of the propagandistic spread of Wilson’s ideas and speeches. He wrote that Wilson’s official speeches were broadcast on the radio, quickly translated, and spread worldwide. The films about American military efforts were recorded in cinemas. Indeed, thanks to Wing, the cult of Wilson appeared two decades before the cult of personality

²⁶ *War Memories of Robert Lansing*, New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1935, p. 261.

²⁷ Walter Lippmann, *The Political Scene. An Essay on the Victory of 1918*, New York, Franklin Classics, 1919, p. 17.

²⁸ Stefan Panaretov, *Diary 1917-1921*, in Petko M. Petkov, *The United States and Bulgaria in World War I*, New York, 1991, p. 178-179.

²⁹ Charles Neu, *Colonel House: A Biography of Woodrow Wilson’s Silent Partner*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 332.

associated primarily with Hitler and Stalin. The testimony of this cult was "not only the distribution of leaflets, postcards and photographs in Western Europe but also in Italy and Russia." They were distributed eastward to China, where Wilson's speeches published by Creel became a best-seller even to the West of the Peruvian Andes.³⁰

Here are two very different responses to the presidential effort. As one Japanese diplomat mentioned later, all these messages were translated and published by the Japanese press. Every statement that flew from Mr Wilson's lips, every sentence that came out of his pen concerning the war was "read and learned by millions of Japanese".³¹ Another witness to the events, Baron Alexei Budberg, a man of Admiral Kolchak's entourage, wrote in his diary on March 17, 1918: "A resident of Moon Wilson exploded with a message to the Russian people; in fact, it's nothing, since 3/4 of the Russian people do not read any messages and very few, if any, are aware of what the United States is and where it is located".³²

President Wilson and his advisers still hoped for the democratisation of Russia during that tough and chaotic time. However, more experienced British politicians have cautioned the American President about the prospects for democratic transformation in Eurasia. In a letter to Wilson, Foreign Office chief Arthur Balfour emphasised that the new people who came to power in Russia after the fall of tsarism were unlikely to be "so much better than the old". "In Russia, there is no middle class. Corruption has eaten deeply into their vitals, and we must not hope for too much".³³

Actual politics often differed from propaganda influences. The Japanese are unlikely to have really "studied" Wilson's message, and the Russians ignored them. The truth is somewhere in the middle: most average public seemed indifferent to them, sometimes not even knowing what they were talking about. They received feedback from a small number of politically active individuals.

It should be stressed that the Committee for Public Information, led by George Creel, has used various psychological and propaganda instruments to shape US public opinion since the country's entered the war. Creel personally addressed the famous artist Charles Gibson and proposed that he lead the Division

³⁰ Sean Dennis Cashman, *America in the Age of Titans. The progressive Era and World War First*, New York, 1988, p. 510.

³¹ Kiyoshi Kawakami, *Japan and world peace*, New York, Macmillan, 1919, p. 48-49.

³² *Dnevnik barona Alekseya Budberga*, Arkhiv Russkoy revolyutsii [Diary of Baron Alexei Budberg, Archive of the Russian Revolution], t. 12, Moskva, Terra, 1991, s. 287.

³³ Arthur S. Link (ed.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, April 7-June 23, 1917*, vol. 42, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 329.

of Pictorial Publicity (DPP). The latter was able to attract the best illustrators in the country to focus creative efforts on military issues. Illustrators then created unforgettable images, including at the same time the stern and familiar image of Uncle Sam with the inscription "I Want You for US Army" by James Montgomery Flagg. Today, many researchers are studying other dimensions of allied active propaganda in those turbulent years, including poetry and musical accompaniment of posters and postcards.

Holger Terp from the Danish Peace Academy started an exciting project collecting and publishing songs from the Great War. There are more than 14,000 wartime prints, which represent an essential part of the common European cultural heritage. This collection contains over 80 soldiers' songs, ballads, and peace songs related to World War I. One such piece, *Goodbye Broadway, Hello France*, was dedicated to the American military campaign in Europe: Every soldier's mother drying her eye. /Cheer up we'll soon be there, /Singing this Yankee air: /Goodbye Broadway, Hello France, /We're ten million strong, /Goodbye sweethearts wives and mothers, /It won't take us long. /Don't you worry while we're there, /It's for you we're fighting too /So Goodbye Broadway, Hello France, /We're going to square our debt to you. /'Vive Pershing' is the cry across the sea. /We're united in this fight for liberty.³⁴

Indeed, one of the leading motives for US participation in the war in Europe was military and political assistance to the allies in France. Still, the issue of the post-war system in Central Europe also attracted public opinion. It was then, in 1918, that those Americans who joined foreign policy and reflected on the country's further tactics in European affairs had some interest in the future of the Danube monarchy. The Liberal weekly newspaper "The New Republic" stated that the Austria-Hungarian problem is now our problem and formulating an effective solution is one of the new international obligations of the American citizen. Assuming the role of builders of New Europe, the West considered it necessary to demonstrate its commitment to plans to form a strong Slavic Federation or Confederation in the Danube Basin. As stated in the Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary on the policy of the Entente countries, almost all the big guns of the political verbal army are firing heavy calibre on problems of military objectives.³⁵

³⁴ Holger Terp, *World War One Songs, Collected and documented*, The Danish Peace Academy, July 2014, in http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/abase/sange/world_war_one_songs.pdf (Accessed 14.02.2022).

³⁵ *Amerika und die Entente, 22.VII.1918*, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (hereafter: HHStA),

Because of the war, let us note that Americans were compelled to study an ethnographic map of Europe. At the end of 1915, the pages of the aforementioned weekly newspaper included an article dedicated to Ukraine by Alvin Johnson, with the rather loud title *Russian Ireland*. In particular, it referred to the need for a differentiated approach to the Slavic problems of Eastern Europe. The author wrote: for us, all Slavs are the same: Russians, Poles, Ruthenians, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats and Serbs. What do we know about the ethnic and linguistic differences between these nations? Do they speak different languages? Can everyone, without exception, be proud of a kind of folklore, or wonderful social and religious institutions?³⁶ Let us underline that the leading role in the Austrophobic campaign in the United States was played by "The New Republic". It is emphasised: "The division of Austria-Hungary into four states of Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia with the transfer of Poland, Romania and Italy to territories nationally close to these states would exactly correspond to the American concept of 'fair disposal' of the Austro-Hungarian problem".³⁷

Another interesting opinion on Ukraine is worth highlighting. The famous historian and British Foreign Office expert Arnold Toynbee wrote in 1915 about the potential of implementing plans to construct a "detached" Ukrainian state from the Russian Empire, which, of course, was supported by the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary, living in Eastern Galicia. Such a scenario could become a reality in the case of "dismemberment of the Russian Empire, and contemplate an independent Ukrainian state, extended, under the patronage of the Central Powers, as far as Kieff and Odesa".³⁸

However, the official commentary on the "Fourteen Points" expressly referred to the possibility of creating another federation – in the territories of Central Europe: The United States also supported a program aimed at establishing a south-eastern European Confederation.³⁹ It is worth noting that at the time, the authorities of the American trade unions made a particular statement at an inter-union conference of workers. The following idea was proposed: The Conference confirms President Wilson's Fourteen Points as conditions for the establishment and maintenance of peace "between equal nations". By the way, union officials

P.A. 898, s. 163.

³⁶ "The New Republic", 1915, 16 Jan.

³⁷ "The New Republic", 1918, 15 June.

³⁸ Arnold Toynbee, *The New Europe: Some Essays in Reconstruction*, London and Toronto, J. M. Dent & Sons Limited, 1915, p. 82.

³⁹ *Arkhiv polkovnika House* [The Intimate Papers of Colonel House], т. 4, Moskva, 1944, s. 156.

made mistakes in the document's text. Not the "*freest* opportunity of autonomous development" but the "first opportunity of autonomous development" was granted to the Austro-Hungarian peoples.⁴⁰

The Austrians made a similar error when translating the text of the Wilson note. Even the Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the Austria-Hungarian Monarchy used the text of Point X, which referred to the need to provide the Empire's peoples with "*erste Gelegenheit*" of autonomous development.⁴¹ In one of the then German publications of the American Peaceful Conditions, where authentic English text is submitted alongside the German version, the translation corresponds to the original text. In particular, we read that the peoples of Austria-Hungary should be given the "*freest* opportunity of autonomous development".⁴²

Contemporary British historian Theo Aronson believes that "endemic separatist movements" in Central Europe have received "unprecedented acceleration" due to the influence of Wilson's Fourteen Points. From that time on, self-determination for all minorities has become more than just a reward; it has become "almost an imperative".⁴³

When talking about the fate of Austria-Hungary, it should be emphasised that the Czech lands and Slovakia were considered the most critical geostrategic factors because they were its geographical centre. If they left, the Empire would fall apart. One of the American wartime observers, George MacAdam, considered Czechoslovakia as the keystone in the Mittel-Europa, admitting: "Let the Czechoslovaks become free people, and that great Pan-German structure collapses".⁴⁴

There is an assessment of the leading American "propagandist" George Creel, who generally believed that Wilson's points did not have serious practical significance. He particularly noted that the Fourteen Points should not be regarded as "a definitive practical formula" but rather as widespread promulgation of principles.⁴⁵ At the same time, during the preparation of Wilson's speech, the experts advocated combining the line of preserving Austria-Hungary as a federal state with elements of "psychological war" against the Habsburgs, thereby sup-

⁴⁰ *Proposals of American Federation of Labor Delegates to Inter-Allied Labor Conference, London, Sept. 17-20, 1918, Labor's official war record*, in Samuel Gompers, *American Labor and the War*, New York, George H. Doran Company, 1919, pp. 374, 376.

⁴¹ *Nachlass Czernin*, HHStA, P.A.I.1092 A., s. 141.

⁴² *Die sieben und zwanzig Punkte des Präsidenten Wilson*, o. O., 1918, s. 3.

⁴³ Theo Aronson, *Crowns in Conflict. 1910-1918*, London, Murray, 1986, p. 184.

⁴⁴ George MacAdam, *Czechoslovakia, the Nation without a Country*, *The World's Work*, Oct. 1918, vol. 36, p. 630.

⁴⁵ George Creel, *The war, the world and Wilson*, London, Harper & Brothers, 1920, p. 301.

porting the revolutionary aspirations of the Slavic peoples, first to influence official Vienna to break peace with the Entente countries. However, in January 1918, according to researcher Betty Unterberger, Wilson did not support such a "double bottom" policy.⁴⁶

Almost all researchers agreed that Point X called for internal (or federal) autonomy for national groups within the Austria-Hungarian Empire. Afterwards, Wilson agreed with the collapse of the Empire, leading to the establishment of "weak states in Central Europe, undermining the balance of power and opening the way for Hitler".⁴⁷

It is no coincidence that Baron Musulin, the Austria-Hungarian ambassador in Bern, reported to Count Ottokar Czernin in a telegram on January 28, 1918, that Wilson's and Lloyd George's statements regarding the future policy on the Austria-Hungarian question substantially undermined great-Serbian plans. The information that the dismemberment of Austro-Hungary was not foreseen in the military aims of the Entente caused "great concern" in the Serbian emigrant circles, as the diplomat noted. In connection with this, the Yugoslav Committee in London stated that "the democratisation of Austria-Hungary based on autonomy cannot solve the Yugoslav question". This can only be achieved if the Yugoslavs are entirely liberated from Austrian rule.⁴⁸

Other points in the Peaceful American Program that directly concerned Austria-Hungarian issues are worth analysing to compare them to Point X. Discussing the text of other matters, Wilson and House agreed that the current points of the London Treaty, which gave Italy power over other nationalities, came into conflict with the principles proclaimed by the United States. A minor field note by Wilson on the "Inquire" report on this subject became the Ninth Point. Both politicians agreed that Turkish domination in Europe was over. Point XI concerning the Balkans was sufficiently blurred, as the future of the Monarchy remained uncertain. Point XIII ensured the restoration of Poland's independence. It adhered to the House's principles and, most crucially, to his friend Ignacy Paderewski's promises. One common German friend introduced him to Wilson's assistant. Because of this visit, Poland obtained the Gdansk Corridor.⁴⁹

Evaluating the Ninth Point, Lippmann wrote that it recognised the principle

⁴⁶ Betty Unterberger, *The United States...*, p. 96.

⁴⁷ Sean Dennis Cashman, *America in the Age of Titans...*, p. 512.

⁴⁸ *Kriegs-Zile Entente-Staaten*, HHStA, P.A. I.1052., Liasse Krieg 69, s. 21.

⁴⁹ George Viereck, *The Strangest Friendship in History. Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, New York, Liveright Inc. Publishers, 1932, p. 212.

of nationality, which meant only one thing: the terms of the London Treaty were not recognised. The expert described the territorial demarcation provided by this contract as “semi-strategic, semi-economic, semi-imperialist, and semi-formal”. In his view, the Allies’ sympathy could only result in Rome’s demands being met, leading to the restoration of the “real” Italia Irredenta. All others, according to reliable sources, only “delayed the impending Yugoslav revolt”.⁵⁰

It was explicitly stated in point XI: “Romania, Serbia and Montenegro should be released; occupied territories restored; Serbia must gain free and safe access to the sea”. Further, it was about the borders of the Balkan states, which should be formed according to “historically established lines and the principle of nationality”.⁵¹ Resolving the issue of Serbia’s access to the sea contradicted the plans of keeping Austria-Hungary together. This question seriously affected the Italians, who concluded another important diplomatic document with the Entente - the secret London Pact, on which much of the Adriatic coast, not to mention Trentino, had to be left to Italy after the end of the war. As noted in diplomatic notes, the legal adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Georgiy Mikhailovsky, Sazonov and other leaders of Russian diplomacy “rewarded Italy with the Slavic lands of Austria-Hungary and separated Croatia from Serbia in vain”.⁵²

The complicated Romanian issue deserves consideration as well. For the first time during the war, the Entente States debated its political resolution in a joint Note on January 10, 1917, when President Wilson addressed England and France to declare his own military and political goals. The response of the Allied countries, in particular, emphasised the need to “liberate Italians, Slavs, Romanians and Czechs from foreign domination”. It is clear that the term “foreign domination” meant the authorities of Austria-Hungary.⁵³ During the war, the famous British publicist and supporter of the collapse of the Austrian Empire, Robert Seton-Watson, warned of increasing regional danger if the Romanian problem was not resolved. In a letter to George Moroianu, a well-known social and political figure, a future expert of the Romanian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, he wrote that if Austria-Hungary collapsed, such a massive failure would be the most suitable condition for Transylvania Romania, and Hungary or

⁵⁰ Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion...*, p. 137.

⁵¹ Arthur S. Link (ed.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson...*, vol. 45, p. 514.

⁵² Georgiy Mikhaylovskiy, *Zapiski. Iz istorii rossiyskogo vneshnepoliticheskogo vedomstva* [Notes. From the History of the Russian Foreign Office], 1914-1920, Kn. 1, Moskva, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1993, s. 100.

⁵³ *Official statements of War Aims and Peace proposals, Dec. 1916 to Nov. 1918*, ed. by J. B. Scott, University of California Libraries, 1984, p. 37.

Russia".⁵⁴ Romanian society has had great opportunities for post-war development, as noted in Professor George Gerron's article *New Romania* in the liberal weekly "The New Europe", noting Transylvania's determination of young democrats in the field of economic transformation. They stand against corruption and archaic Romanian institutions, dreaming of seeing their own country with a well-planned and effective social renewal system.⁵⁵

As previously stated, Walter Lippmann criticised the US President's diplomatic hesitancy in the face of the Central States, leaving Romania, in reality, alone with Hungary on the issue of Transylvania. Under these conditions, representatives of the peoples of Central and Southern Europe, on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference, opposed any federal projects that would lead to the preservation of Austria-Hungary. On October 10, 1918, the corresponding joint Declaration of the representatives of the Romanian, Czech-Slovak, South-Slavic and Polish National Committees was published. Such an international statement was quite appropriate, taking into consideration that on October 17, 1918, the Hungarian Parliament responded to the call of the Austrian Emperor Charles I to reorganise the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with the proclamation of the Kingdom of Hungary's complete independence.

The inquisitive readers may wonder, in the context of the intricate diplomatic struggle that reigned towards the end of the war, "Did Wilson use his knowledge of secret treaties while working on the text of the speech? (...) Fourteen points (...) could not have been formulated without the knowledge of secret treaties," asserted Walter Lippmann in a statement which was published by the Bolshevik government in Russia at the end of 1917. Obviously, excerpts from them were laid in front of the President, as experts and the President himself worked to finalise these crucial documents on military and political goals at the final stage of World War I. However, these topics are unrelated to this scientific exploration.

Concerning the Russian factor and more broadly the leftist, socialist influences on Wilson's external program, the following can be emphasised. President Wilson's position at the end of 1917 was undoubtedly influenced by the "democratic revolution in Russia", whose adherents constantly pointed to the need to adhere to the principle of self-determination for subject nationalities with the subsequent conclusion of the peace with no annexations and no indemnities. Bolshevik proposals at Brest Litovsk for the Central powers demanded this. In

⁵⁴ Cornelia Bodea, Hugh Seton-Watson, *R. W. Seton-Watson și România, 1906-1920*, vol. I, București, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1988, p. 406.

⁵⁵ "The New Europe", 1919, 2 Oct.

addition, a radical peace movement spread among Triple Entente countries. As the contemporary American historian Trygve Throntveit notes in his seminal work, pressure in Britain culminated on December 28, when the Labour Party published a *Memorandum on War Aims* demanding an avowedly Wilsonian program, including a "supranational authority" comprising an international legislature, world court, and mediation council to settle "non-justiciable" disputes.

Moreover, it is worth remembering that in formulating US war aims, President Wilson himself could not ignore the views of the "left" socialist opposition in America. At the end of 1917, the leftist American magazine "The Masses" published the "Program requirements of The People's Council of America", which expressed the views of primarily socialist intellectuals. In particular, they insisted on the promulgation of a "concrete statement of America's war aims" and proclaimed that future peace should be based on the principles of "no forcible annexations, no punitive indemnities, and free development for all nationalities."⁵⁶ Moreover, one of the leaders of leftist thought at the time, Max Eastman criticised the government rather harshly, pointing out that modern America could not wage war for democracy when "industrial feudalism" prevailed at home. At the same time, 2% of the population owns 60% of the national wealth.⁵⁷ According to Walter Lippmann, the liberal "Federation of the World", including the United States, should not be based on old principles. "We shall turn with fresh interests to our own tyrannies - to our Colorado mines, our autocratic steel industries, our sweatshops and our slums," Lippmann concluded. "We shall call that man un-American and no patriot who prates of liberty in Europe and resists it at home."⁵⁸

Returning to the problems of Central Europe, it can be noted that Austria-Hungary had to prepare for severe territorial losses. It is no coincidence that Count Czernin wrote in one of the memorandums: "I am confident that we will reach an acceptable peace; something we will have to give to Italy, and, of course, we will get nothing for it. Then we will have to change the whole order of Austria-Hungary, according to the scheme outlined by the French, Federation Dannubienne, and it is not yet clear to me how the transformation against the will of the Hungarian and German populations will be carried out." "So, I hope, the politician remarked, that we will come out of the war only with a bruise under our eye. However, the old times will never come back".⁵⁹

⁵⁶ "The Masses", Vol. IX, №11, Sept. 1917, p. 34.

⁵⁷ "The Masses", Vol. IX, № 12, Oct. 1917, p. 14.

⁵⁸ Trygve Throntveit, *Power without victory...*, p. 239.

⁵⁹ Ottokar Czernin, *V dni mirovoy voyny. Memuary* [During World War. Memoirs], Moskva,

It should be noted, in this context, that various federalisation projects in the region were discussed. For example, the Balkan Confederation was mentioned. The left-wing British journalist Henry Brailsford wrote about this: "a Balkan Confederation which included Hungary would have become in the military sense a Great Power", and this will make possible the realisation of the ideal of the "Balkans for the Balkan peoples". However, he stressed that the project would be hampered by the attitude of Hungarians, who "think of the Balkan races as Europe thinks of Africa."⁶⁰ Unlike arrogant Hungarian politicians, the Americans and the British put forward liberal political projects. British politicians, for example, used their own experience of supporting "strong free nations" within the British dominions. As one of the authors of the League of Nations, Jan Christian Smuts, said in a speech to both Houses of Parliament in May 1917, we must reject the "idea of assimilation" and further ensure that our nations have the right "to develop freely on the principles of self-government". British Commonwealth of nations "does not stand for standardisation or denationalisation, but for the fuller, richer, and more varied life of all the nations comprised in it".⁶¹

Thus, Washington continued to support, and this was emphasised in the documents, the "movement toward federalism in Austria", which, if successful, would significantly weaken the dualistic system. Americans did not go beyond moderate tactics in the Austria-Hungarian question. This was evidenced, in particular, by the content of the X Point dedicated to Austria from the famous "Fourteen Points of Wilson". Astrid Hausmann, an Austrian researcher of US foreign policy from 1917 to 1919, noted that the formulation of Point X was "typically Wilsonian" - much is said, but nothing essential is mentioned again.⁶²

In such a situation, according to another researcher, Steven Blum, the task of politicians was to "limit the national aspirations of each ethnic group as far as possible".⁶³ On this basis, all other ethno-territorial problems of Central and Eastern Europe were considered important, and such diplomatic tactics remained unchanged until the autumn of 1918. However, under new geopolitical conditions,

Petrograd, Gosudarstvennoye izdatel'stvo, 1923, s. 238.

⁶⁰ "The New Republic", February 13, 1915.

⁶¹ Jan Christiaan Smuts, *War-time speeches: a compilation of public utterances in Great Britain*, London, New York, Hodder and Stoughton, 1917, p. 33.

⁶² Astrid Hausmann, *Die amerikanische Außenpolitik und die Entstehung der Österreichischen Republik von 1917-1919*, Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktor-Grades an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Wien, 1972, s. 86.

⁶³ Steven Blum, *Walter Lippmann: Cosmopolitanism in the century of total war*, Ithaca, 1984, p. 50.

US diplomacy was forced to go on a “new read” of the Wilson’s Point X. An official note sent on October 18 to Austria-Hungary stated in particular that, from the day of the proclamation of Fourteen Points, extremely important events had taken place. The US government has recognised the “fair national demands” of Czechoslovakians and Yugoslavs. “Therefore, the president,” the document emphasised, “cannot consider” mere autonomy “for these peoples”.⁶⁴

In general, the political tactics of the United States were actually twofold: knowing that other developments of events in Washington were possible, they partially supported the national movements of Czechoslovakians and Yugoslavs aimed at disintegrating the Habsburg monarchy.

On October 16, 1918, in a confidential conversation with the head of the British Secret Service in the United States, William Wiseman, President Wilson noted a change in the official position on Austria-Hungary; two new facts had arisen, which modified the declaration as regards Austria. “These were the recognition of the Czech-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs. He would support their full claims”. Wiseman remarked that the Austrian government might send representatives to the Peace Conference claiming to speak on behalf of the various nationalities of their Empire. The President replied very promptly: “We have already recognised Masaryk, Dmowski, and their groups, and we cannot listen to anyone else.”⁶⁵ Although, as later noted by the renowned expert on Austria-Hungarian affairs, Robert Kann, the most optimal solution for the West at the end of the war could be the creation of a “great Eastern European Federation” in the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.⁶⁶

However, when discussing the impact of President Wilson’s program after the war, one may agree with Roger Ransom, a researcher at the University of California. He rightly points out that, looking back on the speech a century later, one can see how much his ideas were ahead of his time. Neither the allied leaders nor those of the Central Powers paid much attention to the Fourteen Points at the time of the speech, and they were hardly eager to accept all of Wilson’s suggestions. As it turned out, Wilson himself mismanaged the attempt to incorporate some of his principles into the post-war settlements. An inevitable failure

⁶⁴ Arthur S. Link (ed.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, Princeton, N. J., vol. 51. Sept. 14 – Nov. 8, 1918, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 383.

⁶⁵ Wilton B. Fowler, *British-American Relations, 1917-1918: The Role of Sir William Wiseman*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 285.

⁶⁶ Robert Kann, *The Habsburg empire. A study in Integration and Disintegration*, New York., 1973, p. 166.

of the policy "to do so was underscored by the refusal of his own countrymen to allow the United States to join a "League of Nations" in 1920".

Nonetheless, the Fourteen Points' exceptional spirit is worth recognising, as it contributed to the victory of unrestrained human nature in the terrible war of the early twentieth century. Ultimately, it was a war of the free world for the individual freedom of every person. The famous British philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote about this in a letter to the liberal American magazine "The Masses". He hoped that a "new sort, men who value the liberty of mind more than the liberty of body" would gradually be formed after the war. In general, he looked for a better future in the United States, where "individuals enjoyed the highest degree of political liberty" than in Europe. He concluded that they believed "in your President, but we are aware of the terrible forces against which he has to contend".⁶⁷

As evidenced by the textual analysis of Wilson's Fourteen Points program and contemporary comments from other diplomatic sources – memoranda, diaries and memoirs of contemporaries, as well as press material of the time, first, the experts closely monitored the attitudes of Central European politicians and scientists from the Entente countries, most notably the United Kingdom and France while preparing the President's January speech to Congress. Secondly, most diplomats and interested experts recognised that the published version of the text of the Points, notably Point X, concerning the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was not monosemantic in interpretation. Third, the content analysis of the document as a whole and specifically of the phrasing of Point X showed that, throughout the year, US diplomacy had repeatedly interpreted its individual positions differently until the autumn of 1918.

President Wilson outlined only the indirect US military and political aims in his speech on the post-war peace program at the war's end. Another presidential address to Congress (February 11, 1918) said explicitly that such declarations signify nothing more than the earlier "sketch of principles" for America. Following that, the program document was regularly corrected. The future of the Habsburg monarchy was the fundamental topic of Wilson's points regarding Eastern Europe. Hugo Grotius argued in his time on the need for intermediate, indirect goals in war because that is how politicians' true motivations are revealed.

Concerning Austro-Hungary, President Wilson had two leitmotifs in 1917-1918: give peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire autonomy and keep it as much as possible as a subject of international law on war. Furthermore, many analysts and politicians saw internal reform as an important direction for the

⁶⁷ "The Masses", Vol. IX, No. 9, July 17, 1917, p. 5.

Empire's future transformation. However, Americans frequently cited the excellent example of Switzerland, where the cohabitation of three ethnicities was founded on free and federal democracy. All this aligns with the US foreign policy strategy in the Danube basin when the war revealed the interdependence and national pluralism of the twentieth century.

Thus, American diplomatic experience and propaganda efforts during the Great War again prove that one must always consider the most unpredictable and unexpected scenarios at crucial moments so as not to be caught up in the historical picture behind which Clio, the ancient muse, ironically smiles.

CONCLUSIONS

The end of World War I brought a new geopolitical configuration, first of all, for the Central and Eastern European region. The program of peace presented to Congress by President Woodrow Wilson in January 1918 was partially implemented, particularly in terms of the political self-determination of nation-states that emerged in the region after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or had been territorially expanded. However, the United States, like the Entente states, failed to transform some of the region's "chaos" of national ambitions into the Danube Federation, following the example of Switzerland.

The situation in 2018-2022 is comparable to the configuration that emerged in the world after the Great War. It has forced states of all sizes to seek new global and regional challenges. After all, just as it was in those times, traditional players are also getting weaker nowadays, with some completely living in the past, and new ones refusing to play by the old rules. Conflict growth impedes cooperation in accomplishing common goals and international development objectives. This is especially dangerous in light of the present US administration's preference for foreign policy sovereignty over the likely restructuring of the liberal international order at the turn of the twenty-first century in response to the "paradox of globalisation."

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CHINESE IMPACT IN THE WESTERN BALKANS: THE EFFECT OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE ON THE EU'S NORMATIVE ROLE

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Abstract: *China, which shows signs of trying to create an integrated historical bloc, also supports a process that will lead to the consolidation of authoritarian political patterns in parallel with its increasing investments and financial support in the frame of the Belt and Road Initiative. This study argues that China's approach to the Western Balkans is an extension of the hegemony-building process. It brings the question of geopolitical concern regarding the enlargement strategy of the EU, which is seen as a normative power. Although this concern has been observed much more in the EU, it emphasises the reform process rather than enlargement. This situation, which could also be defined as a stability-democracy dilemma, not only undermines the normative power of the EU but also leads to the consolidation of illiberal regimes.*

Keywords: *China, Western Balkans, EU, Hegemony, Illiberal Regimes, 17+1 Cooperation, Differentiated Integration.*

Rezumat: *Impactul chinez în Balcanii de Vest: efectul inițiativei "Centura și Drumul" asupra rolului normativ al UE. China, care dă semne că încearcă să creeze un bloc istoric integrat, susține și un proces care va duce la consolidarea modelelor politice autoritare, în paralel cu creșterea investițiilor și a sprijinului financiar în cadrul Inițiativei Belt and Road. Studiul susține ideea că abordarea Chinei față de Balcanii de Vest reprezintă o extensie a procesului de construire a propriei sale hegemonii. De asemenea, aduce în discuție problema geopolitică legată de strategia de extindere a UE, în calitate de putere normativă. Deși această preocupare poate fi observată de ceva timp în cadrul UE, în prezent se pune accentul mai degrabă pe procesul de reformă decât pe extindere. Această situație, care ar*

putea fi definită și ca o dilemă stabilitate-democrație, nu numai că subminează puterea normativă a UE, dar duce și la consolidarea regimurilor iliberale.

INTRODUCTION

The Belt and Road Initiative has been one of the most visible manifestations of China's growing economic strength. As part of this initiative, Beijing wants to create integrated trade corridors specific to a geography reaching Europe from its borders. It is known that the Balkans, which include some member states, fall within the scope of the EU's enlargement strategy. The Western Balkans¹ have been at the focal point of the enlargement strategy declared in 2003.

Many studies discuss the Western Balkans on the axis of the EU and China. Petrovic and Tzifakis stated that the Enlargement Strategy Document in 2018 might lead to an assessment that the EU is considering the region on a geopolitical axis.² On the other hand, Smith, Khaze and Kovacevic state that the EU's perspective on The Western Balkans has been reduced from playing the role of a democratic transformer to an actor seeking stability.³ Gafuri and Müftüler-Bac also underline the same situation and state that the dilemma of stability and democracy affects Brussels even while other players from diverse areas, such as the Balkans, pursue EU membership.⁴ Pastore assesses the illegal migration and the refugee crisis. According to him, the Western Balkans have become a migration corridor. This situation directly affects the EU's enlargement strategy regarding the region.⁵ Webb also discusses the same subject in the context of creating a transformative

¹ Western Balkans consists of Albania, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo. Western Balkan countries all want to be a member of the EU and some are continuing the accession negotiations. This region is also abbreviated as WB6.

² Milenko Petrovic, Nikolaos Tzifakis, *A Geopolitical Turn to EU Enlargement, or Another Postponement?* "Journal of Contemporary European Studies", Vol. 29, 2021, No. 2, p. 160.

³ Nicholas Ross Smith, et al., *The EU's Stability-Democracy Dilemma in the Context of the Problematic Accession of the Western Balkan States*, in *ibidem*, p. 178-179.

⁴ Adea Gafuri, Meltem-Müftüler Bac, *Caught between Stability and Democracy in the Western Balkans: A Comparative Analysis of Paths of Accession to the European Union*, "East European Politics", Vol. 37, 2021, No. 2, p. 270.

⁵ Ferruccio Pastore (Ed.), *Beyond the Migration and Asylum Crisis. Options and lessons for Europe*, Roma, Aspen Institute Italia, 2017, 121 p.; Ferruccio Pastore, *From Source to Corridor: Changing Geopolitical Narratives about Migration and EU-Western Balkans Relations*, "Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies", Vol. 21, 2019, No. 1, p. 17.

impact that affects the EU's enlargement strategy and puts geopolitical factors ahead of democratic functioning.⁶ Belloni states that the rising "anti-EU" sentiment in the Western Balkan countries, where the EU membership process has slowed significantly, is a significant problem that should be evaluated on behalf of Brussels.⁷ Looking at some of the articles that analyse the Chinese influence in the Western Balkans, Przychodniak states that China's investments and commercial and financial impact are minimal compared to the EU. According to him, China invests in the future of the EU-China connection by developing close cooperation with states that are expected to become EU members.⁸ Shopov states that China has become the third most influential actor in the Western Balkans.⁹ A report prepared by the Clingendael Institute shows that China's pragmatic attitude has transformed the Western Balkan countries, contrasting Brussels' rules and norms for different policy areas.¹⁰ Rustemi et al. also discussed Beijing's increasing influence in the Western Balkans regarding political, economic and cultural aspects.¹¹ China's economic mobility aims to expand the discussions focused on integration and enlargement to divide the EU.¹² Pavlicevic evaluated the reflection of China's structural power on the Western Balkans and underlined that this would make Beijing a regional actor in the medium term.¹³

This study focuses on the steps taken by China in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, especially in the frame of the Neo-Gramscian approach. These manoeuvres will further reveal how the EU's Western Balkan strategy has been affected by these manoeuvres. The impact of China's efforts on the EU's normative

⁶ Jonathan Webb, *The Refugee Crisis and Its Transformative Impact on EU-Western Balkans Relations*, "Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies", Vol. 48, 2020, No. 6, p. 1365.

⁷ Roberto Belloni, *The European Union Blowback? Euroscepticism and Its Consequences in the Western Balkans*, "Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding", Vol. 10, 2016, No. 4, p. 534-536.

⁸ Marcin Przychodniak, *The Importance of the Western Balkans in China's Foreign Policy*, "PISM Bulletin", 9 June, 2020, No. 123 (1553), p. 1.

⁹ Vladimir Shopov, *Decade of Patience: How China Became a Power in the Western Balkans*, "ECFR Policy Brief", 2021, No. 371, p. 2.

¹⁰ Wouter Zweers, et al., *China and the EU in Western Balkans: Different Strings Attached*, "Clingendael Institute Report", 2020, p. 41-43.

¹¹ Arlinda Rustemi, et al., *Geopolitical Influences of External Powers in the Western Balkans*, "Hague Centre for Strategic Studies", 2021, p. 2-3.

¹² Heather A. Conley, et al., *Avenues of Chinese Influence in the Western Balkans*, in China's "Hub-and-Spoke" Strategy in the Balkans. "CSIS Europe Program Report", April 2020, p. 9-11.

¹³ Dragan Pavlicevic, *Structural Power and China-EU-Western Balkans Triangular Relations*, "Asia-Europe Journal", Vol. 17, 2019, No. 4, p. 458-460.

role will be explored in this context. Despite Beijing's increasing economic visibility, the EU is still the region's most important partner. The change in Brussels' enlargement strategy will be revealed within the scope of the content analysis.

REFLECTIONS OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

China's interest in the Western Balkans has increased significantly after the 16+1 (later 17+1 with Greece) Cooperation. This move aims to expand the contact and cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), most of which are also EU members.¹⁴ With the Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013, the Balkans have become an essential connection in terms of financial and commercial manoeuvres integrated with the infrastructure, energy and communication investments that Beijing put forward in a global context. Western Balkans is a component of the land corridor that connects to Europe via Central Asia-Western Asia and Turkey, which is seen as the "middle corridor" of the Belt and Road Initiative.¹⁵ In addition, the "sea route", named the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, opens to the Adriatic and the Western Balkans via the Red Sea-Mediterranean connection.

All Western Balkan countries except Kosovo have signed cooperation agreements with China. The 17+1 Cooperation, which Beijing has included in the Belt and Road Initiative, brings together the heads of state of 17 nations, including those of the Western Balkans, at annual summits.¹⁶

China's economic activity in the Western Balkans is quite inadequate compared to the EU. However, given that China's interest in the area grew significantly after 2013, this position might be considered rational. In 2019, the ratio of the region's imports from China to the total imports was 10 per cent. In addition, the balance of the same countries' exports to China in total export volume is only 2 per cent. The EU-specific equivalents of these figures are around 60 per cent and 70 per cent, respectively.¹⁷ Beijing is trying to prioritise its investments in the re-

¹⁴ Andreea Brînză, *The 17+1 Mechanism. Caught Between China and the United States*, "China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies", Vol. 5, 2019, No. 2, p. 226-229.

¹⁵ Erik Brattberg, et al., *Southeastern, Central and Eastern Europe. Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries*, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2021, p. 1-3.

¹⁶ Andreea Brînză, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

¹⁷ Marcin Przychodniak, *The Importance...*, p. 1.

gion. However, a significant part of these investments has not been realised yet. Only 24 per cent of a net direct investment volume of \$2.4 billion contracted as of 2020 has been completed.¹⁸ It is known that the infrastructure loan that Beijing plans to transfer to the region is 6.8 billion dollars. Apart from that, China gave 14 billion dollars of loans to all countries to overcome financial difficulties between 2012 and 2019 (only 60 per cent of this amount was given to Serbia, with whom Beijing has the closest ties in the region). The proportion of direct investments made by China has increased, but even in Serbia, between 2010 and 2019, this ratio was three per cent of total foreign direct investment. In the same period, the rate of direct investments of the EU in Serbia was 70 per cent. Between 2013 and 2019, the total investment of EU-based companies in the Western Balkans exceeds 11 billion dollars.¹⁹ China's investments are mainly within the framework of the credits given to infrastructure projects. Beijing attributes this support to the involvement of Chinese companies and workers in the implementation of the projects. In other words, conditional assistance is provided.

The main reason why China's economic impact grows is the development gap between the Western Balkans and the EU, which is relatively high. This situation will give Beijing a chance for more economic presence in the coming period. Today, China's share in total commercial operation is only six per cent.²⁰ Western Balkan countries generally have a "manageable" debt load. However, it is possible to state that China has an important role in this debt burden. Fifteen per cent of the state debts of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina belong to China. This rate, which is calculated as more than 20 per cent in North Macedonia, has reached 40 per cent in Montenegro. The debt of this country to China has reached 80 per cent of its GDP.²¹ Based on the economic difficulties caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, there are concerns that Montenegro will not be able to pay this debt, and Podgorica will be dragged into the "debt trap".²² There is a possibility that a

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Nina Markovic Khaze, Xiven Wang, *Is China's Rising Influence in the Western Balkans a Threat to European Integration?*, "Journal of Contemporary European Studies", Vol. 29, 2021, No. 2, p. 235.

²⁰ Vladimir Shopov, *Decade of...*, p. 10.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10-11.

²² Within the scope of the Belt and Road Initiative, the debt trap approach, which means the transfer of the most important facilities, ports or investments to the control of China in return for debt, after the countries that China supports by using its credit and debt opportunities become unable to pay their debts. This topic has received a lot of attention in publications. It is claimed that China's Belt and Road Initiative has devel-

similar situation may apply to other Western Balkan countries. Concerned about the monopoly of the Chinese company that built the international terminal of the airport in Tirana in terms of controlling international flights, Albania revised the contract with this company in its favour.

In Bosnia, a Chinese company began the renovation of the country's largest power plant in Tuzla. In addition to various energy and infrastructure investments in Serbia, China also makes direct investments by acquiring certain companies. The steel plant in Smederovo and the Shandong Linglong Tire Factory attract attention as two important ventures invested by Chinese companies. Huawei has come to the fore as Belgrade's communication and technology partner. Huawei is also renewing its digital and telecommunications infrastructure (5G investments).²³ This company is also taking initiatives to regulate the 5G infrastructure of other Western Balkan countries. However, the US is also putting political pressure on the Western Balkan countries to reduce Huawei's visibility in Central and Eastern Europe.²⁴

Beijing strengthens its economic, commercial and financial outlook by establishing close relations with political and economic elites in the Western Balkans. This process, which has been shaped by intergovernmental contracts, which have been criticised for being non-transparent, is generally maintained by the loans provided to infrastructure investments and the financial support provided to overcome the problems. In this process, trade also stands at a critical point. Of course, Beijing profits from the commercial operations. The steps we mentioned earlier that might lead to a "debt trap" may also result in China gaining control or functioning of critical infrastructure facilities in the region.

Especially after the financial crisis of 2008, China's infrastructure investments in the Western Balkans increased significantly. The Belt and Road Initiative has also brought this process into a coherent and planned context. China also started investing in the Western Balkans maritime transport infrastructure.

oped a debt and credit strategy that would make participating countries economically dependent and control their important assets in the long term. China's acquisition of Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port due to Colombo's inability to pay its debts is seen as a pioneering example in this sense. See: Deborah Brautigam, *A Critical Look at Chinese Debt-Trap Diplomacy: The Rise of a Meme*, "Area Development and Policy", Vol. 5, 2020, No. 1, p. 1-14.

²³ Vladimir Shopov, *Decade of...*, p. 10-11.

²⁴ Stefan Vladislavljev, *Surveying China's Digital Silk Road in the Western Balkans*, "War on the Rocks Commentary", 2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/surveying-chinas-digital-silk-road-in-the-western-balkans/> (Accessed on 17.01.2022).

Beijing, which first bought the shares of Piraeus Port of Greece, the gate of the Balkans, thus made its investments in the land corridor from Piraeus to the Western Balkans meaningful.²⁵ In addition to the investments made in Durres Port in Albania, interest in Vlore has also begun. However, Tirana's encounter with Washington's pressure on China's port investments after NATO membership creates an important problem for Beijing. Within the scope of 17+1 Cooperation, a Chinese consortium has undertaken the construction of a new terminal at the Port of Rijeka in Croatia. Beijing also has shares in Zadar Port by Chinese companies. Beijing has also embarked on constructing railway lines connecting Croatia's ports on the Adriatic coast, especially Rijeka and Zadar, to Central and Eastern Europe.²⁶ The modernisation of the railway connecting Belgrade to Budapest and the construction of the Surcin-Obrenovac Highway in Serbia are also being implemented with Chinese investment. The coal mine in Kostolac was also implemented with the investment of the Chinese company. The copper mine investment in Zijin is also among Beijing's plans. Chinese companies are building the Preljina-Pozega Highway.²⁷ China, eager to develop road and railway infrastructure in North Macedonia, is negatively affected by the political instability and the political change brought by NATO membership.

Miladinovci-Stip and Kicevo-Ohrid Highway projects can be seen as projects postponed due to corruption allegations and instability in the country. In Albania, a Chinese company, which bought the Patoz Marinza field in the south of the country from a Canadian company, extracts a certain amount of oil. In Republika Srpska, a Chinese infrastructure firm is also carrying out Banja Luka-Prijedor Highway, although its completion is delayed. Chinese companies have also undertaken the Bar-Boljare Highway, which is under construction in Montenegro.²⁸ Analyses expressing that Podgorica may face a "debt trap" also mention the ever-increasing costs of this highway connecting Bar to Boljare. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, similar to North Macedonia, highway and railway investments are on China's agenda. As we mentioned earlier, Beijing's primary

²⁵ Vladimir Shopov, *Decade of...*, p. 11.

²⁶ Nebojsa Koharovic, *Croatia, China Hitting the Fast Lane of Cooperation*, "China Today", 2019, http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/2018/ii/201904/t20190429_800166589.html (Accessed on 17.01.2022).

²⁷ Jacob Mardell, *Beijing Fills Gaps Left by Brussels in the Western Balkans*, "MERICS", 2021, <https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/beijing-fills-gaps-left-brussels-western-balkan> (Accessed on 17.01.2022).

²⁸ *Ibid.*

goal is to build and control transport corridors that will connect ports such as Piraeus on the Aegean coast and Bar, Rijeka, Zadar and Durres on the Adriatic coast to the inner parts of the Western Balkans and Central Europe. Thus, the sea and land corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative will be integrated into the Western Balkans and reach the EU market.

Part of Beijing's pursuit of effectiveness in the Western Balkans is academic and scientific cooperation. This issue is carried out in parallel with the Belt and Road Initiative and as an extension of the 17+1 cooperation. The partnership between the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the academies of sciences of the Western Balkan countries grows.²⁹ Beijing employs Confucius Institutes to foster academic collaboration and to attract Western Balkan experts and students to study in China. It also supports establishing Sinology departments in prestigious state universities in these countries or ensures the development of existing ones.³⁰ The increase in the rate of Chinese-focused research and lectures by Banja Luka University in the Republika Srpska and its academic connections with China through the Confucius Institute can be cited as an example.³¹ The officials of these institutes frequently visit secondary education institutions in Western Balkan countries, especially Serbia and Bosnia, to make presentations and organise courses on the Chinese language and culture. There are also initiatives that direct students to study in China. There are Confucius Institutes in all Western Balkan countries except Kosovo. In Belgrade, besides the institute, there is also the Chinese Cultural Centre, which incorporates almost every element of Chinese culture and promotes it to the public through various fairs, courses, screenings, competitions and festivals.³² The number of these centres is planned to increase over time.

Private universities in the Western Balkans are more flexible and successful in establishing relations with their Chinese partners. Donja Gorica University in Montenegro hosts a large number of Chinese lecturers. The opening of China-oriented master's programs there can serve as an example. The cooperation projects developed by the Zagreb Business School in Croatia with Chinese universities are

²⁹ Vladimir Shopov, *Decade of...*, p. 6-7.

³⁰ Ljiljana Stevic, *The Evolution of Chinese Cultural Diplomacy and Its Impact on the BiH Perception of the Belt and Road Initiative and China CEE Cooperation*, "China CEE Institute Working Paper", No. 22, 2020, p. 13-20.

³¹ Vladimir Shopov, *Decade of...*, p. 7.

³² *Chinese Cultural centre to Open Soon*, "eKapija", 2021, <https://www.ekapija.com/en/news/3266437/chinese-cultural-centre-to-open-soon-office-space-on-5500-m2-restaurant> (Accessed on 18.01.2022).

also valuable in showing the ties of an EU member with China. It is also an important detail that students who graduate from universities in the Western Balkans are provided with the opportunity to study in China.³³ Some of these students are recruited as lecturers at Chinese universities, and some as specialists in projects of Chinese companies in the Western Balkans. Chinese universities have opened regional departments or research centres. There are 23 departments or research centres related to the region in Chinese universities today. Apart from universities, there are nearly 30 research programs related to the area.³⁴ The China-CEE Institute, located in Budapest, has become one of the most important research centres in the region.

One of the most critical legitimators of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Western Balkans is the media. For example, the number of news articles focused on the Belt and Road Initiative in Albania increased from 42 to 194 between 2016 and 2019.³⁵ However, analysis of the shortcomings and adverse effects of the initiative (such as the debt trap) is scarce in news content. The Western Balkans media portrays China as a friendly and cooperative economic actor. The focus of news content is that Beijing's financial and technological resources should be utilised. The important point is the governments want to direct the media to show China as a friendly and cooperation-oriented actor.³⁶ Considering that there are problems in media independence and states have a serious steering power in this sense, it can be understood how critical China's ties with governments are in manipulating the media.

Recently, China has made agreements with official and private news agencies to try to direct the news in its favour. China provides these agencies with information and content directly, primarily through its embassies and its agencies. Trying to get a place in Western Balkan countries through pro-Beijing writers and reporters, China also allocates a significant amount of funds to these actors.³⁷ These writers and reporters, who make study visits to China, meet directly with the Chinese authorities and are informed about Beijing's approach to certain is-

³³ Vladimir Shopov, *Decade of...*, p. 9.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁶ Xhorxhina Bami, *China Increasing its Footprint in Balkan Media, Study Concludes*, "Balkan Insight", 2020, <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/12/09/china-increasing-its-footprint-in-balkan-media-study-concludes/> (Accessed on 18.01.2022).

³⁷ Vladimir Shopov, *Getting on the Radar: China's Rising Media Presence in South East Europe*, "Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Media Programme SEE", 2020, p. 1-3.

sues. Chinese ambassadors are also trying to establish links with important journalists of the Western Balkans. For example, China is attempting to acquire an important media group in Croatia. It is essential in this sense to produce a news content that will introduce the Chinese lifestyle, culture, food and the Belt and Road Initiative.³⁸ The Chinese ambassadors' attempts to use social media applications (especially Facebook and Twitter) in a friendly and collaborative way are also part of the importance given to the media. This trend has increased significantly during the Covid-19 pandemic.

EVALUATION OF CHINA'S APPEARANCE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS THROUGH THE NEO-GRAMSCIAN APPROACH *Neo-Gramscian Approach and Hegemony*

Gramsci tried to explain how social groups seize and maintain power in a given society. In this context, he wanted to explain how to oppose the actors who took power and construct the power against them. In Gramscian terms, hegemony is a social and political control method that brings together physical (material) power and the consent factor.³⁹ However, consent is much more critical at the stage of providing and maintaining control in the hegemonic sense. The moral, cultural values, practical relationships and worldviews of the dominant classes and groups should be internalised in a social sense with the consent of the secondary groups or classes. The content of the ideology is based on the association of the interests of the controlled classes with the interests of the politically leading actors or groups.⁴⁰ This process is shaped within the framework of voluntary acceptance. In addition, it is confirmed by the controlled classes that the social-political values reflected by the dominant group are correct for them. The hegemon group operates within a broad social framework and legitimises its goals by paying attention to particular demands and rights of the secondary classes. However, the dominant group's understanding of using "force" does not completely disappear.⁴¹ Robinson characterises hegemony as "consensus positioned

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12-13.

³⁹ Vasilis Maglaras, *Consent and Submission: Aspects of Gramsci's Theory of the Political and Civil Society*, "SAGE Open", January-March Issue, 2013, p. 2.

⁴⁰ Quentin Hoare, Geoffrey Nowell Smith (Eds.), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, New York, International Publishers, 1978, p. 328-329.

⁴¹ William I. Robinson, *Globalization, World System and Democracy Promotion in US Foreign Policy*, "Theory and Society", No. 25, 1996, p. 627-628.

in the shadow of the element of oppression” and views this condition as a distinct instance of social dominance.⁴²

While describing the concept of hegemony, Gramsci sees the social structure known as the “historical bloc”, which can be defined as a stable coalition shaped around the leader group, as one of the most important tools in producing consent.⁴³ The formation of historical blocs also depends on the ideological background and the transnational integration shaped in this context. Media, education and material elements have a founding role in forming historical blocks. The function of historical blocs is to establish the link between political and civil society or to strengthen the organic relationship. This will also be feasible because these blocks will include the interests of secondary actors—what Gramsci refers to as “moral hegemony”- into the system.⁴⁴ The relationship style based on cheating and deception, on the other hand, is an expression of domination, not hegemony, due to the lack of moral dimension. In Gramscian hegemony, the interests of a group or class are not given importance when establishing institutions and developing ideology. At this point, an understanding develops that is universal and opens space for secondary actors.⁴⁵

Gramsci, who sees organic intellectuals as social groups that eliminate the need for the use of force by giving morality to hegemony, states that the process of understanding the truth and acquiring knowledge is integrated into hegemony through an ideological and cultural context.⁴⁶ According to Gill and Law, the issue of “consent” should dominate relations between the state and civil society in establishing hegemony, rather than the element of “force.”⁴⁷ Hegemony creates its system of knowledge and conveys it to the consent of secondary groups through organic intellectuals. With this aspect, Gramsci states that there is no independent

⁴² Mehmet Akif Okur, *Gramsci, Cox ve Hegemonya: Yerelden Küresele, İktidarın Sosyolojisi Üzerine* [Gramsci, Cox and Hegemony: From the Local to the Global, On the Sociology of Power], “Uluslararası İlişkiler”, Vol. 12, 2015, No. 46, p. 137.

⁴³ Darrow Schechter, *The Historical Bloc: Toward a Typology of Weak States and Contemporary Legitimation Crises*, in Mark McNally (Ed.), *Antonio Gramsci: Critical Explorations in Contemporary Political Thought*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 179-180.

⁴⁴ Mehmet Akif Okur, *Gramsci, Cox...*, p. 138-139.

⁴⁵ Robert W. Cox, *Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method*, “Millennium: Journal of International Studies”, Vol. 12, 1983, No. 2, p. 164.

⁴⁶ Mehmet Akif Okur, *Gramsci, Cox...*, p. 140.

⁴⁷ Stephen Gill, David Law, *Global Economy and Structural Power of Capital*, “International Studies Quarterly”, Vol. 33, 1989, No. 4, p. 476.

intellectual class and that the intellectuals of the hegemonic class create philosophical, cultural and political content that persuades other groups and brings their wishes and the interests of the dominant class together.⁴⁸ Gill also states that media and education have a very important place in the hegemony formation, which is shaped in the long term by the “organic intellectuals” that it includes.⁴⁹

Cox, who shaped his approach based on Gramsci’s ideas, mentions that power is shaped by consent and the struggles and overlaps in civil society are very important in this sense.⁵⁰ Arrighi handled this situation at the state level. According to him, the main element that distinguishes hegemony from domination is the relationship of consent, which manifests itself not only with the possibilities of material power but also with the influence of the community through the perception of interest.⁵¹ In other words, an actor, who proves that his power is increasing in proportion to particular or all states, will reflect positively on citizens of other states and can have hegemony.

In this context, the most critical issue is to ensure “trust”. According to Cox, hegemony is established through a three-pillar structure of ideas, material capacities, and institutions.⁵² The opinion is the key element in gaining the consent of other societies. Cox defines this situation as a set of values and perceptions regarding the nature that permeates the structures created by states and non-state actors. According to him, hegemony in the system would be strengthened if the set of values and perceptions mentioned were stable and coherent. This will point to the internalisation of hegemony. The idea will shape the formation of hegemony. According to Cox, material factors will support this. These material elements are technological and organisational infrastructure, natural resources, industrial infrastructure and military equipment. When these factors are brought together, they are supported by the component of welfare and material power is formed.⁵³ Although hegemony is generally based on consent, material power can increase the probability

⁴⁸ Mehmet Akif Okur, *Gramsci, Cox...*, p. 140.

⁴⁹ Stephen Gill, *Hegemony, Consensus and Trilateralism*, “Review of International Studies”, Vol. 12, 1986, No.3, p. 210-211.

⁵⁰ Robert W. Cox, *Gramsci, Hegemony...*, p. 164.

⁵¹ Giovanni Arrighi, *The Three Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism*, in Stephen Gill (Ed.), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 148-150.

⁵² John S. Moolakkattu, *Robert W. Cox and Critical Theory of International Relations*, “International Studies”, Vol. 46, 2009, No. 4, p. 441.

⁵³ Robert W. Cox, *Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*, “Millennium Journal of International Studies”, Vol. 10, 1981, No. 2, p. 136.

of coercion through political, economic, military and psychological (social) effects it creates. The possibility of pressure is one of the basic elements of material power. The strong actor can impose his will on the weak if necessary. However, the relationship between the use of force and hegemony is negative. The more successful the hegemon is in obtaining the consent of others, the less likely it will resort to coercion.⁵⁴ Arrighi states that this dominance can trigger a counter-hegemonic alliance against itself.⁵⁵

Institutions are the third pillar of hegemony. These elements, which are created by combining ideas and financial power, have the potential to increase the effectiveness of both. The primary mission of the institutions is to legitimise the effectiveness of the hegemon and to ensure the values reflected by the hegemon are rooted in the international system. However, as Cox mentioned, institutions can turn into a battleground of opposing ideas over time, and even new institutions that reflect different understandings can be formed.⁵⁶ As Okur points out, Cox mentions that social forces influence how societies are incorporated into hegemony. This process, which points to a transnational phase, constructs consent. That is, power is not just a given element. At the same time, hegemonic relations are transformed into a whole with a socially constructed persuasion process. Thus, a link is established between the local, the national and the global. Because civil society acting in a transnational context gives substance to norms, institutions and material elements that support hegemony.⁵⁷

Cox utilised Gramscian references to highlight civil society's power to shape states. To establish global hegemony, the actor gains acceptance in civil society and effectively manipulates the states and the system. As Stephen Gill mentioned, this move can also be considered as the shaping of hegemony within a moral dimension.⁵⁸ That is, the interests of secondary groups will be included in the system, and a general legitimacy will be established. For such a process to be experienced, as Laclau and Mouffe mentioned, the dominant bloc needs to be at a specific intellectual level.⁵⁹ Okur describes this situation as the formation of civil society complexes emerging initially at the national level and then starting to compete

⁵⁴ Mehmet Akif Okur, *Gramsci, Cox...*, p. 144-145.

⁵⁵ Giovanni Arrighi, *The Three...*, p. 150.

⁵⁶ Robert W. Cox, *Social Forces...*, p. 137.

⁵⁷ Mehmet Akif Okur, *Gramsci, Cox...*, p. 145-147.

⁵⁸ Stephen Gill, *Gramsci and Global Politics: Towards a Post-Hegemonic Research Agenda*, Stephen Gill (Ed.), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 3.

⁵⁹ Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London – New York, Verso, 2001, p. 67.

with one another to create hegemonic spheres of influence.⁶⁰ Cox explains this situation through Gramsci's concept of "historical bloc". He stated that hegemonic networks go to a hegemonic coalition over material power, ideas and institutions.⁶¹ In the relationship between the state and the historical bloc, the state has some autonomy in its actions toward the historical bloc. The state does not prioritize the defence of subjective interests while acting by the political interests of the historical bloc and regards this class from a "holistic" perspective. Actors whose special interests come to the fore weaken and move away from the role of hegemon actor. Hegemony should be viewed as a paradigm and disseminated to other system actors through historical blocks. In this framework, the hegemon should have a global project that other states can share or see as legitimate and be able to renounce its short-term interests if necessary.

Cox evaluates the expansion of hegemony from the centre to the periphery within the frame of Gramsci's conceptualisation of "passive revolution". According to him, actors who want to integrate into the hegemonic order will encounter large-scale economic, political and social problems in this process. The biggest problem will be to transform the political structure.⁶² At this point, Cox states that the ruling class can reduce the reaction by making economic and political concessions to resist the pressure of change from the secondary groups. Thus, the "revolution" demand of secondary groups to have their interest dominate the system will be answered by long-term reconciliation in the form of concessions and new articulation processes from the secondary groups to the ruling class. According to Okur, hegemony is a broad-based consent coalition with a particular ideology and integrated institutions. The controlling power can be a single state, a group of states or an alliance of state-private actors.⁶³

China and Western Balkans within the Frame of the Neo-Gramscian Approach

China is uncomfortable with the international system and wants to see it transformed into a multipolar structure.⁶⁴ As mentioned by Mearsheimer, who

⁶⁰ Mehmet Akif Okur, *Gramsci, Cox...*, p. 139.

⁶¹ Robert W. Cox, *Gramsci, Hegemony...*, p. 165-170.

⁶² Robert W. Cox, *The International in Evolution*, "Millennium Journal of International Studies", Vol. 35, 2007, No. 3, p. 516.

⁶³ Mehmet Akif Okur, *Gramsci, Cox...*, p. 144-145.

⁶⁴ Ciwan M. Can, Anson Chan, *Rethinking the Rise of China and Its Implications on International*

emphasises the continuity of the power struggle within the framework of aggressive realism and prioritises the role of regional hegemons, Beijing is aware that it must first strengthen its regional hegemony.⁶⁵ The Belt and Road Initiative will also serve to increase Beijing's global influence and transform the international system in terms of China's economic, commercial, institutional and ultimately political values or expectations. Thus, in the end, a global activity similar to that of the US will be created.

In Gramscian terms, establishing hegemony on behalf of China is the best strategy given the nature of its worldwide dominance. Beijing wants to show how a counter-hegemony can be established against the US and its allies, which China thinks to hold power in a systemic sense. By keeping the opposition under control and including the individuals that can be expected to be opposed to the CCP, it largely concentrates on its political issues. Especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the repression policies against the Uyghur minority and the security moves that are said to have emptied Hong Kong's political autonomy can be evaluated within this framework.⁶⁶ The development of a "Chinese" style of religion as well as diplomatic and military actions that Taipei perceives as "the pressure of occupation" can also be taken into account in this regard.⁶⁷ The recruitment of business people who have the potential to be dissidents to the CCP can also be read as a step taken to show that investment opportunities will increase if they act in the direction desired by the state.⁶⁸ With these moves, Beijing wants to prevent the formation of a possible "counter-hegemony".

While China is integrating into the existing neoliberal institutionalist structure through various organisations (especially the World Trade Organization-WTO), on the other hand, it has an understanding that emphasises dependency relations and makes all the regions with which it interacts, especially the Indo-

Order, "Chinese Journal of International Review", Vol. 2, 2020, No. 1, 2050005, p. 13.

⁶⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia*, "The Chinese Journal of International Politics", Vol. 3, 2010, No. 4, p. 387-391.

⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch Report, *"Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots". China's Crimes against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims*, Mills Legal Clinic, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting> (Accessed on 20.01.2022).

⁶⁷ Xinhua News Agency, *Xi Jinping Stresses Developing Religions in Chinese Context*, 2021, <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-12-04/Xi-Jinping-stresses-religions-in-China-must-be-Chinese-in-orientation-15ILYigIo7e/index.html> (Accessed on 22.01.2022).

⁶⁸ Robin Brant, *Why is Jack Ma a Member of the Communist Party of China?*, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46353767> (Accessed on 20.01.2022).

Pacific, dependent on itself. While realising this through bilateral ties, it tries to make institutional structures such as 17+1, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Silk Road Fund, which can be seen as an extension of the Belt and Road Initiative, inclusive and effective.

When it comes to the Western Balkans, Beijing tries to use its “physical capacity” above all else. This capacity manifests itself in foreign direct investment support, loans and technology aid given to the infrastructure projects. The increasing visibility of Chinese goods also shows the importance Beijing attaches to the “infrastructure” elements described by Althusser.⁶⁹ In the Gramscian sense, it is vital to develop investment opportunities that will create economic and technological transformation in favour of the people and not dependent on large-scale “transformation costs”. Therefore, the EU accession process, which Western Balkan societies see as their main future goal, is highly dependent on political, social and economic conditions. China’s unconditional support to the region is a positive step toward the formation of regional efficiency. Considering the “consent” factor is the most critical condition in the creation and maintenance of hegemonic control, the unconditional relationship to be established with the Western Balkan societies will be in favour of China. Especially in parallel with the 17+1 initiative, China is trying to transform investment, infrastructure development and business practices in the Western Balkans. Despite criticism from Brussels regarding public tenders and the uncertainty of the content of the agreements, as well as corruption allegations involving political elites, the increasing proportion of Chinese investments and financial support, means that Beijing’s aid, which is not based on legal or financial conditions, proves to be important in meeting the needs of the Western Balkans.⁷⁰ Addressing immediate financial needs and a deficit of investment with Chinese capital and support will assist in building social consent. In the end, this may open the door to a counter-hegemony concerning the EU.

When Chinese influence, which is claimed to remain under the control of the political and economic elites and perpetuate the rule of the “authoritarian” leaders in the Western Balkans, turns into a permanent anchor in meeting the economic, technological and financial needs, the “secondary” groups (different interests and

⁶⁹ Louis Althusser, *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)*, in Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, London, New Left Books, 1971, p. 166-176.

⁷⁰Rade Rankovic, *China Grows Balkan Investments by Asking Less Than EU, Say Experts*, 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/a/china-grows-balkan-investments-by-asking-less-than-eu-say-experts-/6349558.html> (Accessed on 20.01.2022).

positions) may also begin to receive support.⁷¹ These societies see EU membership as the main factor that will increase their socio-economic level. If the EU accession process does not materialise in the medium term, China's activity may achieve broader social consent in the end. In such a case, the leaders of the Western Balkan countries, who have been subjected to intense criticism and accused of authoritarian political patterns, corruption and nepotism, may claim a broad spectrum of legitimacy. There may be a connection of interests between authoritarian political patterns and large segments of society.⁷² However, as Robinson mentioned, the possibility of using force will never be removed from the table.⁷³ Serbia's recent armament move confirms this understanding.

China's manoeuvres in the Western Balkans create new "historical blocs" that will be effective in contact with China. The Progressive Party, which previously carried out an EU-oriented policy, and the Socialist Party of Serbia, which undertook the legacy of Milosevic (can be called a tandem of Aleksandar Vucic and Ivica Dacic), are in power in Serbia. This political bloc created serious support in bureaucracy, academia and the media and developed a political understanding accused by the West of being authoritarian and populist.⁷⁴ Although this structure receives strong economic support from the West as membership negotiations are carried out with the EU, Serbia has received large-scale investments and financial support from China in recent years.⁷⁵ A similar situation existed before in Montenegro under the leadership of Milo Djukanovic. Although Djukanovic lost his control over the government, one of the issues that the new Montenegrin government had to deal with the most was the agreements with China.⁷⁶ China is in

⁷¹ Samuel Rogers, *liberal Capitalist Development: Chinese State-Owned Capital Investment in Serbia*, "Contemporary Politics", Vol. 28, 2022, No. 3, p. 349-350.

⁷² Marko Kmezic, *Rule of Law and Democracy in the Western Balkans: Addressing the Gap Between Policies and Practice*, "Southeast European and Black Sea Studies", Vol. 20, 2020, No. 1, p. 184-185.

⁷³ William I. Robinson, *Globalization...*, p. 628.

⁷⁴ EWB, *Serbian Ruling Parties Four Times More Present on Media Portals Than the Opposition*, "European Western Balkans", 2020, <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/11/20/serbian-ruling-parties-four-times-more-present-on-media-portals-than-the-opposition/> (Accessed on 20.01.2022).

⁷⁵ Tena Prelec, *Our Brothers, Our Saviours: The Importance of Chinese Investment for the Serbian Government's Narrative of Economic Rebound*. Policy paper, Prague Security Studies Institute, Prague, 2020, p. 12-13.

⁷⁶ Tijana Okić, *The Debt of Integration: Montenegro's Chinese Loan and the Traps of Europe*, 2021, <https://www.cadtm.org/The-debt-of-integration-Montenegro-s-Chinese-loan-and-the-traps-of-Europe> (Accessed on 20.01.2022).

close contact with Milorad Dodik, the leader of the Republika Srpska, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and with the Rama government in Albania. Beijing tends to create a “historical bloc” in the Western Balkans with the help of integrated politicians.

On the other hand, it opens the door for these countries to form historical blocs compatible with China. As we have mentioned before, the direct and indirect contacts that Beijing is trying to establish with the academies and media organizations of these countries help to create a historical bloc. Sinology departments opened in Western Balkan universities, language-teaching initiatives through Confucius Institutes, and Chinese Cultural centres are certain moves of Beijing, including the academy.⁷⁷ The increase in the number of news related to the Belt and Road Initiative (from 42 to 194 between 2016 and 2019) and media trips to China are important.⁷⁸ It is the function of historical blocs to establish the link between politics and secondary groups (civil society). The Chinese Government aims to create the ideological infrastructure that will enable it to gain social “consent” through the media and academia. Through building an integrated “organic intellectual” class, it aims to create societies that are integrated with Beijing or consent to China’s activity through the education and media sectors, in line with the contact of this class with governments that will establish close relations with China. This situation may be implemented not only in the Western Balkans but also in larger geography, in parallel with the Belt and Road Initiative. In current conditions, it can be stated that the West is much more powerful and legitimate in the eyes of the Western Balkan societies. It can be seen that the process of reacting to authoritarian, populist governments by taking to the squares, which has been seen frequently in the region recently, has been implemented with a strong emphasis on the EU and the West.⁷⁹ In the end, Beijing aims to transform this strong “Western” social infrastructure in its favour through strong and new “historical blocs” to be constructed. As Gill stated, the free will and expectations of the people must be directed for the formation of hegemony.

Cox’s Neo-Gramscian analysis, while focusing on civil society, actually describes this aim of Beijing. The Belt and Road Initiative aims to show that China follows a “win-win” strategy by transforming its increasing economic power into infrastructure needs, technological transformation (especially 5G) and direct in-

⁷⁷ Vladimir Shopov, *Decade of...*, p. 9.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12-13.

⁷⁹ Irina Neshikj, Biljana Spasovska, *Filling Democracy Gaps in the Western Balkans*, 2020, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/12/07/filling-democracy-s-gaps-in-western-balkans-pub-83147> (Accessed on 20.01.2022).

vestments that provide employment to a certain extent.⁸⁰ It tries to do this by developing cooperation with the governments, constructing an integrated “civil society” in bureaucracy, academia, media and business, and by relying on their “persuasion capacity”. However, the biggest problem is the EU and NATO activity, which was structured right after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and has built itself a strong “organic intellectual” class at an early date. Beijing needs to create a “counter-hegemony” to combat this class. China has put the financial capacity underlined by Cox into effect in the Western Balkans. However, statistics show that the increasing Chinese activity is far behind the visibility of the EU.⁸¹ In any case, the material capacity is not enough for counter-hegemony. Within the framework of institutions, no new organisational phase has been created outside of the 17+1 initiative. The 17+1 initiative is also an initiative that functions within the framework of summits and does not have an organisational infrastructure. Although the Belt and Road Initiative has institutional extensions such as the Asian Infrastructure and Development Bank or the Silk Road Fund, it has no institutional extension in Western Balkans or Eastern Europe. Considering that the EU has a supra-national structure within itself, it is evident that Beijing needs an institutional structure that will use ideas and material capacity as transformative aspects. Institutions that emerged as an extension of the liberal institutionalist approach may turn into a field of opposing ideas, as Cox mentioned. The new organisational infrastructure that Beijing has created concerning the Belt and Road Initiative will be able to open up space for the construction of a China-oriented counter-hegemony, based on Arrighi’s thought. Analyses have begun to show that AIIB may compete with the World Bank.⁸²

As Cox mentioned, the relationship between the state and the historical bloc, which is an extension of civil society, is important in the formation of hegemony because the state can act within a certain autonomy compared to the historical bloc. State and civil society in China are highly integrated, and in fact, the historical bloc was built by the CCP. There is a structure in which even businessmen become

⁸⁰ Jens Bastian, *Is China’s Win-Win Cooperation a Loss For Europe?*, 2020, <https://reconasia.csis.org/chinas-win-win-cooperation-loss-europe/> (Accessed on 20.01.2022).

⁸¹ European Commission, *Questions and Answers: Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans*, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_1819 (Accessed on 20.01.2022).

⁸² Ming Wan, *The AIIB Versus the World Bank and the ADB*, in Ming Wan, *The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: The Construction of Power and the Struggle for the East Asian International Order*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 78-80.

members of the CCP, and the bureaucracy, media and academy are completely directed by the state. This situation is also an extension of the “passive revolution” put forward by Gramsci and emphasised by Cox. Anticipating the discomfort that business people, highly educated groups and secondary group members will feel towards the ruling class, steps are taken to include them in this class. It is well known that Chinese intellectuals or civil groups that were excluded from the current historical bloc were also oppressed, as they were perceived as opposition. There is no overlap in the Western Balkans as there is in China. It is possible to say that the civil structure integrated with the West is more robust, and no distinct bloc formation exists (in the recent period, Serbia can be excluded to a certain extent).⁸³ In this context, the biggest challenge for China in penetrating the region is the change of this Western-oriented civil structure through passive revolution. By constantly explaining that it is not in conflict with the West and trying to show this to the Western Balkan countries, China also wants to show that global hegemony does not have to be under the control of a “single” actor, as the Neo-Gramscian approach underlines. At this point, Beijing tries to show that it can act in cooperation with the EU in the Western Balkans.

CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE EU’S WESTERN BALKANS STRATEGY: THE STABILITY-DEMOCRACY DILEMMA

The EU, which promised that the Western Balkan countries would be an integral part of a united Europe at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, has not been able to take care of this promise over time.⁸⁴ In 19 years following, Croatia was the only Western Balkan country to join the EU at the Thessaloniki Summit. The accession process of Zagreb, which became an EU member in 2013, has gone a long way compared to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. The economic and structural problems within the EU, as well as the economic and structural problems of the Western Balkan countries, stopped the enlargement process.⁸⁵ In addition, the damage caused by the BREXIT and the crisis created by the “migration waves” that increased after 2012 did not favour Western Balkan

⁸³ Natasha Wunsch, *EU Enlargement and Civil Society in the Western Balkans. From Mobilisation to Empowerment*, Zurich, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. 13.

⁸⁴ Milenko Petrovic, Nikolaos Tzifakis, *A Geopolitical...*, p. 157.

⁸⁵ Milenko Petrovic, Garth Wilson, *Bilateral Relations in the Western Balkans as a Challenge for EU Accession*, “Journal of Contemporary European Studies,” Vol. 29, 2021, No. 2, p. 201-204.

integration. After 2017, Brussels started paying attention to the expansion process. The call of EU Commission President Juncker at the “state of the union” in September 2017 for a proper enlargement perspective to be provided to the Western Balkans represents the first step in this direction.⁸⁶ Then, in February 2018, the EU Commission’s strategy document was published to accelerate the enlargement of the Western Balkans. Although this document sets the goal of membership in 2025 at the earliest, the criterion that all the countries that will become members should solve their problems with each other is introduced (any candidate country has previously made no request in this direction), making the membership processes much longer and more complex.⁸⁷ The political elites of the Western Balkan nations were disappointed by Macron’s statement that the EU should complete the current reform procedures before enlargement.⁸⁸ At the EU-Western Balkans Summit in May 2018, the Council’s refusal to start membership negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania, despite the Commission’s proposal, was another development that dragged the process into negativity.⁸⁹ Although the “name problem” was resolved with the Treaty of Prespa, the failure to start negotiations with North Macedonia created the image that Brussels was not ready for enlargement. Adverse developments in the Pristina-Belgrade Dialogue were carried out under the EU’s supervision. The disagreement between the EU and the member states on what to do in this regard also pushed the enlargement move into negativity.⁹⁰

As Manners states, the most critical feature of the EU is its normative power.⁹¹ What Manners wants to talk about is not only that the EU is based on common values such as peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights. The EU is working to disseminate these values in its immediate vicinity to make them a worldwide standard. While the EU tries to protect its interests, it also systematically focuses on broader foreign policy goals and values. Many experts find the normative aspect of the EU quite controversial. Hyde-

⁸⁶ Milenko Petrovic, Nikolaos Tzifakis, *A Geopolitical...*, p. 159-160.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 160-161.

⁸⁸ Srdjan Cvijic, *A Ship Without a Rudder? The EU Strategy in the Western Balkans*, in *IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2020*, Barcelona, European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), 2021, p. 206.

⁸⁹ Nicholas Ross Smith, et al., *The EU’s...*, p. 175-176.

⁹⁰ *Serbia-Kosovo Talks Fail to Make Progress despite EU Optimism*, 2021, <https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-kosovo-eu-talks/31308422.html> (Accessed on 20.01.2022).

⁹¹ Ian Manners, *Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?*, “Journal of Common Market Studies”, Vol. 40, 2002, No. 2, p. 238-244.

Price states that the ethical dimension attributed to the EU by realists is debatable.⁹² Sjursen, on the other hand, says that the values that the EU reflects in the normative sense are likely to have a positive or negative effect on other actors with different social, socio-cultural and political backgrounds.⁹³ Fisher-Onar and Nicolaidis underline that the normative power of the EU can be used to hide European neo-colonial desires.⁹⁴ On the other hand, Casier states that the normative initiatives of the EU towards its immediate vicinity manifest themselves in different countries within the framework of different approaches and evaluates that this situation creates a double standard.⁹⁵ On the other hand, Forsberg states that the normative power of Brussels is fundamentally reflected in the enlargement strategy.⁹⁶ However, differentiation in the approach to the Western Balkans, in particular, requires a re-evaluation of this issue.

Emphasising the rule of law, democracy, human and minority rights and fundamental freedoms within the scope of its enlargement strategy, the EU states that countries wishing to become members must be in full compliance with the Copenhagen criterion. Actors who became members after 1993 joined the Union after the completion of this negotiation process, known as *acquis communautaire*. However, especially after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the EU's problems have increased, and severe failures in compliance with normative elements have been observed due to developmental differences between new and old members. Following the constitutional debates and the ensuing 2008 financial crisis, the union's West-East split worsened. Rising "xenophobia" and "far right" movements in Europe distanced even the most pro-enlargement actors. Countries that were members before the 2004 and 2007 enlargements consider that others, almost all former Eastern Bloc members, are still in transition. Therefore, before a new enlargement wave, some argue that administrative reforms should be made to enable the mentioned countries to comply with EU norms at an advanced level. They think this will overcome the political fragmentation that the union is facing. As

⁹² Adrian Hyde-Price, *A Tragic Actor? A Realist Perspective on Ethical Power Europe*, "International Affairs", Vol. 84, 2008, No. 1, p. 30-36.

⁹³ Helene Sjursen, *The EU as a Normative Power: How Can This Be?* "Journal of European Public Policy", Vol. 13, 2006, No. 2, p. 246-248.

⁹⁴ Nora Fisher-Onar, Kalypso Nicolaidis, *The Decentring Agenda: Europe as a Post-Colonial Power*, "Cooperation and Conflict", Vol. 48, 2013, No. 2, p. 292-296.

⁹⁵ Tom Casier, *The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership: Challenging the Normative Argument*, "Europe-Asia Studies", Vol. 65, 2013, No. 7, p. 1383-1385.

⁹⁶ Tuomas Forsberg, *Normative Power Europe. Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type*, "Journal of Common Market Studies", Vol. 49, 2011, No. 6, p. 1198-1200.

Warleigh-Lack points out, it is also stated that the approach called for “differentiated integration”, which is claimed to have given importance to geopolitics beyond EU norms, opens up space for the aforementioned “double-speed” view.⁹⁷ The approach, which envisages the full implementation of the Copenhagen criterion and the integration of new members into the union by solving their existing problems with any EU member, aims to eliminate the problem of differentiated integration. For this reason, the accession processes of the Western Balkan countries are constantly delayed, and the spirit of the 2004-2007 enlargements cannot be made visible in the Western Balkan enlargement. Because a new wave of enlargement towards the Western Balkans will probably transform the “double-speed” view into a “multi-speed” one since the region is also behind the developmental average of countries that joined the union in 2004-2007.⁹⁸

Since 2017, senior EU officials appear to have expressed their concerns about the decreasing effectiveness of the union in the Western Balkans and the increasing visibility of external actors such as China and Russia. Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at the time, stated that she was concerned about Western Balkans becoming an area where global tension turned into a chessboard. Johannes Hahn, the Representative of the Neighbourhood and Enlargement of the period, also stated in 2018 that the Western Balkan enlargement should be fulfilled in the union’s geopolitical interest.⁹⁹ A brief analysis of the Enlargement Strategy Papers dated 2015 and 2018 shows the integration of the normative and geopolitical aspects of the EU’s approach to the area. While the 2015 document mainly refers to criteria such as democracy, human and minority rights, freedoms and the rule of law, it is seen that in the 2018 document, the geopolitical interest of the EU is underlined.¹⁰⁰ In the enlargement document of 2015, it is written that the aim of the EU’s enlargement to the Western Balkans is to ensure peace, security and stability in Europe. It mentions that EU membership will create economic and commercial opportunities for both the union and the region and will transform the Western Balkan societies in the context of democratic rights and freedoms. EU’s 2018 Strategy Paper reveals the enlargement for the Western Balkans in a more assertive language. It states that

⁹⁷ Alex Warleigh-Lack, *Differentiated Integration in the European Union: Towards a Comparative Regionalism Perspective*, “Journal of European Public Policy”, Vol. 22, 2015, No. 6, p. 874-877.

⁹⁸ Michael Emerson, *Scenarios for a Wider Europe*, “CEPS Policy Insights”, No. 2, 2019, p. 14-17.

⁹⁹ Milenko Petrovic, Nikolaos Tzifakis, *A Geopolitical...*, p. 160.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

the Western Balkans is a part of Europe, geographically surrounded by EU member states. Its integration into the union is in the EU's political, security-based and economic interests. This move, which is seen as a geostrategic investment to create a stable, strong and united Europe based on shared values, is also considered an action to protect the Union's citizens. Although it meets the same points as the 2015 document (the rule of law, fundamental rights, economic development, competitiveness, democratic institutions, accessibility, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation), it is emphasised that the reforms should be carried out in an "urgent" manner. In a parallel and increasingly successful framework, it focuses on political and economic collaboration as well as the implementation of reforms.

The main reason why the EU has prioritised the Western Balkans enlargement is the uncertainty arising from the structural problems of the union. Nevertheless, the reservations of the member states are regarded as clearing the way for China and Russia.¹⁰¹ The increase in the amount of financial support, especially with the infrastructure investments made by China, as an extension of the Belt and Road Initiative, created awareness in Brussels. Although this activity has not yet been at a critical level to be compared with the EU, the Chinese movement, which will appear in issues such as market economy, legal regulations, investment and tender processes, poses the risk that the region will undergo a Beijing-oriented transformation. Beijing is developing a Western Balkan move centred not only on investment and financial support programs but also on issues such as media and education. This has put the enlargement strategy in Brussels in the immediate context. The EU has taken action to avoid losing its effectiveness in the Western Balkans, which it has enjoyed since the Thessaloniki Summit and which Culpepper has described as a "structural power."¹⁰² Keukeleire defines structural power as "the capacity to determine and shape the structures, rules and institutions in which other states will act".¹⁰³ This position may also be understood in terms of the EU's "normative power" in the Western Balkans. States will follow the route drawn by Brussels, especially the Copenhagen criterion, to increase the level of welfare and accelerate democratic development. However, the EU's decision to push the enlargement strategy into the background and to place new criteria in front of

¹⁰¹ Nina Markovic Khaze, Xiven Wang, *Is China's...*, p. 236-238.

¹⁰² Pepper D. Culpepper, *Structural Power and Political Science in the Post-Crisis Era*, "Business and Politics", Vol. 17, 2015, No. 3, p. 391-394.

¹⁰³ Stephan Keukeleire, *The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional and Structural Diplomacy*, "Diplomacy and Statecraft", Vol. 14, 2003, No. 3, p. 45-47.

membership processes created a situation that allowed for Chinese action. The structural power of the EU has faced a pragmatist challenge from China. To maintain its structural influence, Brussels is attempting to build a connection between normative and geopolitical requirements. It will be straightforward to distinguish Chinese influence from infrastructural components reflected in economic methods to the political context if there is a greater misunderstanding in this regard.¹⁰⁴ The rise of illiberal regimes in the Western Balkans seriously disturbs the EU. At this point, China is in close cooperation with governments based on an illiberal understanding.¹⁰⁵ The tension between the EU and the Vucic government in Serbia, which has established very close relations with Russia and China, is a relevant example.¹⁰⁶ In addition, the EU's criticisms of the Rama administration in Albania for not strengthening the concept of the "state of law" and the Bosnian Serb leader Dodik's relations with Russia and China, who intervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina with separatist intentions, should also be front and centre.¹⁰⁷ In addition to the increasing Chinese influence in economic and commercial life in Montenegro (the danger of the debt trap previously mentioned), the visibility of Serbian and Russian influence in politics is also an issue that leads to political polarisation.

The EU emphasises the understanding of "stability" rather than the discourse of democracy to limit the rise of illiberal regimes, protect its structural power and limit China's increasing influence in the Western Balkans.¹⁰⁸ There are geopolitical concerns behind this. With some of its members having closer ties to Russia and China than others do, the EU is struggling to combat "differentiated integration" and illiberal regimes that have been on the increase, especially since the migrant crisis. Hungary, in particular Orbán's Fidesz, and Poland, controlled by Kaczyński's Law and Order Party, have come to the fore in this sense. This un-

¹⁰⁴ Dragan Pavlicevic, *Structural Power...*, p. 458-460.

¹⁰⁵ Henrik Larsen, *NATO in an Illiberal World*, "The RUSI Journal", Vol. 166, 2021, No. 3, p. 87-89.

¹⁰⁶ Vujo Ilic, *Serbia's Vucic Takes an Illiberal Turn*, "Balkan Insight", 2021, <https://balkaninsight.com/2021/10/11/serbias-vucic-takes-an-illiberal-turn/> (Accessed on 20.01.2022).

¹⁰⁷ The participation of the Ambassadors of Russia and China in 2022 to the celebration of the Day of the Bosnian Serb Republic on January 9, which was declared illegal by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is an important aspect that demonstrates this bond. See: *US Calls For Probe into Banned Bosnian Serb Commemoration*, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-calls-probe-into-banned-bosnian-serb-commemoration-2022-01-11/> (Accessed on 20.01.2022).

¹⁰⁸ Nicholas Ross Smith, et al., *The EU's...*, p. 178-179.

derstanding, which creates problems even within the EU, has gained serious visibility in the Western Balkans (Serbia is the leading country). This also inspired the idea that China may gain from this problem. As a result, it is reasonable to state that, in terms of the Western Balkans, Brussels continues to be a part of the “stability-democracy dilemma” strategy after 2018.¹⁰⁹ In this context, it is obvious that the EU followed a more normative line until the 2015 enlargement report, but after China and Russia began to penetrate more into the Western Balkans, it became attached to prioritised geopolitical concerns. In other words, due to the predominance of geopolitical concerns, there are criticisms that Western Balkan countries see the failures of democratic pluralism as secondary. There is also a split between Macron, who wants the EU to complete its structural reforms and integrate its enlargement strategy into a normative approach, and pragmatists who stress geopolitical concerns. In this respect, the EU bureaucracy has a more significant expansion propensity than the governments of member states.

CONCLUSIONS

When evaluated in a neo-Gramscian sense, China is trying to build a counter-hegemony through the integration of multilateral and institutional elements into the Belt and Road Initiative, in addition to its material capacity and an approach focused on transforming (and leading, although it does not accept) Western hegemony in the frame of multipolarity. It actively uses the Belt and Road Initiative, and besides the investment initiatives and financial support, organic intellectuals are attempting to create a Beijing-oriented civil society. This civil society will expose the country to the Chinese influence by political and economic elites within a framework Gramsci refers to as the “historical bloc”.

The visibility of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Western Balkans is the subject of various studies. Beijing has created a pragmatic strategy for Central and Eastern Europe on the axis of the 17+1 cooperation, focusing on the infrastructure, financial support and direct investment needs of Western Balkan countries. This situation, which is stated to affect business logic and legal infrastructure negatively and is in violation of EU regulations, also consolidates illiberal regimes. These regimes are brought to the forefront by Russia’s and, to a lesser extent, China’s ideological, economic, and political support, as well as structural

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

challenges inside the EU. Although it is ineffective in comparison to the EU's economic power and efficiency, some studies suggest that China can compete with the EU in Western Balkans in the future. This situation has also led to a change in the EU's perspective toward the Western Balkans. This change was even reflected in the enlargement documents dated 2015 and 2018.

The EU maintains its structural power in the Western Balkans. To keep Chinese influence under control, the EU must overcome the tensions between normative and geopolitical approaches and clarify the direction of its enlargement strategy. After the 2004 and 2007 enlargement waves, there is real discomfort in the EU, which has been criticised for "differentiated integration". As a normative power, the EU can bring geopolitical preferences to the fore to avoid China's pragmatist counter-hegemony in the Western Balkans. Because the confusion, often known as the "stability-democracy dilemma", also creates problems between the member states and the EU. Naturally, this situation also disturbs the Western Balkan countries and brings China's easy-to-implement projects closer.

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NATO'S HISTORICAL CHALLENGES AND ANALYSIS OF ITS CRISES

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Abstract: *This article analyses the challenges facing NATO that has led to speculation about its decline. NATO has successfully addressed a variety of challenges, risks, and threats from management and other standpoints since its foundation. However, the most recent problems it has faced in the latest years are more serious and may carry the seeds of NATO's future destruction. Given that some of them come from inside NATO and others from the shifting global order, they have exposed a lack of consistency within NATO. With a focus on the most recent problems that threatened NATO's coherence and contributed to its possible decline, this study aims to look into these issues and NATO's potential decline, using historical facts and processes. Given these challenges, NATO's future will be dependent largely on internal political cohesion, unity, and transatlantic cooperation.*

Keywords: NATO, historical challenges, crises, management problems, transatlantic decoupling, political cohesion.

Rezumat: *Provocările istorice pentru NATO și analiza crizelor sale. Articolul analizează provocările cu care se confruntă NATO, care au generat diverse speculații relative la declinul organizației. NATO a abordat cu succes o varietate de provocări, riscuri și amenințări încă de la înființarea sa. Cu toate acestea, cele mai recente situații cu care s-a confruntat în ultimii ani sunt mai grave, putând genera chiar germenii posibilei sale distrugerii. Având în vedere că unele probleme provin chiar din interiorul NATO, iar altele din schimbarea ordinii globale, iese în evidență o anumită lipsă de coerență în cadrul alianței. Focalizându-se pe cele mai recente probleme care au amenințat coerența NATO și au contribuit la posibilul său declin, studiul își propune să le analizeze în contextul potențialului declin al organizației, folosind fapte și procese istorice concrete. Având în vedere aceste provocări, viitorul NATO va depinde în mare măsură de coeziunea politică internă, de unitatea și cooperarea transatlantică.*

INTRODUCTION

Until Trump took power in the USA, NATO had been deemed the world's most important and strongest political and security organization. However, when Trump declared during the 2016 presidential campaign that NATO was 'obsolete' and de-emphasized NATO during his presidency, the perception of NATO was negatively affected. This statement has also caused "worry" in the alliance.¹ Such de-emphasizing comments from American leaders have never been mentioned in NATO history. Furthermore, French President Macron also described NATO as suffering "brain death", lamenting a lack of coordination between Europe and the United States in unilateral action.² However, this is hardly NATO's first challenge; it has faced numerous throughout its existence.

This article examines these challenges and crises by reviewing historical facts, events, and dynamics while focusing on the most recent problems confronting NATO, and it concludes that the organization's survival primarily depends on internal political coherence. Following a brief theoretical overview of international security organizations, the paper covers previous challenges that NATO faced and its responses between 1949 and 1990. It then examines challenges that are more recent and responses between 1990 and 2016, as well as current challenges and the implications for NATO's decline. NATO challenges have also been examined from theoretical perspectives for each period. The article concludes with a general discussion of its key findings.

This study used a narrative research approach to conduct these analyses, based on scientific studies and sources from academic journals, scholarly books, reports, and online publications as well as one of the author's perspectives and experiences while employed by NATO.

A BRIEF THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Given that NATO is a security-based international organization, its founda-

¹ *Trump worries NATO with 'obsolete' comment*, 16 January 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38635181> (Accessed on 03.08.2021).

² *NATO is suffering 'brain death', argues French president Macron*, 07 November 2019, <https://www.france24.com/en/20191107-macron-claims-nato-is-suffering-brain-death> (Accessed on 10.03.2022).

tion principles can be traced back to the theoretical evolution of such organizations. The concept of security has evolved because of various states' threat perceptions of their national or alliance interests, international political circumstances, and the emergence of non-military risks to humanity.

International relations theories develop security concepts based on their approaches to security perception; realist, neorealist, liberal, liberal institutionalist constructivist, and critical theories each have various perspectives on security and international security organizations. Realists view a state-centric approach that defines security as a military threat in an anarchic international structure that threatens the nation's survival.³ According to this theory, states make alliances to compete with the common threat(s) or deter any aggression. For realists, international organizations (IOs) are expressions of the interests of powerful states and reflect the current distribution of power in the international system.⁴ This theory sees the IOs as a tool for states to increase or balance their power.

The neo-realist approach differs from the realist understanding by assuming that conflict is a permanent condition of world politics⁵ whereby the international structure determines the behaviour and security of international actors. Waltz defined this well in his famous book *Theories of International Politics*.⁶ Nations may unite or establish alliances to counterbalance militarily superior states, which leads to the neo-realist balance of power approach. Most realists argue that peace and security have been achieved historically through a nation's efforts to achieve a balance of power in the international structure, in particular by establishing alliances against common hostile states.⁷ Neo-realists see IOs as tools that hegemon states with a strong influence in the international system deploy to protect their national interests and maintain their dominant position.⁸ To safeguard their national interests, the other states may rally behind the hegemon nations.⁹ Therefore, unlike liberals, neo-realists reject the view that IOs build and sustain

³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nation*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.

⁴ Michael Davies, Richard Woodward, *International Organizations*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014, p. 23.

⁵ Abdurahman Adamu, Abubakar Zakari, Aminu Idris, *Analysis of Major Theoretical Issues on National and International Security*, in "International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies", Vol. 3, 2016, no. 2, p. 48.

⁶ Kenneth Waltz, *Theories of International Politics*, Reading - Menlo Park - London - Amsterdam - Sidney, Addison-Wesley, 1979.

⁷ Michael Davies, Richard Woodward, *International Organizations*, p. 21.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987.

collaborative efforts for peace, security, and economic effectiveness.

Liberalism, in contrast to the previous two approaches to international security, emphasizes intergovernmental and transnational institutions, collaboration, and shared advantages. This offers possible exits from the supposedly “permanent” conflicts and security dilemmas of the realist world.¹⁰ Liberals see IOs as tools for maintaining peace and security in the international system by creating and implementing rules through liberal institutionalism. Complex interdependence theory¹¹, which is part of liberal theory, claims that states may have fewer disputes as a result of interacting in a liberal economy. Besides, alliances can live longer in a liberal world because there is less hostility.

Constructivists adopt a different ontological and epistemological approach to social processes, emphasizing ideas, culture, norms, and identities as opposed to the materialist analyses of neo-realism and neo-liberalism.¹² They claim that these values and norms, including security, are socially constructed. Constructivist scholars view IOs as norm-makers who promote norms, rules, and principles that they promulgate to the international community to address problems.¹³

Critical theorists discuss international security in terms of people and emancipatory values rather than the state and its *raison d'état*.¹⁴ According to global Marxist perspectives, security concepts are instruments used by the capitalist world to protect and sustain its economic, social, political, cultural, and military privileges. Therefore, they regard IOs as international bourgeoisie mechanisms that facilitate proletarian exploitation in the interests of rich capitalist nations.¹⁵

Another important theory on IOs is the functionalist theory, which derives from liberalism. It argues that IOs emerge in response to the interdependence resulting from technological and economic progress. It, therefore, predicts that sustained international economic and social interactions would eventually result in cooperation and common values that will “spill over” into the political arena.¹⁶ The best example of an IO that supports this theory is the European Union (EU). While

¹⁰ Barry Buzan, *The English School: A Neglected Approach to International Security Studies*, in “Security Dialogue”, Vol. 46, 2015, No. 2, p. 128.

¹¹ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence in the Information Age*, in “Foreign Affairs”, Vol. 77, 1998, No. 5, p. 83.

¹² Barry Buzan, *The English School*, p. 128.

¹³ Michael Davies, Richard Woodward, *International Organizations*, p. 30.

¹⁴ Barry Buzan, *The English School*, p. 129.

¹⁵ Michael Davies, Richard Woodward, *International Organizations*, p. 32-34.

¹⁶ A. LeRoy Benneth, James K. Oliver, *International Organizations. principles and issues*, Upper Saddle River (New Jersey), Prentice Hall, 2002, p. 30-32.

the EU was established on economic motivations, its enlargement has transformed it from an economic union to a political structure through its spillover effects.

Among these security schools, the Copenhagen School of Security Studies has offered a new conceptualization by demonstrating that security cannot any longer be reduced to the military domain. Instead, it has broadened the scope of security analysis to include not only military issues but also economic, political, sociological, and environmental issues where necessary. This indicates that security no longer has a fixed (pre-existing) meaning; rather, it is a social and inter-subjective construction.¹⁷ According to their theoretical understanding, IOs can run in a wider range of security domains, regarding the will of member states.

After a brief overview of the literature on IOs in IR theories, the focus will shift to NATO's historical challenges and responses.

NATO CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES FROM 1949 TO 1990

NATO is an international political and security organization established in the Atlantic basin to protect its members from any aggressors. From the outset, NATO aimed to safeguard its members not only from Soviet Union aggression but also from Germany, as the latter was considered the main perpetrator of both World Wars. NATO's first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, stated that NATO needed not just to keep the Russians out but to keep the Americans in and the Germans down.¹⁸

NATO has encountered many challenges since its creation but acted very wisely to successfully overcome them, which may have otherwise led to its dissolution. During the Cold War, NATO's coherence and the loyalty of its members were never questioned, as the threat was enormous and imminent. Despite several problems and challenges, member states maintained their commitment to the pact and never lost faith in NATO.

Initially, NATO's main security threat was the increasing Soviet threat to the Western Block, when NATO was more of a political than a military association. The growing Soviet threat and the Korean War dictated that NATO would require a military structure to ensure the military alliance's success. Accordingly, NATO

¹⁷ Rita Taureck, *Securitisation Theory and Securitisation Studies*, in "Journal of International Relations and Development", Vol. 9, 2006, No. 1, p. 54.

¹⁸ James Goldgeier, *NATO's Future Facing Old Divisions and New Threats*, in "Harvard International Review", Vol. 31, 2009, No. 1, 2009, p. 50.

devised the concept of 'massive retaliation' to deter the Soviet Union's conventional threat and created an integrated military structure to provide resilient military command and control structure.¹⁹ Thus, NATO overcame its first challenges.

During the 1950s, NATO faced three challenges. The first was West Germany's inclusion into NATO, in 1955, which mainly upset France and other Western European countries. Given that Germany had recently been a security threat, they feared that it would return to earlier expansionist policies and exploit NATO for its national interests. Therefore, NATO's first challenge was to reassure France and other Western NATO nations in the face of the Soviet threat, which it did by using their common security needs and their desire to maintain Europe's stability.

The second crisis was the 1956 Suez Canal crisis when the UK and France confronted both the United States and NATO's main rival, the Soviet Union, who both threatened to use nuclear weapons if the UK and France did not withdraw from the Suez Canal. This was the first crisis to threaten NATO's survival. US President Eisenhower was disappointed by the British secret planning without consulting America.²⁰ The United States reportedly threatened to withdraw from NATO if France and Britain pressed the issue. The attitude of the Americans discouraged France. This became one of the root causes for France to leave the military wing of NATO in the 1960s. At the end of this crisis, the function of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) expanded to discuss all members' concerns²¹ to prevent any future crisis. Nevertheless, it again maintained its coherence and unity despite this unexpected crisis.

The third challenge was the Western European Union (WEU), established by the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed in Brussels on 17 March 1948. In 1954, the Brussels Treaty was strengthened to include West Germany and Italy, and end the former's occupation. The WEU came into force on May 6, 1955. Having remained overshadowed by NATO and dormant until 1990, it had the potential to become Europe's security and defence organization. Despite being transformed into the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 2001, it carried some seeds of autonomous security ideas. This caused divisions among the EU members, between those supporting

¹⁹ Gregory W. Pedlow, *The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969*, in Gregory W. Pedlow (Ed.), *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*, p. XV-XIX, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf> (Accessed on 12.03.2022).

²⁰ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, Westport, Connecticut, Praeger Publishers, 2004, p. 13; Ryan C. Hendrickson, *The Miscalculation of NATO's Death*, in "Parameters", Vol. 37, 2007, No. 1, p. 101.

²¹ Ryan C. Hendrickson, *The Miscalculation of NATO's Death*, p. 101.

NATO and America and those supporting an autonomous EU security architecture, particularly during the 1990s and 2000s as the EU tried to expand the ESDP.

During the 1960s, NATO's major challenge was the decision of France to remove NATO headquarters and military installations from France in 1966 and France's withdrawal from NATO's military structure. The relocation of NATO bases, command sites from Paris to Belgium cities,²² Brussels and Mons, and abandoning the military wing were a severe blow to transatlantic cooperation and shared values. De Gaulle, the French President, was against the USA's increasingly influential role in European security and favoured an independent Europe. The détente between the Western and Eastern Blocs was partially involved in this discussion, which led to the development of France's independent nuclear deterrent and its withdrawal from NATO's military structure in 1966. This represented the first breaking point for NATO when its members revealed disparities in security views and approaches to addressing security threats. NATO established the Defence Planning Committee as France did not want to work within NATO's integrated military command.²³ France did not return to NATO's military structure until 2009.

Disputes between NATO members hindered NATO by decreasing its organizational efficiency and cohesion. In particular, Greece withdrew from its military structure in protest against the alliance's lack of serious response to Turkey's peace operation in Cyprus in 1974. However, Greece's withdrawal reduced its role in NATO's command chain, particularly regarding military issues. Realizing its error, Greece attempted to return to the military structure. However, Turkey (being a NATO member) prevented this until the military coup in 1980 in Turkey, when it consented to Greece's return.

After the East-West détente ended in 1980, with severe struggles between the two blocks, America deployed short-range Pershing II and Cruise missiles targeting Soviet conventional forces in Europe. This decision caused serious controversy, a widespread West European popular movement opposed to the new deployments, and increasingly divergent feelings and perceptions between the US and some other NATO members.²⁴ Although most European nations were against this deployment, they were unable to prevent it because of the economic interdependence among NATO members and the dependence of European members on America for their security.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 102.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Stanley Hoffmann, *NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Reasons and Unreason*, in "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 60, 1981, No. 2, p. 327.

Additionally, the air attack on Kaddafi and Libya in 1986 by the US and England for the role of Libya's involvement in the nightclub bombing in Berlin in 1986 created serious tension among Alliances. For example, France did not allow US and British warplanes to use its airspace.²⁵

The history of NATO is filled with issues and disputes. The Vietnam War, the American military invasions of Grenada and Panama, the 'Star Wars' (Strategic Defence Initiative) plans in the 1980s, Germany's Ostpolitik, burden-sharing of defence spending in the 1970s, and many other crises that occurred during the Cold War sparked discussions or divergent viewpoints among members.²⁶ While some of these were not specifically related to NATO, they had an impact on the organization. In brief, the Cold War era saved NATO from a serious fracture because shared risks outweighed member differences.

Because of the growing totalitarian threat that Soviet Russia was posing in Eastern Europe and trying to spread to Western Europe during the NATO founding period, there were many confrontations between national interests. The Western European countries sought to maintain their national interests, peace and security through the Brussel Treaty in 1949 and then founded NATO in 1949 to safeguard their strategic interests. Given these facts, realist²⁷ and neo-realist viewpoints offer the most insightful analysis of the NATO challenges that arose up to 1990, when allies perceived a common threat from the Soviet Union and a threat to their shared interests.

Indeed, as the common threat intensified, NATO strengthened both its military power and internal cohesion to consolidate the alliance, which directly corresponds to neo-realist perspectives. This means, that, as Walt²⁸ noted, NATO was conceived as a reflection of national interests and power balance among nations. Although there were some disagreements and challenges until 1990, the perceived threats preceded other national concerns and inter-allies disagreements.

CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES BETWEEN 1990 AND 2016

NATO experienced a historic change in 1990, when the Cold War ended and

²⁵ Ryan C. Hendrickson, *The Miscalculation of NATO's Death*, p. 103.

²⁶ *Ibid.*; Andrew Cottey, *NATO: Globalization or Redundancy?*, in "Contemporary Security Policy", Vol. 25, 2003, No. 3, p. 392.

²⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Brief Edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1993, p. 5.

²⁸ Stephen M. Walt, *Why Alliances Endure or Collapse*, in "Survival", Vol. 39, 1997, No. 1, pp. 156–179; Andrew Cottey, *NATO: Globalization or Redundancy?*, p. 393.

the Soviet Union collapsed, with NATO defeating its enemy without spilling any blood, and Europe's communist regimes collapsing in a "white revolution" without any serious uprisings. As the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was unable to invade any allied country, NATO was deemed one of the most successful security alliances in history.²⁹ Given that NATO emerged in response to Soviet aggression against Europe after the Second World War, there was scholarly discussion about the dissolution of NATO since it was no longer needed as the rival block had disintegrated.³⁰ Likewise, neo-realist thinkers Mearsheimer and Waltz³¹ thought that without a serious common threat the US would probably abandon NATO. Similarly, Rupp also claimed that NATO would probably dissolve due to a lack of a shared threat to the essential interests of the Alliance, and the main differences in transatlantic coasts after the 1990s.³²

Indeed, a distinctive feature of NATO is its ability to adapt to varying conditions, and new political and military environments. After the 1990s, new challenges and crises in Eastern Europe led NATO to intervene in various conflicts in a peacekeeping context, using its unique multinational military capabilities to maintain a safe and secure environment.

In 1991-92, the United States, Germany, France, and England faced the first crisis regarding how to end conflicts in the Balkans and recognize the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia.³³ Germany recognized Slovenian and Croatian independence, which created a breakage among allied members. Due to increasing civil society criticism of the US administration for atrocities against Bosnian Muslims, the Clinton Administration conducted military operations against Serbia, compelling them to accept peace terms. The Dayton agreement in 1995 among warring parties (Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia) created a period lasting until today. Given the historical facts, the US acted as a superpower and took most decisions of conducting air attacks on Bosnian Serbs in 1992-1995 and Kosovo in 1999, without consulting with allied members, notably other big powers. Due to this power imbalance, England and France signed an autonomous common

²⁹ Ryan C. Hendrickson, *The Miscalculation of NATO's Death*, p. 101.

³⁰ Andrew Cottey, *NATO: Globalization or Redundancy?* p. 393.

³¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War*, "International Security", Vol. 15, 1990, No. 1, p. 52; Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Emerging Structure of International Politics*, in "International Security", Vol. 8, 1993, No. 2, p. 75-76; Ryan C. Hendrickson, *The Miscalculation of NATO's Death*, p. 100.

³² Richard Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 113-115.

³³ Andrew Cottey, *NATO: Globalization or Redundancy?*, p. 393.

European defence and security declaration at St. Malo in 1998.³⁴ This deceleration has given the EU the capacity for autonomous decision-making and action to respond to international crises when NATO is not involved. To avoid duplication, the EU has agreed to consider WEU's assets.³⁵

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US were a turning point for NATO in overcoming new security challenges resulting from terrorism, ethnic separatism, nationalism, migration, failed states, and extremism. Following the attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which enshrines the principle of collective defence, for the first time in its history. All transatlantic allies agreed with the US-led operation in Afghanistan as it targeted terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, the Bush Government's decision to restrict NATO involvement in Afghanistan was considered a serious blow to the alliance.³⁶ Later, to free the US from Afghanistan for the Iraqi Operation, NATO began out-of-area operations against the Taliban in the area around Kabul in 2003. It expanded operations and assumed all operational responsibility throughout Afghanistan in 2006. However, despite a 20-year campaign and its supposed military supremacy, NATO was unable to defeat the Taliban. Finally, the US and NATO accepted defeat and completed their withdrawal by August 31, 2021.

Finally, the withdrawal of the US and NATO from Afghanistan has led to another challenge in NATO's credibility.³⁷ Apart from factors related to the military theatre itself, there are various reasons for this, including the unwillingness of some NATO members to actively engage with Taliban forces, restrictions imposed by force-providing member states regarding the use of their forces, and a fear of engaging in attrition warfare.³⁸ Overall, NATO failed to overcome the challenges it faced in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, although most scholars predicted that this defeat would cause NATO's collapse, the alliance has maintained its unity because its

³⁴ *Franco-British St. Malo Declaration (4 December 1998)*, https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2008/3/31/f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f/publishable_en.pdf (Accessed on 12.03. 2022)

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community. The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered*, 2nd ed., Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005; Ryan C. Hendrickson, *The Miscalculation of NATO's Death*, p. 104.

³⁷ Graeme Herd, *The Causes and the Consequences of Strategic Failure in Afghanistan?*, in "Security Insights", No 068, August 2021, The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/causes-and-consequences-strategic-failure-afghanistan-0> (Accessed on 15.03.2022).

³⁸ Mats Berdal, David Ucko, *NATO at 60*, in "Survival", Vol. 51, 2009, No. 2, p. 56.

member states continue to support it until a better organization is created.³⁹ However, American withdrawal, without consulting the European allies, has led to frustration among Europeans⁴⁰ and might even lead to the creation of an autonomous European Army.⁴¹

In response to evolving instabilities, risks, and threats to its members, NATO developed new strategic concepts and procedures in 1991, 1999, and 2010.⁴² First, it expanded its definition of security to include new sources of instability, threats, and risks, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, sabotage, and organized crime. Second, it addressed the disruption of vital resources and cyber threats. Third, it noted the increasing number of refugees attempting to enter European states.

During this period, NATO also faced a challenging situation during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was opposed by key NATO European members like Germany and particularly France. The European Allies were not against the war on terror, they supported it. However, they strongly opposed the US expanding the war on terror to rogue states seeking to create weapons of mass destruction.⁴³ There was also a huge discussion about the allies protecting Turkey with air defence. Because of the big difference among members regarding the US-led operation in Iraq, the silence procedure was mostly broken.

Besides, Turkey and the US also disagreed over the Iraq War, which turned into a historic breaking point in relations in conjunction with other issues owing

³⁹ For detailed information about NATO's failure in Afghanistan, see Sertif Demir, *The War in Afghanistan: Toward which Direction? Vietnam, Soviet's Afghanistan Occupation, or Iraq*, in "Bilim Dergisi", Vol. 20, 2010, No. 1, pp. 165-194; Idem, *Afganistan'daki Yirmi Yıllık İşgalin Analizi: ABD/ NATO ve Barış çabaları* [Analysis of Twenty Years of Occupation in Afghanistan: US/ NATO and Peace efforts], in "Uluslararası Kriz Ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi", Vol. 5, 2021, No. 1, pp. 114-153.

⁴⁰ Matthew Karnitschnig, *Disbelief and betrayal: Europe reacts to Biden's Afghanistan 'miscalculation'*, 17 August 2020, <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-reacts-bidens-afghanistan-withdrawal/> (Accessed on 15.03.2022).

⁴¹ Daniel Boffey, *US withdrawal from Afghanistan will lead to EU army, says top diplomat*, 2 September 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/02/us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-will-lead-to-eu-army-says-top-diplomat> (Accessed on 15.03.2022).

⁴² For detail about NATO's strategic concept, see Sertif Demir, *Stratejik Konseptler ve NATO'nun Dönüşümü* [Strategic Concepts and Transformation of NATO], in M. Seyfettin Erol (Ed.), *Sıcak Barışın Soğuk Örgütü: Yeni NATO* [The Cold Organization of Warm Peace: The New NATO], Ankara, Barış, 2012, pp. 57-114.

⁴³ Richard Rupp, *NATO After 9/11*, p. 94; Ryan C. Hendrickson, *The Miscalculation of NATO's Death*, p. 99.

to the crisis in Syria, the Arab uprising, the Libya crisis, the July 15, 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, and Turkey's purchase of Russian S-400 anti-missile defence systems. Western scholars have also criticized Turkey for its foreign policies since 2013, which have focused more on the Middle East, moving away from Western values, establishing close relations with Russia and China, and trying to purchase weapons from them. Some scholars have proposed that Turkey be excluded from NATO because its axis has supposedly shifted from a Western to an Eastern orientation.⁴⁴ This discussion has further exacerbated as Turkey initially opposed NATO enlargement to include Sweden and Finland as new members, citing their support for terrorism.⁴⁵ Rather than this supposed shift, however, Turkey's foreign policies have simply become more assertive and autonomous since 2009. Inevitably, they have hardly coincided with those of America, NATO, and the EU. For example, Turkey resisted Israel's participation in NATO exercises for a long time. Turkey has also prevented Southern Cypress from becoming a NATO member. However, these differences hardly justify Turkey's exclusion from NATO.

Another crisis occurred in the NATO-EU cooperation area. The EU tried to establish and develop its own autonomous security and defence architecture outside NATO's command and control structure. This began with the 1998 Saint Malo Agreement between the UK and France, followed by the EU's initiation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP). However, after the CSDP was approved, the WEU was dissolved in 2001. The fear is that if the EU develops a common security policy, this could lead to duplication of resources among NATO and EU members, while the CSDP will likely de-emphasize NATO's importance.

Because of its weak military capability, the EU needed NATO support to conduct supposedly autonomous peace support operations (PSOs). Having developed its own security architecture, the EU had to negotiate with NATO regarding the use of NATO assets in autonomous EU operations. The relations between NATO and the EU were based on the principles agreed upon during the 1990s. In 2003, the two organizations approved the Berlin Plus provisions outlining the principles

⁴⁴ Evren Balta, *The AKP's Foreign Policy as Populist Governance*, in "Middle East Report", No. 288, Fall 2018, p. 14-18; Aurel Sari, *Can Turkey be Expelled from NATO? It's Legally Possible, Whether or Not Politically Prudent*, 15 October 2019, <https://www.justsecurity.org/66574/can-turkey-be-expelled-from-nato/> (Accessed on 14.03.2022).

⁴⁵ Joe Lieberman, Mark D. Wallace, *Does Erdogan's Turkey Belong in NATO?*, 18 May 2022, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/does-erdogans-turkey-belong-in-nato-sweden-finland-join-veto-weapons-peace-broker-11652882743> (Accessed on 15.06.2022).

for NATO to support EU-led military involvement in which NATO does not participate as a whole.⁴⁶ However, the EU's "assured access" to NATO's military capability upset Turkey, which argued that it, had no right to participate in the EU operations as a candidate state, complaining that the agreement contradicted its WEU observer state privileges. Finally, Turkey saw a contradiction between its lack of "assured access" to the EU and the EU "assured access" to NATO assets.⁴⁷ Because it was still unable to join the EU, Turkey refused to agree to NATO allocating resources to the EU without any pre-conditions. This unexpected development created a new challenge for NATO. The crisis only ended when NATO granted the EU access to NATO capabilities on a case-by-case basis.⁴⁸

Despite certain concerns about NATO-EU relations, NATO reiterated its commitment to improving the NATO-EU strategic partnership at the 2010 Lisbon Summit. The Strategic Concept 2010 also included some concepts concerning strategic cooperation. The key point in the development of relations was the NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016. Both sides agreed to face common challenges from the East (implying the Russian threat) and the South (implying radicalism, refugee flows, and migrations). NATO's foreign minister approved 42 common measures in 2016 and additional 32 measures in 2017 to promote NATO-EU cooperation.⁴⁹ Through these measures, NATO and the EU relied on finding areas of cooperation in response to new threats and risks that can destabilize member nations. Accordingly, during 2018, they expanded cooperation in areas including military mobility, counter-terrorism, flexibility to CBNR (Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Radiological) risks, promoting women, and peace and security issues.⁵⁰

The political and security progress concerning NATO post-1990s can also be assessed from theoretical perspectives. Neo-realism, constructivism and liberal theories can account for the progress post-1990s. The neo-realist theory puts forth that when common threats or common interests dissipate the alliances also

⁴⁶ NATO, *Relations with the European Union*, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm (Accessed on 02.08.2021).

⁴⁷ Hasret Çomak, *Avrupa'da Yeni Güvenlik Arayışları ve Türkiye. Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Avrupa'da Güvenlik Yapılanması Sorunları* [New Security Concepts in Europe and Turkey. Security Structuring Problems in Post-Cold War Europe], İstanbul, TASAM, 2005, p. 75.

⁴⁸ See the detail of these discussions in Sertif Demir, *Avrupa Güvenlik Mimarisinin Tarihsel gelişimi ve Türkiye'nin Bu Güvenlik Mimarisindeki Yeri* [The Historical Development of European Security Architecture and the Place of Turkey in this Security Architecture], in "Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi", Vol. 5, 2009, No. 9, pp. 9-51.

⁴⁹ NATO, *Relations with the European Union*.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

disappear, causing re-emerge of divergent national interests which might result in conflicts. Given this fact, when the Soviet Union, the common threat, disintegrated, NATO should have been dissolved.⁵¹ However, this did not come to happen as anticipated by neo-realists. NATO members sustained their commitment to the alliance when new common risks and threats emerged after the 1990s. Besides, as the winner of the Cold War, NATO served as a bond for its members to sustain their superiority in the world as well as an attractive centre for newly established Eastern European countries. Finally, Russia emerged as a major successor state having all Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction.

As previously stated, after the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1990, the Russian Federation emerged as the strongest successor. It suffered much from the Soviet Union's economic collapse and fragmentation until the mid-2000s. After becoming president, Putin changed Russia's fate with the increase in energy prices, notably for oil. Russia re-emerged as a major power and started to pose a threat to Western interests by occupying some part of Georgia in 2008, cutting natural gas pipelines to Europe, starting the Ukraine crisis in the middle of winter of 2007, occupying Eastern Ukraine and annexing the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. Since 2008, Russia has also threatened NATO's enlargement policy, which includes Georgia and Ukraine. Additionally, Russians' cyber-attacks on American presidential elections in 2016 and 2020 are other hostile acts against NATO members. Because of these negative developments, Western Countries have regarded the resurgence of Russia as a new threat to their common security, and NATO reshaped itself to compete with new Russian threats. NATO reorganized its force and command structures, repositioned its forces at the Eastern borders, and shifted priority to conventional warfare readiness. Overall, allied members have regarded the continuation of NATO as beneficial and viewed it as serving their interests in the chaotic international structure as neo-realist theory asserted.

The constructivist theory views IOs as founders of principles, norms, rules, and principles.⁵² In this perspective, constructive scholars attempt to articulate NATO enlargement and the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) through constructive theory. Because NATO membership requires a country to have a rule of law, liberal values and democratic principles before becoming a member. The PfP initiative prepares any candidate for potential NATO membership in a variety of ways.⁵³ In this perspective, NATO identities, norms and principles, and rules are

⁵¹ Andrew Cottey, *NATO: Globalization or Redundancy?*, p. 393.

⁵² Michael Davies, Richard Woodward, *International Organizations*, p. 30.

⁵³ Trine Flockhart, *Understanding NATO through constructivist theorizing*, in Mark Webber,

structured according to members' interpretations of perceived threats and risks as well as their liberal word order understanding. On the other hand, in the 1990s, when geopolitical thinking and the enemy concept nearly disappeared and all countries were potential members since they were no longer adversaries, NATO transformed itself into a unique embodiment of cultural and civilizational phenomena in terms of security. Their social structures, institutions, and culture made them different from each other.⁵⁴ NATO has assimilated most of them to maintain peace in Europe. Overall, the PfP initiative and the enlargement policy have led NATO to maintain a secure environment in Eastern Europe. According to constructive theory, without an enlargement policy, Eastern Europe could be destabilized and pose a serious threat to the alliance.

On the other hand, liberal ideology, which emphasizes intergovernmental and transnational institutions, collaboration, and shared advantages, can also explain the progress of NATO after the 1990s.⁵⁵ The liberal theory also asserts that an alliance based on common values can continue to exist stably in the absence of a common threat. This shows that NATO is likely to last despite a common threat as there was after the 1990s because of its foundation on common values and principles. Liberals also view IOs as tools for maintaining peace and security through forming and implementing rules in the international system through liberal institutionalism. In this context, institutionalism has been a response to the changing post-Cold War European security paradigm and the security interests of allied members.⁵⁶ After the 1990s, NATO's longevity was aided by the liberal institutionalism manifested in the outnumbered peacekeeping operations. Because peacekeeping has given the alliance worldwide credibility as representing the United Nations, it has been a source of the alliance's ability to reinvent itself and maintain its relevance.

Adrian Hyde-Price (Eds.), *Theorising NATO. New perspectives on the Atlantic alliance*, London, Routledge, 2015, p. 141-142.

⁵⁴ Pedro Lopes de Castro Barbosa, *NATO Enlargement, Identity and Divergent Security Perspectives: a constructivist Approach*, November 20, 2020, <https://www.internationalaffairshouse.org/nato-enlargement-identity-and-divergent-security-perspectives-a-constructivist-approach/> (Accessed on 14.08.2021); Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy is What the States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics*, in "International Organization", Vol. 46, 1992, No. 2, pp. 391-425.

⁵⁵ Barry Buzan, *The English School...*, p. 128.

⁵⁶ Frank Schimmelfennig, *NATO and institutional theories of international relations*, in Webber Mark, Hyde-Price Adrian (Eds.), *Theorising NATO. New perspectives on the Atlantic alliance*, London, Routledge, 2015, p. 93-94.

CURRENT CHALLENGES FROM 2016 TO TODAY

Currently, NATO faces major security concerns, a changing global world order, and internal difficulties. These include Brexit, the militarization of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), decoupling of transatlantic relations, weakened values of the liberal order, and finally Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022.

The UK's position in the EU security structure remains unclear since Brexit. Certainly, the EU will lose one of its main contributors to security and defence capabilities in terms of budget, military, nuclear capacity, and technological innovation. However, rather than this impact, the issue here is how Brexit would influence NATO-EU cooperation. The UK has been the main country to achieve a balance in NATO-EU cooperation, particularly in security and defence issues. Despite helping to facilitate the formation of the CSDP as an EU member,⁵⁷ the UK disagreed with making it a counterpart of NATO and de-emphasizing NATO's role in Europe. Because it thought such policies would duplicate efforts, the UK objected to further enlargement of the CSDP's military capacity. Besides, the UK was always unenthusiastic about further militarization of the EU if it weakens NATO's key role.⁵⁸ Likewise, the UK mostly blocked the deployment of CSDP missions and operations, vetoed a permanent headquarters, and opposed an increase in the European Defence Agency (EDA)'s budget and common funding of the Athena mechanism.⁵⁹

In contrast, Germany and France have historically been against the US presence in Europe and its leading role in European security and defence issues. Therefore, they have endeavoured to advance the CSDP. When it was an EU member, the UK resisted their efforts. Following Brexit, however, Germany and France can achieve their aspiration to establish a security organization under

⁵⁷ Sarah Lain, Veerle Nouwens, *The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and Security*, RUSI Occasional Paper, London, April 2017, updated August 2017, p. VII-VIII.

⁵⁸ Michał Oleksiejuk, *The Impacts of Brexit on the Security and the Defence Industry in the European Union and the United Kingdom*, Warsaw Institute, Special Report, 20.04.2020, <https://warsawinstitute.org/impacts-brexit-security-defence-industry-european-union-united-kingdom/> (Accessed 15.04.2021).

⁵⁹ Ana Isabel Xavier, *The Impact of Brexit on Security and Defence Multilateralism: More Cooperation or Overlapping Interests?*, in "Marmara Journal of European Studies", Vol. 26, 2018, No. 1, p. 106.

their full control as there is no longer a strong voice opposing them,⁶⁰ although some other EU nations also object to further developing a military structure within the EU. Nevertheless, German-French cooperation can further enhance permanent structured cooperation (PSCO) in defence and Europe's defence industries.⁶¹ They can also expand PSC to CSDP,⁶² which the UK generally opposed.

The militarization of the CSDP, which means structuring and implementing a permanent military headquarters, can decrease the EU's reliance on the NATO-EU cooperation mechanism established through Berlin Plus in 2003 and the Warsaw Declaration in 2016, which enables EU access to NATO capabilities. The Berlin Plus agreement created a planning and conduct cell for CSDP operations within SHAPE and established NATO liaison officers in the Joint Staff of the EU in Brussels.⁶³ However, further militarization of the CSDP will eventually lead to a severe split and controversy between NATO and the EU. It will also be a challenge for non-EU NATO members like Turkey and Norway.

NATO has experienced significant challenges and crises in the last years including several disagreements over perceived common threats and interests, transatlantic decoupling, the disinterest of some allied members in NATO, the militarization efforts of the CDSP, and, finally, the loss of some liberal and democratic values in certain allied countries. Besides, America's strategic priorities have shifted from Europe to East and Pacific Asia since China emerged as a new rival hegemon and began to challenge the US. According to neo-realism, these developments might lead to a loss of confidence in NATO. This, however, did not occur. Despite facing many crises and challenges, NATO has been a successful security organization for more than 70 years preserving security and peace in the transatlantic region, as liberal, liberal institutionalism and complex dependency asserted that successful organizations are unlikely to dissolve.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Nicole Koenig, Marie Walter-Franke, *France and Germany: Spearheading a European Security and Defense Union?*, Jaques Delors Institute – Berlin, Policy Paper No. 202, Berlin, 2017, p. 1.

⁶² Ana Isabel Xavier, *The Impact of Brexit ...*, p. 110.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁶⁴ Gunther Hellmann, Reinhard Wolf, *Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO*, in "Security Studies", Vol. 3, 1993, No. 1, p. 26-27; Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 26-27.

THE CHALLENGES OF NATO DECLINE

NATO has faced various challenges, which it has mainly overcome. Until now, the challenges due to internal dynamics have had little effect on NATO's organizational capacity and cohesion. However, in the last few years, there has been discussion about NATO's decline and decreased future role, mostly resulting from a lack of internal cohesion. As mentioned earlier, this discussion was particularly generated after US President Trump defined NATO as "obsolete" and French President Macron declared NATO to be suffering from "brain death".

As discussed earlier, a major recent challenge for NATO has been the weakening transatlantic link. The Trump administration accused rich European members of not allocating enough funds to develop NATO's military capabilities and leaving the entire burden on the US shoulders. This was the first time an American president had openly accused European members of not sharing the burden while calling the EU an economic rival. Transatlantic decoupling is not a new issue since it began earlier after the USSR collapsed. However, it did not lead to serious problems in NATO until 2015, following American complaints that Germany was not bearing its fair share of military spending and was establishing close relations with Russia and China for energy and technology, respectively.⁶⁵

Some scholars argue that NATO has also experienced institutional decline and reduced relevance for its members for various reasons, such as the transatlantic decoupling on security issues, the quest of European members to lead in dealing with their security issues, and the transformation of NATO into the preferred choice for regional and global security governance due to multiple security providers. They assert that institutional decline is motivated by three major factors: the loss of legitimacy, utility, and cohesiveness.⁶⁶ However, although NATO has become less cohesive in its policies and its utility in some cases, it is too early to claim that NATO lost its legitimacy.

Another dynamic that has played a role in NATO's decline is President

⁶⁵ Loren Thompson, *Germany's Policy Choices are Hastening, The Decline of NATO*, March 4, 2019, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2019/03/04/germanys-policy-choices-are-hastening-the-decline-of-nato/?sh=5b403f91bba3> (Accessed on 02.08.2021).

⁶⁶ Rafael Biermann, *NATO's institutional decline in post-Cold War security governance*, in Charlotte Wagnsson, James Sperling, Jan Hallenberg (Eds.), *European Security Governance. The European Union in a Westphalian World*, Abingdon, Routledge, 2009, p. 44.

Trump's troubling anti-NATO and anti-European bias, which made him a challenge for NATO and its survival. Because Trump viewed the EU as an economic rival and NATO as obsolete, European nations questioned the US credibility as leader of the West for the first time since the Second World War.⁶⁷ This was also the most serious transatlantic decoupling since NATO's foundation, which accelerated Germany and France's decision to militarize the CSDF. As mentioned earlier, because of Brexit, Germany and France were free to formulate their desired European security structure. Therefore, Macron defined NATO as brain dead as he wanted to advance the CSDP as a security organization. After Trump's defeat in the 2020 election, NATO's survival is more assured because the Biden administration has declared its commitment to NATO and promised to advance its role in the international arena. Biden's first visit to NATO HQ in Brussel after the invasion of Ukraine is a symbol of how important NATO has become.

Another factor contributing to NATO's decline is the failure of liberal democracy within NATO itself. NATO is a typical alliance, which has not only deterred and defended against external threats but has also advanced liberal democratic governance.⁶⁸ Thus, Eastern European nations wanted to become NATO members not just for their security but also to sustain their democratic regimes. However, over the last decade or more, populist and anti-democratic regimes have been spreading globally. Interestingly, several NATO members are increasingly autocratic regimes that are undermining liberal democracy's institutions and practices.⁶⁹ In short, the challenges facing NATO are not just exogenous but also internal due to populist political approaches.

The other main challenge since 1990 has been burden sharing because the alliance has not faced any tangible hostility, so member nations are reluctant to allocate additional resources for defence spending. However, as the USA regularly points out, member nations are supposed to increase military spending up to 2% of GDP in line with the Wales Summit declaration in 2014, which explains Trump's annoyance with European members. In addition, since the development of European defence capabilities of the EU is considered a key tool in making the Euro-

⁶⁷ Douglas Lute, Nicholas Burns, *NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis*, Report, February 2019, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2019, p. 2.

⁶⁸ Celeste A. Wallander, *How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance*, in "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 97, 2018, No. 4, p. 70–71.

⁶⁹ Douglas Lute, Nicholas Burns, *NATO at Seventy...*, p. 4–5.

Atlantic area safer and contributing to transatlantic burden-sharing, unnecessary duplication must be avoided.⁷⁰

NATO's decision-making system also threatens its resiliency and effectiveness, as critical decisions require the consent of allies. Given the growing number of members, some suggest empowering the Secretary-General (SG) regarding administrative and resource issues.⁷¹ However, while the SG's role could be increased for routine administrative tasks, other duties, such as operational power and decision-making in crisis scenarios, must be negotiated among members. Otherwise, having been excluded from decision-making, they will hesitate to participate in NATO operations.

NATO is also under pressure from the changing international order. The economic rise of Asian countries is decreasing American dominance.⁷² The distribution of global economic and military power has changed significantly since the mid-1990s, with the US and its wealthy allies' shares of global GDP and military power eroding substantially in the past two decades.⁷³ In particular, China's GDP is expected to surpass the USA's in the coming decade. As China rises and invests its economic wealth into the military, the US will shift its focus from Europe to Asia. Indeed, it has already shifted many resources to Asia to secure its national interests. Consequently, NATO and Europe will become less relevant and attract fewer resources from the US. This can be a challenging issue for NATO.

The diverse characteristics of these threats will threaten NATO's coherence. Some countries think Russia is a threat while others consider instability in the Middle East and North Africa as the major security concern. Thus, NATO needs to make its members' security interests converge.⁷⁴ Finally, another issue is NATO's attitude toward core values. As expressed in the NATO Summit declaration in June 2021 the allied members reiterate their commitment to territorial security, freedom, and shared values including individual liberty, human rights, democracy,

⁷⁰ NATO, *Relations with the European Union*, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm

⁷¹ Douglas Lute, Nicholas Burns, *NATO at Seventy...*, p. 5.

⁷² Dick Zandee, *The Future of NATO. Fog over the Atlantic?*, in "Strategic Monitor 2018-2019", <https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2018/strategic-monitor-2018-2019/the-future-of-nato/> (Accessed on 20.06.2021).

⁷³ Hal Brands, *Dealing with Allies in Decline. Alliance Management and U.S. Strategy in an Era of Global Power Shifts*, Washington, DC, The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017, p. I.

⁷⁴ Dick Zandee, *The Future of NATO*.

and the rule of law.⁷⁵ However, there are growing concerns about the tendency of some members to move away from those values.

However, two major facts appear to be putting an end to the discussion of NATO's internal incoherence: Biden's presidency in America in January 2021 and Russia's attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Biden, as the new president, has seen NATO as a critical link between the Euro-Atlantic area and he wanted to restore NATO's role in maintaining peace and security in Europe. He seems to be almost successful in his attempts to put a stop to the "suffering brain death" debate.

The Russian war on Ukraine, on the other hand, reshapes NATO's role and importance in European security in the eyes of all NATO members. This attack ended the established world order after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1990. It is undeniable that without NATO protection, no country in Europe can be safe and secure, since Putin wants to establish a "new Soviet-style empire. This has reaffirmed the vital role of NATO in maintaining peace and security in Europe.⁷⁶ Viewing Russia as a threat, the historically neutral countries, Sweden and Finland, applied for NATO membership because they perceived Russia as a new big threat to their survival. Moreover, NATO, under the US-led, reshapes itself in response to the new Russian threat through strategic conceptual evolution, enlargement policy, adapting new force structure and command and control system. On the other hand, this war has an enormous implication for the elimination of some of NATO's challenges or crises that it experienced in the last decade. For example, as a resurgent Russia becomes a very visible and impending threat with a big nuclear threat, NATO transatlantic decoupling, decreasing enthusiasm in the alliance, and declining liberal political principles are marginalized or ignored.

However, this war has also pointed out the historical challenges that NATO has had. For example, while Russia's minor bordering nations have wished for NATO assistance in an ongoing conflict, many major members have been hesitant to join in battle since Russia possesses a huge nuclear arsenal. Likewise, there is no full consensus among members on implementing economic, political, cultural and military sanctions on Russia. In addition, Turkey has long opposed NATO's expansion to include Sweden and Finland claiming that they protect terrorists who escaped from Turkey. These show that NATO's unity and

⁷⁵ *Brussels Summit Communiqué*, 14 June 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm (Accessed on 04.08.2021).

⁷⁶ For Russia-Ukraine war, see Sertif Demir, *The 2022 Russia-Ukraine War: Reasons and Impacts*, in "Bölgesel Araştırmalar Dergisi", Vol 6, 2022, No. 1, pp. 13-40.

cohesion have yet to be attained. However, the Russian war on Ukraine has caused some of them to be postponed or de-emphasized, even though NATO still faces several difficulties and crises.

CONCLUSIONS

NATO provides a political-military framework for managing security challenges, that links European and North American interests, and aims to ensure security based on understanding and cooperation for the benefit of future generations. NATO has undergone several important transformations to meet different challenges and is now evolving to meet future challenges. NATO's history is full of crises and controversies. Its foundation was based on realist theory, which at that time provided the prevailing explanation for international politics. Later, its organizational structure evolved along neo-realist principles.

NATO has acted wisely to overcome these challenges, which might otherwise have destroyed NATO's coherence and effectiveness. During the Cold War, NATO coherence and member commitment were unquestioned since the threat was enormous and imminent. Although NATO faced various serious problems and challenges, its member states maintained their commitment to the pact and never lost their faith in NATO.

However, recent challenges have been more serious and could destroy NATO if it fails to maintain its coherence. The NATO's lack of coherence, burden-sharing issues, certain members' declining interest in the alliance and transatlantic decoupling⁷⁷ appear to be key challenges to overcome. Besides, the decreasing influence of liberal political values and order has also affected some NATO members, while the economic and military rise of China and other Asian countries will deflect the US's attention away from Europe toward Asia. All these developments indicate that NATO is approaching a trial phase.

NATO is a unique international organization based on voluntary membership that has provided security to its members through a consensual decision-making system. These are essential and non-negotiable features of NATO, and the diversion of US capabilities towards Asia means that the US will expect Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own security. Increased transatlantic de-

⁷⁷ Frederick Kempe, *The perils of transatlantic decoupling and how to stop it*, 14 June 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/the-perils-of-transatlantic-decoupling-and-how-to-stop-it/> (Accessed on 10.02.2022).

coupling may weaken the interest of powerful European countries in NATO, ultimately leading to NATO's demise. Therefore, as NATO's main founder, the US must be very cautious while adapting to the changing global word order. Otherwise, NATO's stance in Europe will become unclear, given France and Germany's eagerness to establish a militarized CSDP.

Indeed, certain unanticipated developments in the last two years have altered the evolution of NATO challenges. They are Biden's presidency in America in 2021 and Russia's attack on Ukraine. Biden has restored the transatlantic bond and unified all members under the NATO umbrella. For example, the declaration of NATO summits held in June 2021 in Brussel reiterated allied members' commitment to NATO's founding Washington Treaty and their eagerness to sustain transatlantic relations. This clearly emphasized the head of member states' will to maintain the coherence and unity of the organization in the future. Furthermore, NATO has united against the illegitimate and unjust Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022. It is an undeniable fact that NATO still has various challenges and crises to overcome, but the Russian attack on Ukraine has caused some of them to be postponed or de-emphasized because of the resurgent Russian threat to NATO, as openly published in the new strategic concept approved at the NATO Summit held in Madrid in June 2022.

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**THE EPIC ANATOMY OF THE BODY.
NEW HISTORICAL-HUMANISTIC APPROACHES
TO THE MEDICAL IMAGE***

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Abstract: *In current historiography, the interdisciplinary study of history, visual arts, and medicine is no longer a novelty. The last decades have brought challenging works to the attention of researchers, highlighting, in particular, affinities between the three fields. Offering a different dimension to medical problems and overcoming chronological, geographical and disciplinary limitations, such books and studies broaden the horizon of knowledge, revealing the effects of medicine on society from multiple perspectives: cultural, political, economic, religious and intellectual. As the innovation in medicine is increasingly accelerated, and the results of scientific research in the field of biomedicine are challenging (often generating ethical debates and moral dilemmas), works like Anatomy of the Medical Image: Knowledge Production and Transfiguration from the Renaissance to Today offers the opportunity to assess the changing role of medical practices over “longue durée” of history. They contribute to a better understanding of the past and a more profound and fuller interrogation of the present. The thirteen contributions in the volume edited by Brill under the auspices of the Clio Medica series show how the historical approach, the visual material and the medical subject can work together.*

Keywords: *Body, Visual Representation, Debate, Interdisciplinarity, Book review.*

Rezumat: *Anatomia epică a corpului. Noua abordare istorico-umanistă asupra imaginii medicală. În istoriografia actuală, studiul interdisciplinar al istoriei, artelor vizuale și medicinei nu mai reprezintă o noutate. Ultimele decenii au adus în atenția cercetătorilor*

* Review on Axel Fliethmann, Christiane Weller (Eds.), *Anatomy of the Medical Image. Knowledge Production and Transfiguration from the Renaissance to Today*, Leiden – Boston, Koninklijke Brill, 2021, XV + 311 p.

lucrări provocatoare, subliniind, în special, afinitățile dintre cele trei domenii. Oferind o dimensiune diferită problematicii medicale și totodată depășind limitările cronologice, geografice și disciplinare, astfel de cărți și studii largesc orizontul cunoașterii, dezvăluind efectele medicinei asupra societății, din perspectivă multiplă: culturală, politică, economică, religioasă și intelectuală. Cum inovația în medicină este tot mai accelerată, iar rezultatele cercetării științifice în domeniul biomedicinii din ce în ce mai provocatoare (generând adesea dezbateri etice și dileme morale), lucrări precum *Anatomia imaginii medicale: producerea și transformarea cunoștințelor din timpul Renașterii și până în prezent (Anatomy of the Medical Image: Knowledge Production and Transfiguration from the Renaissance to Today)* oferă oportunitatea de a evalua rolul în schimbare a practicii medicale în „durata lungă a istoriei”. Ele contribuie la o mai bună înțelegere a trecutului și la o interogare mai profundă și mai deplină a prezentului. Cele treisprezece contribuții reunite în volumul editat de Brill sub auspiciile seriei *Clio Medica* prezintă modul în care pot fi puse la lucru, împreună, abordarea istorică, materialul vizual și subiectul medical.

* * *

From the first reading, the title of the book, edited by Axel Fliethmann and Christiane Weller, may arouse the interest of researchers who deal with the study of the visual, mentalities and the history of medicine. I believe the first keyword in the title – Anatomy – is not accidental, meaning, for some scholars, the pillar of teaching medicine. For others (more concerned with the humanistic side), it symbolises a way to connect the inert body with the living individuals, society and, implicitly, a historical era. One of the most widespread opinions is that anatomy, as a science, emerged during the Renaissance (and, again, the mention in the title of the book is not accidental), striving to achieve its niche in the spectrum of emerging academic disciplines. Dissecting a body not only reduces it to its parts but offers the opportunity to enrich knowledge through discovery. However, the body is a composition of muscles, bones, and blood vessels. It is also an abstraction, a historical, technological or political construct, loaded with meaning depending on the historical era, mentality or visual culture. Moreover, the second keyword in the title is *Image* or how people perceive, see or imagine, generating ideas, alternatives or oppositions.

An *Anatomy of the Medical Image* is undoubtedly a challenging title, especially since it announces a subject treated from the perspective of the production and transfiguration of knowledge over several centuries. So was Antony Kenny's 1973 work, *The Anatomy of the Soul. Historical Essays in the Philosophy of Mind*. The book is built on similar principles to other studies that address the theme of imagining and visualising the human body (Barbara Maria

Stafford, *Body Criticism. Imaging the Unseen in Enlightenment Art and Medicine*, MIT Press, 1991; K. B. Roberts and J. D. W. Tomlinson, *The Fabric of the Body. European Tradition of Anatomical Illustration*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992; Robert P. Zwijnenberg, Renée Van de Vall, *The Body Within. Art, Medicine and Visualization*, Brill, 2009), attempting to demonstrate how the history of medicine and mentalities merges with cultural studies, anthropology meets religion, anatomy interferes with plastic techniques, philosophy with body aesthetics, and the doctrines of social medicine with political ones. In other words, it has evident academic character, although it seems intended to satisfy the curiosities and tastes of a varied audience.

Taking into account the theme and chronology, the editors structured the volume into three parts for which they found exciting subtitles. A very elaborate Introduction highlights the course of research from the last 30 years on visual paradigms in a cultural context and the role of epistemic images in the complex and complicated process of knowledge. In the field of medicine, images were, for a long time, seen only as illustrations necessary to explain the scientific text, which was not a bad thing. However, the examination of images as a basis for the production of knowledge did not have a considerable role, even if the historians proposed a broader understanding of visual formats, overcoming the traditional interpretations specific to the canons of fine art. Later, the diversified analysis of visual paradigms proved utility in medical historiography. A different look at the body by associating medical information with the historical-cultural and technological context offers unsuspected surprises at the discursive, anatomical, pathological, gender and imaginary levels.

"Epistemology of anatomy and aesthetics" or the first part of the volume, contributes to the knowledge of the anatomical dimension of the body as a subject of dialogue between two competing forces, namely artistic creation and philosophical introspection. Although Rembrandt's "Anatomy Lessons" have been debated by William S. Hecksher (1958); Josua Bruyn et al. (1982-1989); Baige Elise Smith (2010), Jill Redner reconsiders the representation of the body-mind dualism/soul, insisting on the dialogue between science (medicine) and religion in the artistic depiction of two states of fact: life (those who examine the corpse) and death (the deceased). In both of these, the paradoxical human dimension appears as a divine creation and medical body (p. 47). The changes in the artistic style, the working technique and the intellectual perception of life and death are elements identified by the authors as being decisive in the two-dimensional evaluation (artistic and ideological) of the creation of the famous Dutch painter. Axel Fliethmann proposes an equally interesting material, revealing what happens when the visual

culture meets the medical discourse. The illustration of pathologies implied a visual medical paradigm that breaks the Renaissance man from religious, philosophical or social limitations and stigmas, exposing him as a truthful, realistic construction. In the same key of the historical influences that allow or impose the change, we can read the contribution of Elizabeth Stephens, who brings to light the personality of Anna Morandi Manzolini, “a lady anatomist”, as she was called by Rebecca Messbarger (p. 81), a specialist in moulds medical and one of the provocative female characters in eighteenth-century Europe. According to the author’s opinion, anatomical modelling is the result of the convergence between science and art, contributing to the progress of medical research. The last of the materials that interrogate anatomy epistemically and aesthetically is Heikki Lempa’s study which analyses the anatomy of sculpture and the modelling of the male body through physical exercises. It is a fascinating retrospective on one of the cultural stereotypes from the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that had made Johann Heinrich Lips illustrate the boys in the book of Johann Christoph Friedrich GutsMuths as cheerful and dynamic, in permanent movement, similar to characters from Greek antiquity, but with features specific to the Germanic imaginary. Lempa’s research also highlights the dialectic of masculinity in the early 1800s, when it was understood as a “moral beauty of the body” (p. 110) or a combination of sensitivity and robustness. Moreover, the research findings lead to the idea that there is no singular image of the German man and his body but rather a contested field of competing stereotypes, which shaped what can be called the “classic German male body” (p. 111).

While the first part focuses on the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries, presenting the interference of anatomy with the artistic and aesthetic imagination, the second section of the volume - “Identity and Visual (De)Formation” – explores the relationship between body image and identity in the nineteenth century as the dimension of metaphysical or religious beliefs is overcome by the emotional or psychological. A modern, dispassionate, scientific approach to the human body made it easier to discover the inside and outside of the body, the influence of race or mentalities also facilitating its identification and framing in a particular cultural context. In the study signed by Corinna Wagner, the knowledge of the outer body, through what defines it or is observable/ intuited, leads to the penetration into the secrets of the inner body, unseen/intuited. The connection of the material body with the emotional one can be easily observed in the “expressiveness” of the face (p. 116) or the mimicry of individuals. A historical and anthropological perspective brings Duchenne, Darwin, Bramwell and Parker into the discussion. It is also a provocative invitation to notice the ability of nineteenth-century photog-

raphy to expose facial complexity. The contribution signed by Joanna Madloch underlines the relationship between medicine and image technology in the same nineteenth century, more precisely, the “occupational portrait” (p. 141) that appeared as a response to the increasing specialisation of professions. The photographs were taken between 1840 and 1900, usually in specialised studios, showing doctors accompanied by books and charts, but also by skulls or other parts of the skeleton, as a metaphor for the daring attempt to face death. In addition, the author refers to the photographic image of the dissections that illustrated the courses of the 1880s and 1920s. In essence, it emphasises the profession’s role in a social and cultural context, especially concerning the attitude towards human remains. Carolyn Lau proposes another dimension of the medical portrait (this time painted). She presents the creation of an artist known as Lam Qua, one of the most successful Cantonese painters working in the Western style. Making portraits of notorious patients of the American missionary doctor Peter Parker, he visualised the human body in its most curious details, forcing the viewer to confront the morphological tension generated by the pathological, which surprises and disturbs balance, tact, and science. The unusual combination of morality and strangeness could be a typical rhetorical strategy for so-called curiosity management, the paintings sparking interest from a medical, cultural and historical perspective, but not from an aesthetic one. Diametrically opposite is the proposal of visual artist Stef Lenk, who demonstrates how imaginative thinking and drawing provide a unique language for borderline experiences. He extracts from the clinical content of the diseases the creative, atypical symbolism manifested even during crises of anxiety and depression. Visual exteriorisation thus becomes useful in communicating otherwise uncomfortable topics (mental illness), facilitating destigmatisation and a positive change.

The third group of studies is entitled “Power, Consumption and the Pathological Body” and analyses the perception of the deformed, sick, disabled or mutilated constitution from an angle other than medical and artistic. Malformations or deformities can be negotiated culturally and mentally, especially when the image becomes essential in domains such as political economy, sociology and race ideology. Starting from the historical critique of Foucault, Claudia Stein signs a material entitled “Capitalism without Desire”, which makes me think of Todd McGowan’s book, *Capitalism and Desire*, published in 2016. It is a thought-provoking investigation of the aspects that the author considers “fundamental” in the knowledge of human nature from the perspective of one of the most successful fields of contemporary economic thought and practice: behavioural economics. Considering the historical context of Germany at the beginning of the twentieth

century, she focuses on the “anthropological paradigm of hedonistic human nature” (p. 198), generated from the intersection of laboratory research with the momentum of industrialisation and the explosion of consumer culture. The result of such a combination outlined a distinct profile of the modern man, endowed with a native desire for consumption in its multiple forms. It is an original historical vision of the collaboration between life sciences, biomedicine, biotechnology and political economy that can form the basis of further studies applied to other geographical areas. Michael Hau’s chapter can be considered profitable from the historiographic point of view, even if the subject addressed is a particular one in the vast field of the history of medicine. Reappraising the “capillary microscopy” promoted by the doctor Walther Jaensch, the study shows how new therapies applied to people with “inhibited mental development” could transform them from potential threats to the welfare of the Weimar Republic into productive citizens. It is about a biopolitical strategy meant to increase genetic quality through eugenics, leading to public health and social welfare. There is then a thematic continuity concerning interwar Germany, although Birgit Lang’s contribution aims at another plane: that of the psychiatric discourse that produced an almost pathological fascination with sexually motivated crimes. The author dwells on the phenomenon of “Lustmord” (or sexually motivated crime, victims often being prostitutes) found in the works of male graphic artists and which called into question the role of aesthetics, drawing attention to the management of certain types of sexual, social and political anxieties. The careful contextualisation of the narrative and comparison of criminological photographs with artistic creations indicate a complex construction, exceeding the epistemological limits of criminology, forensic pathology, photography and visual arts. It is a discussion about the imaginative transposition of visceral violence. It is also a way to approach the dimensions of artistic ambivalence regarding the politics and socially engaged aesthetics in the Weimar Republic. Christiane Weller’s study raises a question related to the interest and rationale of art collections within psychiatric institutions: can these artistic creations be “read” and otherwise psychoanalytically, or do they have an aesthetic, sociological or even political dimension? Of course, the portrayal of mental anguish becomes interesting for a specific type of art consumer, “psychiatric” or psychotic works of art being classified according to some criteria, including the diagnosis or pathology of the artist-patient. Also, Weller emphasises a novel aspect, namely the dual character of these works of art. On the one hand, they reflect the clinical side that interests psychiatry as a discipline, functioning “as an archive” (p. 261) as both the narrative and the feelings evoked by it occupy a given space or epistemic context. On the other hand, the artistic creations in

question transcend scientific knowledge, diagnosis and psychiatric classification, undermining or deconstructing medical discourse in favour of the initial elements of self-expression without the need for language or logic. Barry Murnane's contribution is also about the questioning of reason, which investigates contemporary discourses regarding the conceptualisation of the Posthuman, the imagination of biotechnology and the importance of mass media. Building on the 2013 BBC series *In the Flesh*, "a post-zombie apocalypse drama" (p. 262) that presents the possibility of artificially regenerating the undead's ability to think and behave rationally, controlling their criminal urges, the author addresses the challenges of treatments regenerative, surgical and pharmaceutical and the ethics of the biomedical body in the contemporary context of the advance of media and imaging technologies. It is a daring look at the epistemological function of biomedicine which, in nowadays culture and implicitly in the production of visual media, enriches the last 21st-century imagery, dramatically changing the trajectory of knowledge and understanding of the human body.

The 13 chapters, the Introduction, a generous bibliography (in which the diversity of titles shows the seriousness of the investigation and its multidisciplinary or interdisciplinarity) together with two indexes of names and subjects, a list of illustrations and notes about the authors constitute the 104th volume of the *Clio Medica* series printed in 2021 under the auspices of the prestigious Brill publishing house.

Concluding on this book, it is undeniable that the contributors reveal an acute awareness of the ethical questions associated with the history, medicine, art, and biotechnology. They propose a different way of looking at the image (painting, graphic, photograph, film sequence) as a creator, not so much of new objects but, more tellingly, of new subjects. Without neglecting the conceptualisation that highlights the significance of ideas, language and documenting the body, the authors' approaches emphasise relationship, interaction and communication, the act and social, economic, political and cultural impact. Bringing together a unique blend of history, art, and science, *Anatomy of the Medical Image: Knowledge Production and Transfiguration from the Renaissance to Today* is an engaging, interesting, and inspiring read for historians, physicians, sociologists and artists alike. We look forward with interest and enthusiasm to see what new perspectives the interdisciplinary dialogue will unveil.

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